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Summaries 
Case studies, mainly in Zimbabwe but also in Zambia, investigated economic aspects of con-
trolling savanna species of the tsetse fly (Diptera: Glossinidae) which is the vector of bovine 
trypanosomiasis in southern Africa. Costs for the four major techniques for tsetse control, each 
of which has been used on a large scale in the recent past, were analysed on a comparative 
basis. The costs of using odour-baited insecticide treated targets compared well with tra-
ditional ground spraying using DOT, which is increasingly disfavoured on environmental 
grounds. The cheapest method of tsetse control is to treat cattle with appropriate insecticides. 
There are many situations where this is not feasible, for lack of cattle, but the approach is gen-
erally very promising and needs urgent technical development. Although aerial spraying is 
likely to be the preferred method for tsetse control in some specific situations, it is the most 
expensive of the four techniques which were evaluated. 
Case studies showed that the policy of the Government of Zimbabwe was justified in rely-
ing upon tsetse control rather than the use of trypanocides. However, the comparative advan-
tage is variable according to specific circumstances. A methodology for cost comparison has 
been developed and demonstrated, based upon simple economic models usable by planners 
without formal economics training. 
The emergence of bait techniques provides an opportunity for innovative strategies for 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis control in southern Africa, in which tsetse operations involve local 
communities and co-ordinate with rural development more closely than in the past. There is a 
key role for the economics profession in assisting to ensure that co-ordination is effective and 
appropriate. 
Des etudes de cas, effectuees principalement au Zimbabwe mais aussi en Zambie, ont etudie 
les aspects economiques de la lutte contre les especes de tse-tse des savanes (Dipteres: 
Glossinidae), vecteur de la trypanosomiase bovine en Afrique australe. Les coOts des quatre 
techniques principales dans la lutte antiglossinaire, qui ont toutes ete recemment utilisees sur 
une grande echelle, ant ete compares. Le coOt de !'utilisation de cibles traitees avec des insec-
ticides et des appats olfactifs etait comparable a celui de la pulverisation traditionnelle au sol 
avec du DOT, qui suscite de plus en plus de desapprobation pour des raisons ecologiques. La 
methode de lutte antiglossinaire la moins onereuse est le traitement des bovins avec des insec-
ticides appropries. Dans un grand nombre de situations, vu la penurie de bovins, il n'est pas 
possible d'utiliser cette methode, mais c'est une approche generalement tres prometteuse qui 
requiere des progres techniques de toute urgence. Bien que la pulverisation aerienne soit pro-
bablement la methode de lutte antiglossinaire preferee dans certaines situations specifiques, 
elle reste la technique la plus onereuse parmi les quatre evaluees. 
Les etudes de cas ant indique que la politique du Gouvernement du Zimbabwe, reposant 
sur la lutte antiglossinaire plutot que sur !'utilisation de trypanocides, etait justifiee. Toutefois, 
l'avantage comparatif varie selon les circonstances specifiques. Une methodologie permettant 
de comparer les coOts a ete mise au point et demontree. Elle est fondee sur des modeles econ-
omiques simples qui peuvent etre utilises par des planificateurs sans formation economique 
professionnelle. 
L'apparition de techniques d'appats fournit une occasion de deployer des strategies innova-
trices pour la lutte contre les glossines et la trypanosomiase en Afrique australe, dans les-
quelles les operations antiglossinaires impliquent la participation des communautes locales et 
une coordination avec le developpement rural plus etroite que dans le passe. Les economistes 
doivent jouer un role cle pour assurer que cette coordination soit efficace et appropriee. 
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Section 1 
The Main Issues 
Trypanosomiasis is a disease of man and his domestic livestock, caused by 
certain of the many species of parasitic protozoa of the genus Trypanosoma. 
One species (Trypanosoma bruce1) causes human sleeping sickness, while 
some species (e.g. T. congolense and T. vivax) are of economic importance 
in affecting cattle, as 'nagana'*. Other species of trypanosome particularly 
affect camels and pigs. Untreated animal or human trypanosomiasis will 
lead, at best, to chronic debilitation and, at worst, to death. 
Within sub-Saharan Africa, transmission of trypanosomiasis from one host 
to another is mediated almost exclusively by tsetse flies (Genus : Glossina), in 
the case of man and cattle. When a tsetse fly takes a blood meal from an 
infected host, the ingested trypanosomes undergo a cycle of development 
within the fly, which is then capable of infecting hosts upon which it sub-
sequently feeds. 
Tsetse flies occur only in Africa, in a belt across the continent below the 
Sahara stretching from Senegal in the west, to Somalia in the east, and as far 
south as the Republic of South Africa. There are twenty-three different 
species of tsetse fly, which fall into three distinct groups according to habitat 
- forest (the fusca group), riverine (the palpalis group) and savanna (the mor-
sitans group). The latter two groups are of greater economic importance as 
they are the main vectors of trypanosomiasis. 
Apart from the suffering caused by the disease, the direct economic conse-
quences of trypanosomiasis are increased morbidity and mortality in people 
and livestock. This leads to reduced productivity, and costs associated with 
the prevention or treatment of the disease with drugs. People suffering from 
sleeping sickness are not able to work effectively, while livestock suffering 
from nagana lose weight, do not have the strength required for draught work, 
have lower fertility, produce less milk and manure, and may die of the dis-
ease or from secondary infection. 
Trypanosomiasis also has a substantial indirect impact resulting from con-
straints upon land use in affected areas. Farmers generally avoid tsetse-
infested areas, preferring to live and keep their cattle in areas with least risk 
of trypanosomiasis. Where there is human population pressure, for example 
in Nigeria and Zimbabwe, tsetse-infested areas are increasingly needed for 
agricultural use. 
•A term now adopted into the English language (e.g. the Concise Oxford Dictionary), deriving from a Zulu 
word for animal trypanosomiasis Uordan, 1986: p. 29). 
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Over past decades, enormous resources have been allocated to control oper-
ations and to research into trypanosomiasis and its tsetse fly vector. However, 
progress against the disease has been limited. The area of Africa infested with 
the fly remains in the order of ten million square kilometres. 
Breeds of cattle which are tolerant to trypanosomiasis occur in some parts 
of Africa (Shaw and Hoste, 1987), but these animals are only a small propor-
tion of the total cattle at risk of the disease and disease tolerance is only lim-
ited. Trypanotolerant animals still suffer loss of productivity due to chronic 
trypanosome infection and can succumb to the disease under high challenge. 
Trypanotolerance is not a general solution to the problem of trypanosomiasis 
in Africa. 
Trypanosomiasis can be readily treated with curative drugs, in both 
humans and livestock. The disease can be also prevented by treatment of ani-
mals with prophylactic drugs, which are widely used throughout Africa. In 
the case of livestock, trypanocidal drugs can be very cost-effective and 
cheaper than the drugs used to control other major diseases. However, resist-
ance to the presently available drugs has become a severe problem in some 
countries. Given the small size of the market, there is poor prospect of new 
drugs being developed. In many African countries, Government veterinary 
services lack funds and the institutional capability required to implement 
large-scale drug programmes. 
Great efforts are being made to develop a vaccine against trypanosomiasis 
but prospects are poor because of the ability of the trypanosome to change 
the antigenic nature of its cell coat. Government programmes of vaccine 
administration face institutional problems similar to those of drug pro-
grammes mentioned above. 
An alternative approach to prevent spread and persistence of the disease 
is to control its fly vector. In the first decades of the century, this was 
attempted by vegetation clearance to remove habitat essential to tsetse. 
Subsequent methods involved shooting wild animals, which were the food 
source of the fly and reservoirs of disease, to establish game-free cordons 
around livestock production areas. This proved very effective, but game 
destruction has always been objectionable. The method was eventually aban-
doned when chemical control of the tsetse fly became possible. 
Insecticidal techniques for tsetse control first became feasible following 
the development of synthetic organochlorine insecticides such as DOT and 
dieldrin, some fifty years ago. The first large-scale tsetse control operations 
using organochlorine insecticides were undertaken in South Africa, during 
1945-51 (Du Toit, 1954), and involved aerial application of persistent depos-
its. 
In East Africa, this method was considered too expensive. Research turned 
towards other ways of using insecticides. Direct application to cattle or to 
stationary baits proved problematic (Vanderplank, 1947). Subsequent atten-
tion focused on application of the insecticide to natural vegetation. The tech-
nique which emerged became known as ground spraying, in which deposits 
of persistent insecticides, such as DOT or dieldrin, were sprayed on tsetse 
resting sites in selected areas of the fly's habitat, by ground-based teams. This 
technique was the mainstay of large-sca le programmes in numerous countries 
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in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, but is increasingly disfavoured for environ-
mental reasons. In the last 15 years, research has been conducted to develop 
ground spraying using insecticides other than DDT and dieldrin. 
The 1980s saw a revived interest in aerial spraying, using ultra-low-vol-
ume (ULV) application of non-persistent insecticides such as endosulfan, 
thanks to improvements in aircraft operation technology. Large-scale aerial 
spraying programmes have been conducted in Somalia, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana and Zambia in the last 15 years. 
The technical feasibility of the sterile insect technique (SIT) for tsetse con-
trol has been shown in pilot programmes in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and 
Tanzania, but the technique is at present very expensive and difficult. 
The main development of the last decade has concerned the practical 
application of 'bait technology' to tsetse control, in which tsetse flies are 
lured to a live or artificial host in order to kill or sterilize them. This is per-
haps the most promising technique currently being developed in terms of 
technical feasibility, environmental acceptability and economic viability over 
a wide part of tsetse-affected Africa. In West and Central Africa, French 
workers have developed simple cloth traps and insecticide-treated screens 
which attract and kill riverine species of tsetse fly as a means of control. In 
eastern and southern Africa, similar approaches have now proved feasible 
against savanna species of tsetse, following the identification of powerful 
odour attractants for the savanna species. 
The current choice of technique required evaluation for a number of reasons. 
• Most organizations which implement or fund tsetse control programmes 
are anxious to abandon the long-established techniques which involve 
widespread application of persistent insecticides to the environment. In 
particular, ground spraying of insecticides such as DDT and dieldrin is 
becoming unacceptable. 
• Countries which have traditionally relied on drugs to control trypanosomia-
sis are facing increasing problems of drug resistance. 
• National tsetse and trypanosomiasis control organizations in Africa need to 
make long-term decisions about what techniques they will use in the 
future, in order to build up the appropriate institutional capability. 
• Every year, such control organizations must decide where and when one 
technique will be used rather than another. International donors who sup-
port tsetse control projects also want to be sure that the appropriate control 
methods are used. 
• Funding for research and development into the different tsetse control tech-
niques should be in proportion to their prospect of widespread application. 
The choices are complex, since the comparative advantage of the different 
methods varies from one situation to another. In parts of West Africa, the 
problem is one of human trypanosomiasis transmitted by riverine species of 
tsetse fly. In parts of southern Africa, the problem is almost entirely one of 
animal trypanosomiasis transmitted by savanna tsetse species, whose ecology 
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and biology are quite different from their riverine relatives. Furthermore, 
geography, climate, land use, livestock species and breeds, population press-
ure and other factors vary greatly from one situation to another. Such differ-
ences influence the comparative advantage of various approaches. At the 
outset, as yet, no method of tsetse control is practicable and the best choice 
in all circumstances. 
Sections 2-1 0 first develop a methodology and then compare the econ-
omics of the main methods of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control which 
appear technically feasible, using case studies. The analysis aims to facilitate 
better planning and appraisal of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control pro-
grammes. This was particularly timely in view of the current activities of the 
EU-funded Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Programme (RTICP), 
involving development of techniques and a strategy for large-scale tsetse con-
trol operations throughout southern Africa. 
The discussion draws principally upon the findings of a four-year study in 
Zimbabwe, where many of the major developments in tsetse control tech-
nology have been pioneered or used in large-scale operations over the last 
15 years. Supplementary material is included from other countries, in particu-
lar Zambia. In this context, the study focuses on southern Africa and the con-
trol of animal trypanosomiasis transmitted by savanna species of tsetse. 
Having assessed the most cost-effective technique for tsetse and/or trypanoso-
miasis control, it remains to be demonstrated that intervention is justifiable. 
The benefits and the costs of control, including those arising outside the 
direct boundaries of the project, must be identified, quantified, valued and 
compared. 
Standard methodologies for benefit-cost analysis in developing countries 
have been described by Mishan (1971 ), ODA (1971), Gittinger (1972), Little 
and Mirrlees (1974) and others. Prices for inputs and outputs are adjusted to 
reflect true value to the economy, rather than prevailing domestic market 
prices, where these are distorted, for example by government subsidy, tax or 
other form of control. As costs and benefits are likely to arise for many years 
after the investment, future cash flows are projected. These are translated into 
equivalent current values by a discounting process in order to arrive at: the 
net present value (NPV) of the investment; or a benefit-cost ratio; or the inter-
nal rate of return which is a measure of the interest rate earned by investment 
in the project. These parameters can be used as criteria for deciding whether 
the investment is justified. 
Such techniques have been applied to tsetse control operations in various 
countries. The first major economic evaluation of trypanosomiasis control 
was undertaken in Uganda, in the late 1960s Oahnke, 1974 and 1976). 
Application of insecticides from the ground was shown to be cheaper and 
more effective than game elimination as a method for control of savanna 
tsetse. These were the only techniques then considered feasible in Uganda. 
Jahnke also undertook benefit-cost analysis of beef production (commercial 
versus pastoralist) under scenarios with and without tsetse control, in the lat-
ter case with prophylaxis and/or using trypanotolerant cattle. Wildlife utiliza-
tion was also evaluated as an alternative land use. Jahnke showed that the 
relative economics of the different approaches varied according to the 
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specific situation, particularly in relation to the agricultural potential of the 
infested area, and the degree of the trypanosomiasis problem. He concluded 
that the development of a tsetse and trypanosomiasis control strategy has to 
be integrated with land use planning. 
Cam us (1981 a) undertook a detailed study in the Cote d'lvoire, to measure 
the effect of trypanosomiasis on the productivity of four types of cattle. 
Camus (1981 b) then used a herd model to show that the economic losses 
due to the disease amounted to some 91 million FCFA (1979/80 prices) for a 
total population of about 334 000 cattle. However, he did not assess the ben-
efit-cost relationship of intervention. 
In Nigeria and Mali, Shaw (1987) and Putt et al. (1980) took Jahnke's 
work several stages further. Comparative cost analysis was mainly concerned 
with tsetse control by insecticidal ground spraying versus drug treatment of 
cattle. Shaw put effort into the identification and accurate assessment of all 
the direct and indirect effects of trypanosomiasis and its control. Perhaps her 
main contribution was the development and application of computer models 
for improved analysis of the projected benefits from tsetse and trypanosomia-
sis control. In particular, the models accommodated changes in herd growth 
and productivity, with and without veterinary intervention, and for different 
scenarios of human population density, which Shaw concluded was a crucial 
determinant of the viability of tsetse control. 
Habtemariam et al. (1983a,b) developed a linear programming model 
which they used for benefit-cost analysis of trypanosomiasis control in south-
western Ethiopia, comparing insecticidal ground spraying with game 
reduction. The model, featuring 127 equations and 81 activities, indicated an 
optimal solution involving reclamation of some 5200 sq km of land, where 
testse control would have positive net economic benefits. 
Brandl (1985, 1988a and 1988b) reported economic studies of trypanoso-
miasis control in Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. He compared the cost-
effectiveness of SIT (generally the most expensive method), aerial application 
of residual insecticides, and insecticide-impregnated traps (generally the 
cheapest method), used mainly in the control of riverine tsetse. His benefit-
cost analysis examined tsetse control in pastoralist areas, where projected 
livestock revenues were confined to herd growth, milk, slaughter offtake and 
live sales. The viability of tsetse control varied according to the scale of the 
operation, the degree of tsetse/trypanosomiasis challenge, and the project 
life. 
In Somalia, a large-scale tsetse eradication programme, funded by ODA, 
was conducted in the 1980s. This included attention to economic and land 
use issues, which revolved around the effects of pastoralist use of riverine 
grazing areas along tsetse-infested major rivers (Putt, 1983; Hendy, 1986 and 
1987; Hendy and Daniels, 1987). 
The economics of trypanosomiasis control using trypanotolerant cattle and 
chemotherapy was investigated under the auspices of the African 
Trypanotolerant Livestock Network, in Ethiopia, Kenya, The Gambia, Cote 
d'lvoire, Zaire and Togo (ltty et al., 1988; ltty, 1992). A dynamic herd model 
was used to simulate projections for herd growth, meat and milk production 
and economic performance, from base values collected for herd structure 
and productivity. lt was shown that trypanotolerant cattle are suited for situa-
tions with low to medium trypanosome prevalence, but that import of trypa-
notolerant stock is not necessarily profitable. Tsetse control appeared 
appropriate in situations with higher disease risk. 
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In addition to these major studies, more limited economic studies have 
been reported from Botswana (Putt, 1985), Kenya (Wilson et al., 1981 and 
1986), Tanzania (Matteucci, 1971 ), Zambia (Leslie, 1987; Putt et al., 1988) 
and Zimbabwe (Falkenhorst, 1983). Other reports and papers relevant to 
economic assessment of trypanosomiasis control include those by Aldhelm 
(1980), FAO (1977a), Finelle (1974 and 1987), Griffin and Allonby (1979), 
Jordan (1961 ), Jordan et al. (1978), Negrin and Mclennan (1977), Shaw 
(1989) and Toure (1981 a). 
The methodological issues in benefit-cost analysis of tsetse and trypanoso-
miasis control are similar in many respects to those arising for other animal 
health interventions, where modelling approaches have developed consider-
ably in the last decade (e.g. James, 1984). Accordingly, this study does not 
involve any general development of the basic methodology for benefit-cost 
analysis of animal health interventions. 
Little attention has been given to important social issues arising in tsetse 
control programmes (Salmon and Barrett, 1994). Some of these issues have 
been explored in Zimbabwe (Salmon, 1992) but are not dealt with in this 
study. 
Section 8 demonstrates that bait techniques are emerging as cost-competitive 
with traditional methods of tsetse control. Bait techniques provide scope for 
new approaches to tsetse control, which are more flexible and more sensitive 
to land use intentions, but which at the same time are more complex to opti-
mize and appraise. 
Meanwhile, Barrett (1994 and 1997) argues that tsetse control organiz-
ations can, and should, take a realistic perspective on prospective land use 
change in tsetse areas. Such perspectives should lead to decisions, about 
where and when to intervene, which are far more considered than before the 
advent of bait technology. With aerial or ground spraying operations, it was 
not practicable to design control programmes to closely match the planning 
and implementation of rural development programmes. 
Section 11 proposes that recent and prospective developments in bait 
methods of tsetse control augur a new era, in which economic considerations 
should play an increasingly important role in the routine planning and 
appraisal of tsetse control operations. This has substantial institutional impli-
cations for African governments, most of whom have limited capability for 
economic analysis of tsetse and trypanosomiasis programmes. 
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Section 2 
Approach and Methodology of 
Cost Analysis 
Fifteen years ago, tsetse control organizations in southern Africa had limited 
choice of techniques for use in field operations. The few techniques which 
were reliable and effective at affordable cost had largely complementary 
roles. 
In Zimbabwe, the area at risk of tsetse invasion was perceived to be enor-
mous, and supported large cattle herds. In consequence, reliance upon 
trypanocidal drugs, without tsetse control, was never considered as an 
option. Aerial spraying, tried in the 1950s and 1970s, proved unsatisfactory 
under Zimbabwean conditions, using the available technology. After some 60 
years of investigation, the only practicable way to control trypanosomiasis 
was a combination of ground spraying and selective game elimination 
(Barrett, 1994; Chapter 2). 
Zambia relied mainly upon ground spraying in the past, although large-
scale aerial application of insecticides was used successfully between 1968 
and 1987. Aerial spraying was limited to flat terrain, infested only with G. 
morsitans, as the technique could not be used confidently in other areas. 
In Malawi, tsetse infestation is confined largely to the national parks and 
game reserves. Elsewhere, habitat capable of sustaining tsetse is very limited, 
because of the vegetation changes associated with high human population 
density. Trypanosomiasis is a minor problem at a national level, occurring 
only at the periphery of the wildlife protection areas, where it is managed 
using trypanocides. 
In Botswana, tsetse are confined to the Okavango delta and its 'pan-
handle'. Fly eradication by ground spraying was not feasible because of the 
difficulty of ground operations in the swamps. Accordingly, aerial spraying 
became the technique of choice. 
Thus, the choice of technique was usually straightforward. This situation 
has changed radically in the last ten years, for a combination of reasons: 
• ground spraying combined with game elimination came under increasing 
challenge from the environmental lobby; 
• host-free corridors between permanent cattle and game fences were practi-
cable in an essentially defensive strategy of preventing fly invasion, but less 
so for progressive reclamation of tsetse-infested land; 
• the military-like organization required for successful ground spraying has 
proved increasingly difficult to achieve; 
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• innovations in aerial spraying technology gave prospect of using this tech-
nique with acceptable environmental impact, and in difficult terrain where 
the method was previously not feasible; and 
• bait technology, involving the treatment of cattle with insecticides or the 
use of odour-baited insecticide-treated objects (so-called targets), has pro-
ven technically effective for both elimination of tsetse and as a technique 
for restricting fly invasion. 
By the mid-1980s, tsetse control organizations began to have real choices of 
techniques to use in different circumstances. Technical feasibility remains the 
primary consideration: not all of the current techniques can be considered in 
all situations. For example: 
• aerial spraying remains problematic in very rough terrain, even with heli-
copters; 
• treating cattle with insecticides to achieve tsetse control requires that cattle 
are present in sufficient number and appropriate distribution; 
• some species of tsetse are less susceptible to control by bait techniques; 
and 
• in some places, the target technique is unworkable because of abuse or 
theft of the targets and traps. 
Environmental and institutional considerations can also restrict choice. 
Ground operations involving the creation of extensive access routes may be 
disfavoured in wilderness or wildlife areas. The techniques used must be 
appropriate to the local institutional capability. Where large-scale operations 
are needed urgently, in a crisis, aerial spraying is advantageous as it can be 
undertaken by international contractors. It does not need the large, trained 
labour force and local organizational capacity required in ground spraying. 
Even with such considerations, several techniques (alone or in combina-
tion) may be feasible in any particular situation. In choosing between them, 
cost will be one of the primary considerations. 
Comparative cost analysis of the different methods of tsetse and trypanoso-
miasis control has two objectives: 
• the strategic objective is to inform African Governments and donor agen-
cies of the likely future role of newly emerging bait techniques; and 
• the tactical objective is to assist senior staff in tsetse control organizations 
to assess the most cost-effective approach in any particular situation, by 
providing a simple framework for comparative cost analysis. 
In both cases, the methodology needs to be flexible, allowing for the very 
heterogeneous and complex situations in which tsetse and/or trypanosomiasis 
control may be required. 
The primary choice is between tsetse control and the management of try-
panosomiasis using drugs. The secondary choice concerns which specific 
technique to use. 
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In comparing the different techniques, there is real prospect of technical 
improvement and economy in the design of bait techniques, which appear 
cost-competitive with the older techniques in a wide range of situations. 
Direct, indirect and overhead costs 
Tsetse or trypanosomiasis control can be evaluated in terms of direct, indirect 
and overhead costs. 
Direct costs (see Table 2.1) arise from the chemicals, manpower and equip-
ment employed in the primary field activity, in which flies are killed or ani-
mals are treated. Accordingly, such costs relate almost linearly to the size of 
an operation. 
Indirect costs (see Table 2.1) arise in secondary field activities. In general, 
these costs vary according to the scale of the operation, but not necessarily 
in a linear relationship. 
Overhead costs derive from apportionment to the field operations of the cen-
tral costs for running the tsetse control programme, and are largely fixed 
costs, such as: 
• professional management, and administration of operations by 
Headquarters staff 
• staff training 
• tsetse and trypanosomiasis surveys and 
• research. 
Table 2.1 Summary of major direct and indirect costs for different tech-
niques of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control 
Technique 
Ground spraying 
Aerial spraying 
Treating cattle with 
insecticides 
Targets 
Trypanocides 
Direct costs 
Insecticide 
MVE for field teams 
Insecticide 
Flying charges 
Insecticide 
Cattle dips 
MVE for field teams 
Insecticide 
Hardware/software 
MVE for field teams 
Drugs 
MVE for field teams 
Note MVE = manpower, vehicles and equipment. 
Indirect costs 
Camp and access provision 
Aerial spraying contractor's 
fixed charges 
Camp and access provision 
Droplet monitoring 
Routine disease surveys 
Camp and access provision 
Routine disease surveys 
In comparing the different techniques for tsetse control, it is essential to 
assess the combined direct and indirect costs of each method, but less 
important to consider overheads; as they are, in effect, fixed. However, over-
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heads are relevant in comparing a tsetse control strategy with the alternative 
of controlling the disease using trypanocidal drugs, as rather different insti-
tutional structures are required. 
Cost per unit of area treated versus area reclaimed 
For Zimbabwe, where most of the case study data originate, reports of the 
Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Branch (TICB) about ground and aerial 
spraying are often quite clear on the costs incurred and the precise area trea-
ted, which enables an accurate assessment of the cost per unit of area trea-
ted. However, this does not necessarily represent the area effectively 
reclaimed from tsetse infestation as success is often less than 100%. Flies sur-
vive in some areas, or quickly re-invade, such that operations in successive 
years need a substantial overlap. 
Ground and aeria l spraying incur precisely known costs over a very short 
period with uncertain results . By contrast, with insecticidal treatment of cat-
tle, or the use of targets, the area to be cleared of fly is specified . However, 
as the techniques are implemented over an unspecified time (i.e. until eradi-
cation is achieved), the eventual cost is initially uncertain. Because the 
modes of operation of bait technology and traditional insecticidal techniques 
are different, the nature of risk is fundamentally different. This requires care-
ful consideration in comparative cost analysis. 
Reclamation versus protection from reinvasion 
Cost analysis of tsetse control programmes must avoid confusion of (a) the 
costs of eliminating tsetse flies within an area (reclamation), with (b) those of 
preventing fly reinvasion after the operation (protection). 
In order to clarify the conceptual approach, assume that: 
• reclamation operations are always 1 00% successful (i.e. there are no sur-
viving pockets of infestation); and 
• it is possible to establish permanent, effective barriers to tsetse movement; 
• the costs of such barriers can be clearly distinguished from the costs of rec-
lamation. 
The total cost of any one reclamation operation occurs in a single year. 
Barriers incur recurrent costs which are likely to be lower than the initial cost 
of establishment. 
Where a barrier is already in place, normally it should be justified without 
prospect of on-going reclamation. The rationale is that if the barrier was 
removed, the area of tsetse infestation would expand, up to the natural limit 
of the fly distribution. The net present value (NPV) of future recurrent expen-
diture on maintaining the barrier should be less than the NPV of the com-
bined costs of drug treatment of trypanosomiasis and projected losses in 
cattle productivity in the area at risk. 
Thus, in principle, if reclamation takes place at a tsetse front where a bar-
rier is already in place, the barrier should not be considered in benefit-cost 
analysis of further reclamation, other than: 
• the cost of moving the barrier to a new position; and 
• changes in recurrent expenditure on the barrier associated with change in 
length or design as a result of the reclamation operation. 
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In some situations, recurrent costs might reduce substantially as a result of a 
control operation. In the extreme case, complete eradication of a fly belt or 
residual population ends further recurrent expenditure. This rationale might 
justify clearing the fly from some national parks and other cattle-free areas. 
Savings can also be significant in situations other than complete eradication. 
For example, Falkenhorst (1983) studied the economics of tsetse control in 
the Sebungwe '(western) region of Zimbabwe. He demonstrated that tsetse 
control was justifiable in terms of savings in recurrent costs of tsetse control, 
irrespective of savings in drug costs or improved productivity in the cleared 
areas. The eradication of fly from 13 755 sq km at a total cost of Z$1 0.64 
million (1983 prices) would reduce the length of the tsetse frontier from 232 
km to 55 km. The recurrent cost of 'holding operations' would reduce from 
Z$1.55 million per year to Z$0.37 million per year. Over 20 years, the finan-
cial rate of return was calculated at 18.3%. Taking into account projected 
benefits of increased agricultural production in the area to be cleared, 
Falkenhorst estimated the overall rate of return to be over 50%. 
However, the previous assumptions are not realistic, in that neither bar-
riers nor reclamation operations are permanently effective. Target barriers of 
the type used recently in Zimbabwe are not completely effective in prevent-
ing fly movement. Flies may pass the barrier and transmit trypanosomiasis to 
cattle in the cleared area, and in some situations may establish viable popu-
lations within the cleared area. Thus, there may be a minor recurrent expen-
diture on drugs to treat infected cattle near the perimeter of the cleared area, 
and occasional expenditure on ad hoc operations to deal with breaches in 
the barrier. The scale of the problem will depend on the fly invasion press-
ure. 
In comparative cost analysis of the different techniques of tsetse recla-
mation, it is unnecessary to consider the problem of protection from reinva-
sion. However, in comparing tsetse control with trypanosomiasis control 
using drugs, both reclamation and protection costs may require consider-
ation. 
In actual operations, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the costs of rec-
lamation from those of protection. Thus the economic appraisal of large-scale 
operations is complex, and may require evaluation of a long-term strategic 
plan rather than benefit-cost analysis of activities on a year-by-year basis. 
Benefit-cost analysis 
Trypanotolerance is not a recognized trait in the main cattle breeds of south-
ern Africa. Accordingly, cattle production in this region can be sustained only 
through tsetse control or use of trypanocides. Non-intervention is not a prac-
ticable option, unless cattle are to be effectively excluded from the land use 
system. To this extent, the economic benefits of tsetse control are, primarily, 
the savings in drug costs, although livestock productivity under the alterna-
tive regimes may need also to be taken into account. Thus, comparative cost 
analysis of the alternative strategies is, in effect, benefit-cost analysis. In prac-
tical terms, the impact of trypanosomiasis, without any form of intervention, 
does not have to be assessed. 
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Fundamental differences in cost structure 
The methodology for comparative analysis must take into account the very 
different cost structures of the alternative strategies. 
• The costs of tsetse control occur mainly in the initial eradication phase, 
with some recurrent expenditure on protection of the cleared area from fly 
reinvasion. 
• By contrast, the costs of managing trypanosomiasis using drugs, without 
tsetse control, are almost entirely recurrent costs. 
• Except in the case of treating cattle with insecticides, the costs of a tsetse 
control programme are dependent on the area to be cleared of flies and 
are independent of the number of cattle within the area. 
• The costs of a trypanocide programme are conversely dependent upon the 
number of cattle to be treated, and not upon the area they occupy. 
A simple model 
The following, simple model shows how the cost ratio of the two strategies 
can vary greatly, according to cattle population density and the project life. 
Cattle population density is assumed to range from 4 to 16 livestock units 
(LU) (500 kg) per sq km, which is representative of the carrying capacity of 
southern African savanna (Mombeshora and Maclaurin, 1989). Project life is 
assumed to range between 5 and 20 years, representing the number of years 
of drug costs that would be saved by implementing a tsetse control pro-
gramme. This reflects that the area could be re-invaded by flies at a future 
date, and that land use could eventually render the area unable to support a 
tsetse population, after which trypanocides would not be required. 
Initially, simplifying assumptions are made. 
• The costs of barriers to protect against reinvasion into tsetse-cleared areas 
are ignored. 
• Trypanosomiasis incidence is zero with tsetse control. 
• Livestock numbers and productivity do not change. 
• Survey, monitoring and overhead costs are ignored. 
• Local and foreign exchange costs are not distinguished. 
• Costs incurred by the Government are not distinguished from those 
incurred by farmers. 
• Tsetse control is budgeted at Z$600/sq km. 
• Trypanosomiasis control is by prophylaxis budgeted at Z$1 0 per LU per 
year, throughout the project life. 
• The discount rate used for converting future recurrent costs to a net present 
value is taken as 1 0%. 
The cost ratio of chemoprophylaxis to tsetse control varies according to cattle 
density and project life (Figure 2.1 ). The cost advantage of tsetse control 
increases as the cattle population density and project life increase. At stock-
ing rates lower than about 6 LU per sq km, chemoprophylaxis is cheaper 
than tsetse control, even over 20 years. Above 15 LU per sq km, tsetse con-
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Figure 2.1 Cost ratio of chemotherapy to tsetse control for different project 
lifetimes and cattle population densities. Cost of tsetse control, 
Z$600 per sq m; cost of chemotherapy, Z$1 0 per 500 kg of live-
stock unit per year; discount rate, 1 0%. 
trol is cheaper, even over a period of only five years. In the middle scenario 
of 10 LU per sq km and a ten year project life, tsetse control is slightly 
cheaper than chemoprophylaxis. 
The discount rate used for calculating the present value of recurrent drug 
costs is of some significance. A high discount rate lessens the present value 
of future drug costs. Tsetse control becomes less cost-competitive, since its 
costs are not discounted, being incurred only in the first year of the project. 
If the viability of tsetse control is to be examined under conservative assump-
tions, it will be appropriate to use a higher discount rate. However, within 
the plausible range of discount rates, the economic comparison of the two 
strategies is more sensitive to assumptions concerning project life and cattle 
population density than concerning the discount rate. 
The model has limitations reflected in the assumptions stated above. The 
important conclusion is that tsetse control is likely to be more cost-effective 
than control of trypanosomiasis using drugs, where (a) cattle density is high, 
and (b) tsetse eradication is likely to be permanent, with a minimum risk of 
re-invasion. Chemotherapy is likely to be the preferred option where (a) cat-
tle density is low and (b) prospects are poor for keeping the area tsetse-free 
in the future. The best approach will vary, according to the specific circum-
stances. Therefore, the objective of economic comparison of the two strat-
egies is to show where and when one approach is more cost-effective than 
the other, rather than to try to prove that one approach is generally cheaper. 
The complexity of appraising real situations 
To be more realistic, economic comparison of tsetse control and management 
of trypanosomiasis using drugs requires consideration of issues such as the 
potential problem of fly reinvasion into tsetse-freed areas, and changes in 
I ivestock numbers and productivity. 
Changes in livestock numbers 
In some situations, the number of livestock in an area is unlikely to change 
greatly following a tsetse eradication campaign. This was the case, for 
example, in some parts of Zimbabwe (such as Chesa) which were invaded 
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by flies in the late 1970s during the war. Such areas were already fully settled 
and tsetse control did not lead to any major change in land use. Projection 
of future livestock numbers is more problematic where relatively unsettled 
areas are freed of tsetse, as is the case along much of the current tsetse fron-
tier in the Zambezi Valley. Here, cattle numbers are rising rapidly, and the 
economic analysis of tsetse control will depend crucially on the projection of 
future growth in the cattle herd. 
Rates of cattle herd growth may be affected by the presence or absence of 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis control programmes, but not necessarily so. For 
example, in the Mid-Zambezi Valley, cattle numbers began to rise at high 
rates in the early 1980s despite a substantial tsetse problem, since farmers 
were able to protect their cattle with trypanocides supplied through effective 
government veterinary services. Barrett et al. (1991) concluded that the rate 
of herd growth was determined primarily by factors other than the tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis situation. For example, the financial viability of cotton pro-
duction, combined with infrastructural and institutional development in the 
area, appeared to have encouraged immigration of farmers who also brought 
cattle with them. The profits from agriculture were being invested largely in 
cattle, purchased outside the area and brought into the Valley. Thus, the pro-
jection of future herd growth must take detailed account of the social, econ-
omic and political factors affecting land use change. 
Changes in livestock productivity 
Livestock productivity differs between cattle maintained on drugs under try-
panosomiasis challenge and cattle in a tsetse-free environment without trypa-
nosomiasis challenge. Before assessing the economic impact of such 
changes, the baseline productivity of cattle must be known in the agro-pas-
toral farming systems of southern Africa. Much previous economic analysis of 
tsetse control, and indeed of other animal health interventions, has tended to 
focus on livestock production systems in which commercial offtake for meat 
is the main output. However, provision of animal draught is the most import-
ant role of cattle in smallholder farming systems in Zimbabwe (Barrett, 
1992b). There are few data concerning the productivity of cattle in the tsetse-
infested areas. 
In the early 1980s, trypanosomiasis caused widespread mortality and mor-
bidity among cattle in the areas invaded by tsetse. However, no objective 
data are available from which to assess the productivity of drug-protected 
cattle during the period of high challenge in comparison with productivity 
after the tsetse control programme in the area. 
Small stock have generally been ignored in this study. Cattle are the domi-
nant species of domestic livestock in smallholder farming systems of much of 
southern Africa, accounting for approximately 90% of the biomass of dom-
estic livestock. However, small stock are also significant, especially in some 
areas, and are also susceptible to trypanosomiasis. 
Use of small models 
The need for a highly flexible methodology suggests that a number of simple 
models based on clear assumptions would be of more use than a single 
unwieldy and complex model. These are more easily modified and can also 
incorporate subjective judgements. 
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Use of scenarios 
The approach makes much use of 'scenarios' to examine varying situations 
where different techniques might be employed. The term scenario (for want 
of a better word) is used to mean a particular combination of operational cir-
cumstances, which dictate the levels of inputs required to achieve a specified 
expectation of c;:ontrol. In general terms, a pessimistic scenario is one where 
control is difficult and/or expensive to achieve; the basic scenario represents 
a typical operation; the optimistic scenario is one where control is easier and 
less costly. 
Though similar in concept to sensitivity analysis in standard economic 
benefit-cost analysis, which tests a central conclusion by examining the 
implications of varying assumptions about one key variable in one situation, 
the scenario approach examines a range of plausible but quite different situa-
tions, with emphasis upon gaining a broad perspective. 
Financial versus economic analysis 
The analysis is presented mainly in financial prices (i.e. the prevailing dom-
estic market price). This avoids confusion about conversion factors needed to 
work in economic prices (adjusted to allow for subsidy, tax and other con-
trols) and does not significantly alter the conclusions (see page 1 07). 
Historical evidence 
The first stage in model development was to examine evidence about the 
types, quantities and costs of resources (such as chemicals, manpower, 
vehicles and equipment) actually used in past operations. These data have 
strengths and weaknesses. 
• Historical data concerning the quantities of resources used in a specific 
operation have the advantage of realism: they reflect operational inefficien-
cies such as chemical wastage, overmanning, and logistical problems. 
• The weakness of such data is that the design of the technique may have 
evolved over time, either through technological innovation or in response 
to changing field conditions (different ecology, fly density, fly species, etc.). 
For these reasons, a specific operation today may not require the same 
level of inputs as the average level of past operations. 
Accordingly, it is important to understand the technical evolution of each 
technique, and how the current optimal design varies according to oper-
ational circumstances. 
TICB annual reports usually include only the direct costs of field oper-
ations. Disaggregation of historical data on indirect costs is difficult because 
annual expenditure on activities such as road building, mapping, camp con-
struction and maintenance, and so on, is budgeted centrally and not clearly 
associated with specific operations. Disaggregation by technique is even 
more difficult because, in the 1980s, various methods of control have been 
used each year, often involving more than one technique in the same oper-
ation. 
A further methodological problem arises. The direct cost of permanent 
staff deployed on tsetse control operations was counted by the TTCB only for 
those specific months (usually four or five) when they were involved in con-
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trol operations. Unlike the casual staff, the graded staff are paid for the full 
twelve months of the year. The permanent staff do other work outside the 
spraying season, but this represents an unavoidable overhead cost. Typically, 
the combined cost of salaries and subsistence for graded staff involved in a 
field operation was recorded as less than 50% of the expenditure on casual 
wages and rations. Yet the total annual TICB expenditure on salaries, subsist-
ence and allowances for the same graded staff (excluding established and 
administrative staff) has averaged over 130% of the expenditure on casual 
wages and rations. 
In order to assess the general level of TTCB expenditure on various sup-
port activities relating to field operations, the total budget of the Branch was 
analysed over the period 1982/83 to 1990/91 (Barrett, 1994), as summarized 
in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Annual estimates of expenditure by the TTCB, Zimbabwe, by 
vote, 1982-90 (Z$'0000, 1990 prices) 
82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 AVG 
A. Salaries and wages 5290 4747 4377 4524 4475 5368 4563 4092 4115 4617 
34.5% 35.2% 36.8% 35.6% 36.8% 41.6% 35.2% 34.4% 37.5% 36.4% 
B. Subsistence and travel 3050 2592 2095 2192 2266 2181 2650 2616 2300 2438 
19.9% 19.2% 17.6% 17.2% 18.6% 16.9% 20.5% 22.0% 21.0% 19.2% 
c. Incidentals 111 93 87 99 94 92 111 122 130 105 
0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 0.8% 
D. Drugs 15 48 56 60 18 20 16 14 10 28 
0.1% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
E. Research 138 162 151 137 118 121 119 108 100 128 
0.9% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.0% 
F Furniture 12 5 4 2 3 6 5 6 5 5 
0.1% 
G. Tsetse eradication 6701 5826 5109 5698 5187 5124 5491 4924 4300 5373 
43.7% 43.2% 43.0% 44.8% 42.7% 39.7% 42.4% 41.4% 39.2% 42.2% 
TOTAl 15 317 13 473 11 879 12 712 12 162 12 912 12 956 11 881 10 960 12 695 
Source Files of the TTCB (Annual Estimates of Expenditure), Harare. 
Note Figures for financial years 1982/83 to 1986/87 refer to actual expenditure. Figures for subsequent years 
are for the Voted Provision. 
Cost modelling 
From this historical evidence and from discussions with technical colleagues, 
costs were modelled for each technique using appropriate technical par-
ameters. Developed as simple spreadsheets, each model identi fies the princi-
pal component inputs for the technique and allows speci fication of the 
quantities used and/or their costs. This facilitates comparison of techniques in 
different operational circumstances, since the overall costs can be calculated 
for varying assumptions about how a particular technique would be imple-
mented (e.g. target density; insecticide application rates). 
Pricing of inputs is not generally problematic, but requires careful con-
sideration. Except where otherwise stated, costs are given in 1990 prices, 
adjusted from current prices using a series of Consumer Price Indices (CPI) 
published by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in Harare for the period 
1975 to 1990. The CPI is based on lower-income urban families in the towns 
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of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru. This is not particularly appropriate 
for the cost components of ground spraying. However, no more suitable 
index of inflation is available. Because of this, only limited significance can 
be attached to historical cost information, particularly in early years. 
For imported inputs, or those purchased from the domestic private sector, 
prices used in ' the analysis are those actually paid by the Government of 
Zimbabwe in 1990 (or most recent date, adjusted for inflation). Official 
exchange rates are used for converting the prices of imported goods and ser-
vices. The vehicles used in field operations are mostly on lease from, and are 
maintained by, the Government's Central Mechanical and Engineering 
Department (CMED). The 1990 CMED hire rates are used in the analysis. 
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Figure 2.2 Changes in TICB real salaries, 1984-90 for different grades of 
staff. Labels give examples of posts. 
Source Pub I ic Service Commission wage schedules . 
Manpower costs for TICB staff are based on Government salary scales 
with a provision for allowances (field subsistence, housing, travel, etc.). Real 
wage rates in the public sector have varied significantly over the last decade, 
affecting skilled labour and field officers more than senior professional staff 
and unskilled grades, as shown in Figure 2.2. Pay differentials have been 
eroded steadily, as a matter of government policy, so that higher paid staff 
have received awards below the rate of inflation. The most senior pro-
fessional posts are outside this trend, as the Government has allowed special 
pay awards for key technical posts. 
The prospect of continuing change in the price ratio of the component 
inputs to tsetse control adds to the value of using a modelling approach for 
comparative cost analysis, since costs can be quickly recalculated for differ-
ent assumptions about the price of each component input. 
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Section 3 
Ground Spraying 
Tsetse flies spend as much as 23 hours per day resting. As they cannot sur-
vive continued exposure to temperatures significantly higher than 30°C, tsetse 
flies retreat during the hot season to so-called 'essential habitat', comprising 
vegetation along surface drainage lines and around certain geographical fea-
tures. The flies seek resting and refuge sites such as tree boles, rot holes in 
trees, rock crevices, ant-bear holes, overhanging banks and the underside of 
fallen trees. 
Ground spraying involves the application of a persistent insecticide to 
these resting and refuge sites. This is usually done by a large number of small 
teams of workers, carrying pressurized knapsack sprayers charged with insec-
ticide solution. Other methods of application include vehicle-mounted fog 
generators (FAO, 1977; Jordan 1986). 
As insecticide deposits are liable to be washed off by rain, ground spray-
ing is done during the dry season. In southern Africa, the hottest period 
occurs at the end of the dry season, when flies retreat to essential habitat and 
actively seek refuge sites in the heat of the day. 
The technique was developed in East Africa after the Second World War, 
when synthetic organochlorine insecticides first became commercially avail-
able. Ground spraying was carried out in East Africa from the 1950s 
onwards, initially using DOT (Wilson, 1953), and subsequently dieldrin. The 
technique has been used widely throughout Africa (AIIsopp, 1984). Perhaps 
the largest and most successful tsetse eradication programme to date was in 
Nigeria, where between 1955 and 1978 some 200 000 sq km of land were 
reclaimed from tsetse infestation. Ground spraying, mainly using DOT, was 
the principal method of tsetse control used in more than 95% of the area 
reclaimed from tsetse (Putt et al., 1980). 
Ground spraying was introduced into Zimbabwe in the late 1950s. Between 
1958 and 1990, over 140 separate operations* covered a total area of almost 
180 000 sq km. This used some 2880 tonnes of DOT and 74 tonnes of diel-
drin (both calculated as active ingredient: a.i.). The records of these oper-
ations provide a wealth of information for economic evaluation of ground 
spraying in southern Africa. The data require interpretation in the context of 
changes in tsetse control strategy in Zimbabwe over the last three decades. 
*Ground spraying is counted as a single operation where it takes place within one spraying season, within 
a single and substantial area of infestation, with unitary planning and implementation. With this defini-
tion, ten or more operations have been implemented in Zimbabwe in some years. 
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The situation in the mid-1950s 
In the mid-1950s, public concern about game destruction in tsetse control 
lead to the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry on Human and Animal 
Trypanosomiasis in Southern Rhodesia (Thomas et al., 1955), after which 
ground spraying emerged as the favoured method. 
Operations using dieldrin 
Initially, dieldrin was used for ground spraying in Zimbabwe, because at that 
time it was preferred over DOT in East Africa. Table 3.1 summarizes infor-
mation about operations in Zimbabwe using dieldrin between 1958 and 1967. 
In this period, there was much experimentation with insecticide appli-
cation rates, equipment, treatment techniques and the design of field oper-
ations, but these early operations were measured and reported inconsistently, 
with few details. Some of the areas of operations given in Table 3.1 are there-
fore estimates. Despite limited scope for useful analysis, Table 3.1 demon-
strates an evolving technique, with increases in the area treated and number 
of operations between 1958 and 1967. 
Table 3.1 Ground spraying operations in Zimbabwe using dieldrin, 1962-67 
Year Dieldrin Total area of No. of Average size Quantity of dieldrin used 
concentration tsetse operations of operation 
% operations (sq km) Litres of diluted kg of active ingredient (sq km) insecticide 
total (sq km) total (sq km) 
1958 1.8 41 1 41 3735 91.10 79 1.93 
1959 3.1>-5.0 41 2 21 18 661 455.63 847 20.66 
1960 3.7 336 2 166 52 258 155.53 1905 5.67 
1961 3.7 2590 1 2590 129 007 49.61 4780 1.85 
1962 3.7 1626 4 406 117 557 72.31 4349 2.68 
1963 3.1 and 3.7 1497 4 374 123 412 62.44 4290 2.87 
1964 3.1 2803 3 934 186 325 66.47 5966 2.13 
1965 3.1 4149 4 1037 318 630 76.80 9878 2.38 
1966 3.1 4541 6 757 617 265 135.93 19 134 4.21 
1967 3.1 3152 5 630 720 071 228.45 22 322 7.08 
TOTAL 20 776 32 649 2 286 941 110.06 73 550 3.54 
Source Annual reports of the Department of Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control and Reclamation (1958-60) and 
of the Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Branch from 1961 onwards. 
The application rate increased steadily, from 50 litres per sq km in 1962, to 
136 litres per sq km in 1966, but was still well below the volume levels sub-
sequently used in DOT operations. This increase was due partly to the pro-
gress of operations from areas of marginal tsetse habitat into areas of denser 
fly infestation, where conditions were better for fly survival and where fly re-
invasion was more problematic (Robertson and Kluge, 1968). 
The first trial of ground spraying, in 1958, involved treatment of a mere 
40 sq km of land with a 1.8% emulsion of dieldrin wettable powder (wp), in 
the Kapondo area of Urungwe. Eradication was not achieved and the area 
had to be partly resprayed with a 3.7% dieldrin emulsion. In 1959, ground 
spraying was used to treat several hundred kilometres of riverine vegetation 
in the Sabi-Lundi area (Farrell, 1960). DOT and dieldrin were used separately 
in two operations. This proved sufficiently successful that ground spraying 
continued in this area in subsequent years. 
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A substantially larger trial (250 sq km) of dieldrin ground spraying took 
place in the Maseme area of Sebungwe in 1960, with great success. The 
spraying was discriminative, in that treatment was confined to woodland per-
iphery, major drainage lines and rock outcrops, which are believed to furnish 
the main tsetse resting sites during the late dry season, when the spraying 
was undertaken. In this way, only some 5% of the total land area was treated 
with insecticide. The spraying was selective, being directed only at tsetse 
resting sites. The 'discriminative and selective' elements of this operation 
were to become the standard approach. 
A much larger area of some 2500 sq km was treated with 3.7% dieldrin 
emulsion in the Nagupande area of Sebungwe in 1961 . To make the oper-
ation cheaper and more manageable, the insecticide was applied unselec-
tively, in the so-called 'band' spraying method. Although the insecticide 
concentration in the spray was the same as in the 1960 Maseme operation, 
the overall application rate per square kilometre was much lower. 
Unfortunately, the fly population quickly recovered after an initial population 
reduction of about 80%. 
After this setback, almost all operations employed selective and discrimi-
native application spraying. In exceptional cases where vegetation and topo-
graphy were too homogeneous for 'conventional' ground spraying, grid or 
parallel line spraying was used, with high insecticide application rates. 
Four separate operations in 1962 were all moderately to highly successful. 
A programme of collaboration with the authorities in Mozambique and South 
Africa was initiated to organize joint operations in the region of the inter-
national border between these countries. As part of the programme, extensive 
trials of riverine spraying with dieldrin took place. 
From 1962 onwards, ground spraying took an increasingly central role in 
the operations of the TICB, with optimism that the technique could com-
pletely replace game elimination as the main method of tsetse control. 
Unfortunately, severe reduction in game elimination activities resulted in a 
major resurgence of the tsetse and trypanosomiasis problem in several parts 
of the country. lt became clear that ground spraying, by itself, could not pro-
vide an adequate solution. 
Meanwhile, experiments at Nagupande demonstrated that only a handful 
of species represent the main wild hosts of the fly. Accordingly, and following 
a review of the tsetse and trypanosomiasis situation in Southern Rhodesia 
(Cockbill, 1964), a new long-term strategy was formulated which combined 
selective game elimination, bush clearing and ground spraying. 
Figure 3.1 shows the operational areas for ground spraying and controlled 
hunting, most of which had field stations to which staff were permanently 
deployed. Occasionally, old camps were closed and new camps were 
opened. Each station normally undertook one or more operations each year, 
which were separately planned, managed and reported. 
The operational area west of the Sengwa and Lutope rivers, mainly within 
Binga and Wankie (Hwange) Districts, was referred to as Sebungwe in TICB 
reports, with a field station in Lusulu. Gokwe was the principal station for 
operations between Sebungwe and the Sanyati/Umfuli (Mupfure) river system, 
covering Gokwe District and parts of Gatooma (Kadoma) and Lomagundi 
(Makonde) Districts. The Urungwe operational area stretched along the 
Zambezi escarpment from the Sanyati river to the Angwa river and was man-
aged mainly from Makuti. Operations east of the Angwa lay within Sipolilo 
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Figure 3.1 Map of Zimbabwe showing operations areas for tsetse control in 
1968. 
Source Annual report for the TICB, year ending September 1968. 
(now Guruve) District, where there is presently a major field station at 
Mashumbi Pools. In the northeast, the Zambezi Front (East) comprised oper-
ations in Darwin, Mtoko and lnyanga Districts. The South Eastern Front com-
prised operations in the Sabi-Lundi area and extended into Mozambique 
(Robertson et al., 1972). 
Research suggested that ground spraying with DOT would be feasible 
under local conditions and cheaper than with dieldrin (Vale, 1968). This was 
confirmed in large-scale field trials in 1967. From 1968 onwards, DOT 
became the standard insecticide for ground spraying in Zimbabwe. After 
1967, dieldrin was not used again by the TICB, other than in a small oper-
ation in Mozambique, in 1969, as part of joint operations along the inter-
national border. 
Ground spraying procedures in Zimbabwe have been largely unchanged 
since the late 1960s, as defined in the TICB Field Staff Handbook (Cockbill, 
1975: pp 68-78). 
Table 3.2 summarizes data on 111 DOT ground spraying operations under-
taken in Zimbabwe between 1967 and 1990. These operations are well 
documented in published TICB annual reports from 1966 onwards. After 
1976, annual reports were produced irregularly, but most past operations are 
described in unpublished TICB monthly reports and most of the original 
operational maps are still held by the TTCB. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of ground spraying operations in Zimbabwe using 
DOT, 1967-91 
Year No. of DOT Total area Average Volume of DDT Weight of 
operations concentration treated size of solution applied: DDT applied:* 
(%) (sq km) operation 
(sq km) Total (litre/ Total (kg/sq km) 
('0001) sq km) (tonnes) 
1967 3 5 .0 1059 353 134 126 6.7 6.3 
1968 6 5.0 10 847 1808 2263 209 112.9 10.4 
1969 7 5.0 10 866 1552 2771 255 136.2 12.7 
1970 11 5.0 11 282 1026 2673 237 133.3 11.8 
1971 12 5.0 8376 698 2506 299 125.0 14.9 
1972 6 5 .0 11 330 1416 3747 331 166.9 16.5 
1973 10 5.0 10 969 1097 3989 364 199.0 18.1 
1974 5 5.0 7899 1580 3425 434 170.9 21.6 
1975 5 5 .0 9150 1630 3498 382 174.5 19.1 
1976 4 5.0 8798 2200 3688 419 184.0 20.9 
1977 3 5.0 1348 449 679 504 33.9 25.1 
1978 3 5.0 1159 386 553 477 27.6 23.8 
1979 3 5.0 1851 617 1111 600 55.4 29.9 
1980 4 5.0 5425 1356 2778 512 138.6 25.5 
1961 2.5 3428 1676 490 41.6 12.2 
5.0 6501 3460 532 172.6 26.5 
6 9929 1655 5138 517 214.4 21.6 
1982 2.5 45 18 403 0.4 10.0 
5.0 8292 4221 509 210.5 25.4 
4 8337 2084 4239 508 211.0 25.3 
1983 4.0 6021 3113 517 124.2 20.6 
5 .0 1843 694 485 44.6 24.2 
3 7864 2621 4007 510 168.8 21.5 
1984 4.0 7373 3422 464 136.5 18.5 
5.0 17 9 522 0 . .4 26.0 
5 7390 1478 3431 464 137.0 18.5 
1985 2 4.0 4811 2406 2624 545 104.7 21.8 
1986 2 4.0 6742 3371 3323 493 132.6 19.7 
1987 2 4 .0 7716 3858 3164 410 126.3 16.4 
1988 1 4.0 2838 2638 1475 520 58.9 20.7 
1989 1 4 .0 1187 1187 827 697 33.0 27.8 
1990 1 4 .0 213 213 109 682 4.4 20.4 
TOTAL 111 157 385 1418 62 151 395 2 877.7 18.3 
Source TTCB annual reports for the years 1967 to 1974, 1982 and 1983. Data for other years was derived from 
monthly reports and original maps of operations kept on file at the TTCB . 
* Weight of DDT refers to active ingredient (a.i.) and not formulation. 
Between 1968 and 1976, the total area ground sprayed each year ranged 
from about 8000 to 11 000 sq km (Figure 3.2). Towards the end of this 
period, operations ceased in some areas because of deteriorating security. 
The rate of insecticide application increased steadily from 1967 to 1979, 
more than doubling in terms of both volume of solution and weight of DOT 
applied per square kilometre (Figure 3.3). Throughout this period, DOT was 
applied as a 5% weight/volume suspension. 
Operations were very limited in the late 1970s, because of deteriorating 
security in the border areas, prior to independence in 1980. In 1981, it was 
estimated that some 13 000 sq km were lost to tsetse reinvasion during the 
war years; this represented just over 25% of the area (50 000 sq km) 
reckoned to have been freed of infestation in the previous 20 years (Napier 
Bax and Hursey, 1981 ). 
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Figure 3.3 DOT application rates in ground spraying operations in 
Zimbabwe, 1967-90. 
Source Table 3.2. 
Operations recommenced in earnest in 1980, concentrating initially on 
the Western Region. There are several noteworthy features of the post-inde-
pendence period. 
• Increasing concern about the environmental impact of using DOT for tsetse 
control. In Nigeria, ground spraying had proved successful in large-scale 
operations using DOT at only 2.5% strength. Experimental work in the 
Zambezi Valley had produced similar results under local conditions. So, in 
1981, the lower strength DOT formulation was used over a wide area, but 
with unsatisfactory results. Subsequently, most operations used a 4% DOT 
wp suspension. 
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• After 1981, tsetse control operations on the Zambezi front only. Tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis ceased to be a significant problem in the south-east, per-
haps because of reduction in the wild animal population in the border area 
during the war years. 
• Increasing importance of other techniques for tsetse control. From 1982 to 
1984, ground spraying in the Western Region was carried out in conjunc-
tion with large-scale aerial spraying operations (Shereni, 1985; Hursey and 
Allsopp, 1983 and 1984; Allsopp and Hursey, 1986). The total area ground 
sprayed per year declined steadily over this period (Figure 3.2). Ground 
spraying resurged briefly in 1986 and 1987, but by this time the use of 
odour-baited targets for tsetse control had been proven on an operational 
scale. Large-scale aerial spraying operations were again conducted in 1987 
and 1988. 
In direct consequence of these combined developments, the use of ground 
spraying declined rapidly between 1988 and 1990. By 1991, the lTCB had 
ceased to use DOT for ground spraying. 
direct costs of ground spraying include the insecticide, manpower, 
vehicles and other equipment used in the spraying operation. Indirect costs 
include the provision and maintenance of access roads, the establishment, 
equipping and maintenance of camps and expenditure on items such as pro-
tective clothing, radios, maps and so on. Historical indirect and overhead 
costs have been analysed in detail elsewhere (Barrett, 1994; Appendix C). 
Total direct costs 
The lTCB has routinely reported the direct costs of its ground spraying oper-
ations since 1977, with a breakdown of costs between insecticide, man-
power, vehicles and other sundry items. The data in Table 3.3 relate to 
operations extending over an area of 55 772 sq km, which is 84% of the 
total area ground sprayed between 1977 and 1989. 
The data for 1977 to 1979 have limited significance since they relate to 
relatively small areas, and to operations undertaken during the height of the 
war prior to independence. lTCB field staff and vehicles were regularly 
diverted from routine duties to the war effort (e.g. border fence and minefield 
construction). This may not be fully reflected in operational records. 
In terms of annual averages calculated from lTCB reports, the direct costs 
of ground spraying were mainly within Z$300 to Z$400 per sq km between 
1977 and 1989 (Figure 3.4). The largest cost was insecticide, averaging 
43.8% of total costs, followed by manpower (37.9%; Table 3.3). This figure 
includes only the 'graded staff' and casual labour, but excludes Tsetse Field 
Officers and other senior staff. Vehicle costs were between 10% and 20% 
and averaged 14.8% of the total direct cost. Other minor costs included 
spare parts, fuel and oil for water pumps. 
The low costs in 1978 and 1979 may reflect unusual circumstances pre-
vailing just prior to independence, as previously mentioned. The overall 
impression is that real costs have not increased much, if at all, in the 1980s. 
There is a slight upward trend, but this may be spurious in view of the use of 
the Consumer Price Index for adjustment to 1990 prices (see page 1 0). 
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Table 3.3 Cost and productivity data for selected ground spraying operations, 1974-89 (1990 prices, Z$'000) 
Year 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 Avge 
77--89 
Average cost!sq km {1 990 
prices, Z$)* 405 263 244 399 318 393 302 345 340 404 384 454 . 464 362 
Comprising (%)t: 
Labour wages and rations 25 19 27 28 32 34 30 31 23 31 26 30 22 29.7 
Graded staff salaries 7 10 10 4 6 7 8 11 9 7 7 11 11 7.8 
Subsistence allowance 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1.9 
Transport 16 15 20 13 18 14 14 14 14 9 13 16 17 14.2 
Mise and spares 5 2 8 6 2 2 2 l 5 5 3 2 3 3 .1 
Sub-total 54 49 67 53 60 59 57 59 52 54 51 61 54 56.7 
Insecticide 46 51 33 47 40 41 43 41 48 46 49 39 46 43.3 
Area treated {sq km) 1348 922 1538 3543 9078 8324 5588 6052 4812 6742 3800 2838 1187 4290 
Team-months 30 17 36 112 264 248 144 182 160 187 101 86 33 123 
Area/team month 45 54 43 32 34 34 39 33 30 36 38 33 36 35 
Source TICS operational records. 
* 1990 prices were derived by adjustment based on the Consumer Price Index: 
YEAR: 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
Factor: 20.6 22.7 25 .8 27.2 30.8 34.1 41 .9 50.4 54.6 62.5 70.3 75 .5 85.2 100 
t TICB castings exclude the salaries and allowances of Tsetse Field Officers in charge of operations; all costs of access and camp construction; operational planning; tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis surveys; and other overhead costs. 
Insecticide application rates 
Between 1977 and 1989, the amount of DDT used in ground spraying aver-
aged close to 22 kg but varied significantly from year to year (Figure 3.3), 
which reflects the: 
• varying strength of the DDT formulation used (from 5% to 2.5% and then 
to 4%) and 
• varyingvolumeofsolution applied persq km, according to local requirements. 
Manpower, vehicle and sundry costs 
Manpower costs were between Z$120 and Z$190 per sq km in the 1980s, 
with an apparent upward trend (Figure 3.4). This requires closer scrutiny in 
relation to two principal factors which affect manpower costs per sq km: real 
labour wage rates and field team productivity. 
Government policy since independence has been to reduce wage differentials 
(page 19), with greater effect in reducing the real salaries of field officers than in 
increasing real wages for junior employees (Figure 2.2). Accordingly, this does 
not provide a satisfactory explanation of the apparent trend in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 Historical direct costs of ground spraying in Zimbabwe, 1977-89 
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Source Table 3.3. 
The area treated per team (Figure 3.5) averaged 34.4 sq km per month 
between 1980 and 1989, significantly lower than the figure of 45.3 sq km for 
the period 1975 to 1979. However, this latter period may be unrepresentative, 
as discussed above. There is no obvious trend in apparent team productivity 
since 1980, which might have explained the upward trend in manpower costs. 
This is an interesting observation, since the capability of the TICS to con-
duct large-scale operations is perceived by some to have eroded considerably 
since independence: 
• numerous middle-level and senior staff left government service (partly 
because of declining real salaries), which might have weakened the man-
agement and supervision of field operations; and 
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1974 and 1989. 
Source Table 3.3. 
• vehicle support for field operations has become increasingly problematic 
in recent years: in 1990, only 43% of the TTCB's fleet of 136 vehicles were 
fully operational (Shereni, 1991 ), while the other 57% were off the road 
for prolonged periods, awaiting repair by the Government's Central 
Mechanical Engineering Department (CMED); 
• the structural adjustment policy of central government in the late 1980s 
included reducing the size of the civil service, so that many key posts were 
'frozen' vacant for prolonged periods. 
The increased manpower costs per square kilometre might be due to more 
staff and casual labourers being deployed in operations. The composition of 
a ground spraying team was supposedly standard, comprising 21 to 25 per-
sons per team (Cockbill, 1975; TICB Annual Estimates of Expenditure) but in 
practice the size of teams has varied. lt is difficult to establish the number 
and grades of people actually employed in past operations, since TICB 
reports tend to state the number of teams deployed per operation, without 
giving the team composition. Only partial data can be found in monthly 
records, and evidence is therefore inconclusive. 
Modelling the cost per unit of area treated 
With the standard TICB team composition and normal rates of vehicle use, 
the cost of keeping a ground spraying team in the field is estimated at just 
under Z$9000 per month (Table 3.4). This is slightly higher than the historical 
average cost (page 26) because it includes the salary and vehicle costs of the 
Tsetse Field Officer supervising the team (normally excluded in TICB cast-
ings). lt also reflects that the slight interest in real terms of the cost of 
unskilled government staff has risen slightly in real terms in recent years. 
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Table 3.4 Manpower and vehicle costs of ground spraying 
A MANPOWER*t Number per Monthly cost % total (C) 
Tsetse Field Officer 
Senior TFA 
Learner TFA 
Lorry driver 
Other graded employees 
Casual workers 
TOTAL PER TEAM-MONTH 
team 
0.33 
1 
1 
1 
4 
18 
25 
man team 
(1990 prices, Z$) 
1587 524 
700 700 
463 463 
510 510 
458 1832 
145 2610 
6639 75 
* Established and graded staff salaries are based on the upper range of the salary scale, calculated as 
1 0% above the mean salary. An additional25% is provided to cover subsistence and allowances. 
t The cost of casual workers includes wages plus rations. 
B VEHICLESt~ 
Team lorry 
TFO's four-wheel drive 
Spraying equipment, sundries 
TOTAL PER TEAM-MONTH 
km/ 
team-month 
1500 
400 
Cost 
km month 
(1990 prices Z$) 
0.79 
1.43 
1185 
572 
500 
2257 
t Vehicle costs are based on CMED hire rates. Distances travelled per month are based on 
established TICB norms. 
,-[ The provision for spraying equipment and minor consumables is an estimate based on 
historical levels of actual expenditure. 
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C TOTAL MANPOWER, VEHICLE AND 
EQUIPMENT COST PER TEAM-MONTH 8896 100 
Table 3.5 sets out the direct and indirect costs of ground spraying per unit 
of area treated, and compares three operational circumstances. 
The basic scenario represents a typical ground spraying operation in 
Zimbabwe, covering an area of 4000 sq km or more. Operational parameters 
derive from the average figures for past TTCB operations: it is assumed that 
the team covers about 35 sq km per month, applying an average of 21 kg of 
DOT per sq km. The total cost is estimated at Z$672 per sq km, of which 
indirect costs account for 30%. 
The main indirect cost is for access provision, budgeted at Z$150 per sq 
km. This reflects past levels of TICB gross expenditure on access provision 
for eradication operations (Barrett, 1994; Appendix C). 
This figure was endorsed as reasonable by senior TICB staff. As an upper 
ceiling, in the most difficult areas of rough terrain and poor access, up to 25 
km of new road could be required for every 100 sq km of operational area. 
New road costs about Z$1200 per linear km, equivalent to an average cost 
of Z$300 per sq km of operational area. In the easiest situation, no new 
access roads would be required, although existing roads might need some 
attention, requiring expenditure in the order of tens of dollars per square kilo-
metre. 
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Table 3.5 Cost model of DOT ground spraying (1990 prices, Z$) 
General 
parameters 
A MANPOWER, VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT (MVE) 
Area covered/team-montht 
MVE Costs team-montht 8896 
sq km 
B INSECTICIDE 
kg DDT (a.i.)/sq kmt 
price of DDT/kg a.i.'J 
insecticide cost/sq km 
C SUB-TOTAL OF DIRECT COSTS PER SQ KM 
%of total F 
D INFRASTRUCTURE§ 
Access provision, camp construction 
and maintenance 
E OTHER INDIRECT COSTS§ 
Equipment, clothing and consumables 
F. TOTAL OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS 
PER SQ KM 
10.38 
Scenario* 
Basic Pessimistic 
35 30 
254 297 
21 26 
218 270 
472 566 
70 68 
150 200 
50 70 
672 836 
Optimistic 
40 
222 
17 
176 
399 
75 
100 
35 
534 
* The 'basic' scenario involves situations represented by the average parameters for past 
operations by the TTCB. The pessimistic scenario represents above-average operational 
difficulty. This could be due to difficult terrain, dense vegetation, high tsetse fly population. 
Conversely, the optimistic scenario corresponds to situations of relatively access where the 
habitat is marginal for fly survival. 
t See Table 3.3 . 
t See Table 3.4. 
'J Price paid by TTCB (delivered Harare). 
§ Access provision, camp construction and maintenance and expenditure on equipment, tools 
and uniforms is budgeted on the basis of historical expenditure levels on access provision in 
relation to overall expenditure of tsetse eradication operations, as discussed in the main text. 
In practice, the costs of tsetse control vary according to the agro-ecology and 
tsetse situation in the area of operation and according to the productivity of 
the teams deployed. Table 3.5 presents plausible optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios, in which the cost of DOT ground spraying ranges from Z$534 to 
Z$836 per sq km treated. 
Estimating the cost per unit of area reclaimed 
The above model estimates the cost of ground spraying a given area, but 
tsetse control may not be totally successful. Shereni (1985) reckoned that, of 
the 21 172 sq km which had been ground sprayed between 1980 and 1985, 
only 40% had been effectively freed of infestation. Losses are partly due to 
re-invasion (Napier Bax and Hursey, 1981) and partly due to survival of flies. 
The extent of reinvasion depends firstly on the size and shape of the oper-
ational area in relation to the remaining fly belt, and secondly on the fly 
invasion pressure. Failure to eradicate can be due to bad planning or man-
agement of the operation, or to exogenous events such as early rains. 
Despite the many operations undertaken in Zimbabwe, evidence is lacking 
concerning how the success rate of ground spraying has varied over time or in 
different agro-ecological zones, for the following reasons. Before 1980, oper-
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-ations tended to take place in the same areas, year after year, to consolidate 
tsetse control between fixed cattle and game fences, rather than to actively 
push the fly front back at a significant rate. Since 1980, ground spraying has 
often been integrated with other methods of tsetse control; therefore, it is diffi-
cult to assess the performance of any one particular technique. 
Some experienced tsetse control staff in Zimbabwe consider that complete 
eradication in one operation is feasible only under conditions marginal to 
tsetse survival. At least two treatments may be necessary where conditions 
for fly survival are good and the tsetse population is dense. 
Since the use of DOT is disfavoured on environmental grounds, the TICB has 
investigated alternative insecticides for ground spraying. Similar investigations 
have been made in Nigeria (Spielberger et al., 1979), Uganda (Okoth et al., 
1991), Cote d' lvoire (Seketeli and Kuzoe, 1981) and Tanzania (Toure, 1981b; 
Matechi and Muangirwa, 1981). 
In Zimbabwe, research suggested that deltamethrin might be an alternative 
insecticide under local conditions (Holloway, 1990). lt appeared feasible to 
control tsetse by applying deltamethrin to tree bark at levels higher than 0.05% 
a.i. Accordingly, large-scale trials were undertaken in the Western Region of 
Zimbabwe in 1990 and 1991. In both years, part of the area was ground sprayed 
with DOT and the remaining part was treated with deltamethrin (Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 Comparison of DOT and deltamethrin (DTM) ground spraying 
operations in the Western Region of Zimbabwe, 1989 and 1990 
(1990 prices) 
1989 DOT 1989 DTM 1990 DOT 1990 DTM 
Area treated (sq km) 1270 600 198 467 
MANPOWER AND VEHICLES 
Number of team months 46.5 20.5 6 21 
Area/team month (sq km) 27 29 33 22 
Cost/sq km (Z$): 
Manpower 191 178 109 207 
Vehicles 78 73 45 59 
Sub-total 269 251 154 266 
INSECTICIDE 
Total amount used 44 tonnes 886 litres 5.52 tonnes 580 litres 
Cost per unit of quantity 7788 506 7788 502 
a.i./sq km 26.0 kg 266 ml 20.9 kg 224 ml 
Cost/sq km treated (Z$) 270 748 217 623 
TOTAL COST 539 998 372 889 
Cost ratio, DTM to DDT: 1989 1990 
Manpower and vehicles 0.9 1.9 
Insecticide 2.8 2.9 
Total 1.9 2.4 
Source: Operations data provided by Mr W Shereni, Chief Glossinologist, TTCB. 
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The control achieved using deltamethrin compared well with use of DOT, but 
at application rates in which the cost per sq km treated was almost three times 
greater using deltamethrin than with DOT. Overall, the direct costs were 
approximately doubled. If indirect costs were also taken into account, ground 
spraying with deltamethrin would cost approximately 70% more than with DOT. 
The disproportionately high cost of the deltamethrin operation in 1990 
reflects differen-ces in manpower and vehicle costs due to differences in the 
topography of the operational area and is not due to the choice of insecti-
cide. 
At the treatment levels investigated in Zimbabwe, ground spraying with 
deltamethrin is much more expensive than using DOT. Cost-competitiveness 
would be possible if deltamethrin proves to be substantially more effective 
than DOT at this level of application - i.e. a greater proportion of the treated 
area is effectively freed of fly infestation. Further trials would be needed to 
demonstrate this point. 
Lee and Torr (1987) reported unpublished data by Wooff and Lee that esti-
mated the insecticide cost of ground spraying with deltamethrin in Somalia 
as being double that for dieldrin. They noted that extensive screening of 
alternative insecticides has not produced an insecticide that is as economical 
and effective as the persistent organochlorines. 
At the present cost, deltamethrin could be recommended for ground spray-
ing only if other, presently cheaper, methods of tsetse control (such as targets 
or treatment of cattle with insecticide) prove impracticable. Furthermore, the 
high cost would prejudice the economic viablity of tsetse control as an 
alternative to reliance upon trypanocides, where this would be feasible. 
On the other hand, ground spraying with deltamethrin is not so expensive 
as to preclude use under certain circumstances. Prospects will improve if the 
application rate of deltamethrin can be reduced without loss of efficacy. 
The advantages of DOT ground spraying are that: 
• it is an established technique; 
• it works well sometimes; 
• it is relatively inexpensive; 
• foreign exchange requirements are comparatively low; 
• it does not require sophisticated equipment; and 
• DOT has very low human toxicity. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages are that: 
• the use of DOT is disfavoured on environmental grounds; 
• in areas of significant wildlife population, the technique appears more 
effective when combined with selective game elimination, which is also 
an increasingly unacceptable activity; 
• alternative insecticides make the technique expensive; 
• operations require good logistical support and careful planning by experi-
enced entomologists; 
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• operations can be carried out only during a limited period in the year, after 
which there is an immediate potential problem of fly re-invasion. 
Most of the criticism of DOT ground spraying rests upon long-standing 
environmental arguments (Carson, 1962). This chemical has been restricted 
in many developed countries since the early 1970s. DOT persists in the 
environment, accumulates in the food chain and has had adverse effects 
upon certain species of birds, fish and bats in countries where large quan-
tities of DOT have been used, mainly for agricultural purposes. 
From 1987 to 1991, the environmental impacts of the use of DOT for 
tsetse control were examined in northern Zimbabwe (Douthwaite and Tingle, 
1994). No major differences in the insect populations of sprayed and 
unsprayed areas were detected. Although high DOT residue levels were 
found in some fish, there was no evidence that fish populations were 
adversely affected. Some species of insectivorous birds such as the red-billed 
wood hoopoe (Phoeniculus purpureus) and the white-headed black chat 
(Thamnolaea arnoti) were virtually eradicated from the sprayed areas. 
However, none of the affected species were endemic to the treated area and 
it is expected that the populations will recover through immigration and 
reduced mortality over the next ten to 20 years. There was evidence of some 
thinning of the eggshells and hatching failure of fish eagles (Haliaeetus 
vocifer) on Lake Kariba, but this did not appear to be having an effect on 
population levels. Effects on bats, lizards and soil ecology appeared minor. 
There was no evidence of widespread irreversible environmental damage 
associated with past use of DOT in Zimbabwe. Most recent levels of DOT 
usage for tsetse control (tens of tonnes per year) are an order of magnitude 
less than past levels - hundreds of tonnes per year for tsetse control, plus 
similar quantities for malaria control and agricultural use. Importation of 
DOT for agricultural use in Zimbabwe ceased in 1983. The pesticide was for-
mally restricted other than for tsetse and malaria control in 1985 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1985). Present levels of DOT use in Zimbabwe 
should not give rise to environmental concern. 
Often the positive aspects of DOT are ignored. Apart from the social and 
economic benefits of the pest control in which DOT is used, this chemical 
has extremely low human toxicity. DOT presents no apparent health hazards 
to field workers mixing the formulation or applying it with knapsack sprayers. 
In a study of human levels of DOT residues in Zimbabwe, Mpofu (1986) 
found that levels in DOT spraymen compared favourably with those from the 
USA and India and noted that, according to the WHO, such levels have no 
adverse effects on the individuals. 
In a review of non-target effects of insecticides used in tsetse control oper-
ations, Douthwaite (1992) noted that concern about such effects tends to be 
greatest among those most removed from such operations and is often based 
upon myth and misconception. However, democratic national governments 
and international donors must inevitably take account of public opinion on 
such matters, even where the scientific evidence is to the contrary. 
The development of new methods of tsetse control may in any case make 
DOT ground spraying outdated. In the early 1990s the policy of the ITCB in 
Zimbabwe was to reduce reliance on the use of DOT, while sensibly retain-
ing a capability to use the technique; unforeseen problems may arise with 
the new methods currently being used for large-scale operations. 
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Section 4 
Aerial Spraying 
The aerial application of insecticides for tsetse control has a long history. 
Indeed, following the development of organochlorine insecticides in the 
1940s, the first large-scale tsetse control programme using insecticide 
involved aerial spraying of some 18 000 sq km in Zululand (now Kwa Zulu, 
South Africa) between 1945 and 1952 (du Toit, 1954). 
Aerial spraying can apply either persistent or non-persistent insecticide. In 
general, the deposition of persistent insecticides by aerial application is pro-
hibitively expensive compared with ground spraying, as the latter method 
can be used selectively, to treat only that part of the habitat likely to be pre-
ferred by tsetse, and discriminatively, to treat only preferred resting and ref-
uge sites. Apart from the cost consideration, the aerial application of 
persistent insecticides is likely to have more adverse environmental impact 
than non-persistent application. 
In some West and Central African countries, helicopters have been used 
to apply persistent insecticides in areas of difficult ground access. The advan-
tage over using fixed-wing aircraft is that application can be more selective 
Oordan, 1986, pp 148-154). 
Apart from such special cases, aerial spraying has mostly involved apply-
ing non-persistent insecticides using fixed-wing aircraft. A ULV insecticide is 
applied as a very fine aerosol which drifts through the habitat, the objective 
being to kill all tsetse flies in the treated area. At any one time, some tsetse 
are underground as pupae and therefore protected from the transient insecti-
cide aerosol. In consequence, the treatment must be repeated at regular inter-
vals to ensure that emergent flies are killed before they reach sexual maturity 
and produce offspring. Thus the method is often described as the 'sequential 
aerosol technique' (SAT). 
Because each insecticidal treatment is transient, aerial spraying is techni-
cally very demanding, if eradication is to be achieved. The insecticide must 
be delivered as an aerosol in which the droplet size falls consistently within 
a specified range (about 30 Jlm diameter). The aerosol delivery must be accu-
rate, requiring low-level flying and specific conditions of air temperature and 
movement. Spraying can be conducted from just before dusk until shortly 
after dawn, when ground-level air is characteristically stable and without 
convection, because of temperature inversion. The ideal is little or no wind. 
The aircraft flight path must be carefully controlled to ensure complete 
and even coverage of the treated area. Swath widths (the distance between 
successive flight paths) are usually between 200 m and 400 m. Sophisticated 
on-board navigation systems are used in conjunction with ground-based 
marker teams, equipped with flares and mobile beacons, in constant radio 
contact with the aircraft. 
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Devices are deployed on the ground to collect droplet samples for evalu-
ation of the aerosol. Supplementary insecticidal treatment (filling-in) is given 
where underdosing has occurred as a result of topography, vegetation charac-
teristics, weather, flight-path error or fault in the aerosol delivery system. 
Meteorological conditions are monitored continually throughout the oper-
ation, to estimate the pupal period and first larval period, which determine 
the timing of the spray cycles. 
The ultimate efficacy of the operation can be assessed only through inten-
sive entomological monitoring, using techniques such as bait oxen, odour-
baited stationary traps and vehicle-mounted electric traps (VET). Caught 
female flies are dissected and aged on the basis of ovarian category. The 
initial population structure can be estimated from the females caught before 
spraying, while flies captured during the operation are dissected to determine 
whether they survived the spraying or emerged after the previous spray cycle. 
As low residual fly populations are very difficult to detect, aerial sprayed 
areas have to be monitored for many months after an operation. When occa-
sional flies are detected, or isolated cases of trypanosomiasis occur many 
months after the operation, it is usually difficult to decide whether these have 
occurred because of failure of the aerial spraying or because of intervening 
fly and cattle movement. 
The technique is best suited for relatively flat terrain, both for ease of low-
level night flying and also to achieve homogeneous drift of the insecticide 
fog through the habitat. The treatment of rugged terrain using SAT has always 
been problematical. 
Development of the technique in East Africa 
Much of the early research into aerial spraying was done at the Colonial 
Insecticide Research Institute (which became the Tropical Pesticides Research 
Institute) at Arusha in Tanzania (Lee, 1969 and 1977), where the technical 
feasibility and basic principles of the technique were established. A major 
constraint to widespread use of aerial spraying has always been that ground 
spraying was cheaper. Research and development have therefore concen-
trated on using smaller quantities of insecticide, with higher precision of 
application, to achieve satisfactory tsetse control at lower cost. 
SAT operations in Zambia 
By 1968, the technique was sufficiently developed that a large-scale aerial 
spraying scheme was implemented in the Western Province of Zambia (Park 
et al., 1972). Approximately 1600 sq km of mixed woodland was treated 
with endosulfan, applied over five cycles. The operation appeared very suc-
cessful. lt was reckoned that ground spraying would have cost one third more 
than the aerial spraying. 
Between 1968 and 1978, nine aerial spraying campaigns covered a total 
area of 21 360 sq km (Evison and Kathuria, 1984). Endosulfan was the only 
insecticide used, and various formulations and dose rates were investigated. 
Spraying took place only in daylight hours of temperature inversion. 
Operations in 1982 and 1 983 were funded by the World Bank, while the most 
recent operation, in 1987, was conducted under the RTICP. Aerial spraying 
operations in Zambia are summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of operational statistics for aerial spraying operations 
in Zambia, 1968-87*t 
1968 1970 1971 1972 1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1983 1987'fi 
Area treated (sq km) 
Application rate (g/ha) 
Cycle 1 
Cycle 2 
Cycle 3 
Cycle 4 
Cycle 5 
Total 
Cost breakdown (%) 
Flying charges 
Insecticide 
Ground work 
1990 cost/sq km (Z$lt 
1600 
• 28.0 
28.0 
28.0 
28.0 
28.0 
140.0 
29 
56 
15 
770 
1535 
28.0 
28.0 
28.0 
28.0 
112.0 
86 
10 
5 
938 
3055 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
100.0 
81 
16 
3 
599 
3700 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
80.0 
76 
20 
4 
506 
2970 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
20.0 
100.0 
78 
19 
3 
548 
3400 
18.0 
13.0 
12.0 
10.0 
10.0 
63 .0 
60 
38 
2 
523 
1100 
12.0 
12.0 
6.7 
4 .9 
4.9 
40 .5 
77 
20 
3 
1049 
2000 
10.0 
13.0 
12.0 
10.0 
10.0 
55 .0 
67 
30 
3 
822 
2000 
18.0 
18.0 
12 .0 
12.0 
60.0 
66 
31 
3 
768 
2000 
18.0 
18.0 
12.0 
16.5 
16.5 
81 .0 
so 
40 
10 
572 
Source Evison and Kathuria (1984); Annual reports of the DVTCS, Republic of Zambia; ASRDP operational 
reports; Putt et al. (1989). 
4500 
22.0 
15.0 
18.0 
14.0 
14.0 
83 .0 
58 
42 
1017 
t Only endosulfan was used in the above operations. An operation covering 1000 sq km was 
carried out in 1982 but details were not available at the time of preparation of this report. 
* No aerial spraying was carried out in 1969, 1974, 1979-81, 1984-86. 
t Historic Zambian Kwacha costs were adjusted to 1990 prices using the official Consumer 
Price Index (International Financial Statistics of the IMF). 1990 Zambian Kwacha prices 
were converted to 1990 Zimbabwe dollar prices using the average official exchange rate 
for 1990. 
~ The 1987 operation cost 766 000 ECU in flying charges plus 560 280 ECU for insecticide. 
This is converted to Zambian Kwacha at the July 1987 exchange rate of 1 ECU = ZK8.706. 
Ground costs are not included. 
SAT operations in Botswana 
Aerial spraying has been the mainstay of tsetse control in Botswana since the 
technique was first investigated in a series of trials in 1972. Tsetse infestation 
is confined to very flat terrain in and around the Okavango Delta, where G. 
morsitans centralis is the only tsetse species present. This situation is well sui-
ted to aerial spraying, while difficult to tackle from the ground because of 
access and flooding problems. 
Aerial spraying operations from 1973 to 1979 were described in detail by 
Davies (1980) and summarized by Jordan (1986: pp 185-193). Putt (1985) 
reported figures for operations between 1980 and 1984. The area treated per 
year increased steadily as it became feasible to use more than one aircraft, 
flying in formation (Table 4.2). The type of aircraft and navigation system 
improved over time. The standard operation eventually comprised four spray 
cycles, although earlier operations occasionally involved more. 
Initially, only endosulfan was used, which is comparatively toxic to fish. 
As much of the spraying was over the waters of the Okavango Delta, an 
alternative insecticide was sought that had less environmental impact. The 
eventual preference was for a mixture of endosulfan with a synthetic pyre-
throid, such as deltamethrin. 
For several years after 1985, Dakota DC3 aircraft were used for aerial 
spraying with a 1 km swath width, greatly increasing the area that could be 
treated per year and reducing the cost significantly. lt is understood that the 
Department of Veterinary Services in Botswana has subsequently reverted to 
using smaller aircraft and narrower swath width. 
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w Table 4.2 Summary of operational statistics for aerial spraying operations carried out in Botswana between 1973 and 1984 00 
1973 1974 1975-A 1975-B 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Area treated (sq km) 1150 1300 1000 1700 2500 4000 2500 3000 1750 6000 6500 9350 7500 
Insecticide used* E E E E E E E D,E E D,E D,E D,E A,E 
Number of spray cycles 3 4 4 6 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
Swath width (m) 300 300 300 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 
Application rate (g/ha) D E D E D E D E A E 
Cycle 1 11.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 0.2 12.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 
Cycle 2 11.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 9.5 9.5 12.0 0.1 6.0 9.5 9.5 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 
Cycle 3 7.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 
Cycle 4 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 0.1 6.0 
Cycle 5 6.0 9.5 9. 5 9.5 9.5 9.5 
Cycle 6 6.0 
TOTAL 29.2 24.0 24.0 36.0 33.5 43.0 49.0 0.3 34.5 50.0 0.1 44.0 0.4 24.0 0.4 24.0 0.4 24.0 
Spray aircraft used 
Piper Aztecs 1 1 2 
Cessna 301 
Aerocommander 5008 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Shrike Commander 1 1 1 
Navigation equipment 
Decca Doppler *** *** 
Global VLF *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
litton 3000 *** 
Source Putt (1985) citing Davies (1980) and unpublished data provided by Mr J Bowles, Chief Tsetse Control Officer, Department of Veterinary Services, Botswana. 
* E: endosulfan; D: deltamethrin; A: alphamethrin. 
Other aspects of the SAT were refined and developed in Botswana (Davies 
and Bowles, 1979; All so pp, 1984) in collaboration with Britain's Centre for 
Overseas Pest Research (COPR, now part of NRI). This included night flying, 
techniques for aerosol monitoring and evaluation, and environmental impact 
assessment of the insecticides. 
SAT operations in Somalia 
In Somalia, a National Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Project (NTTCP) 
was established in 1980, with funding from the Arab Fund for Economic and 
Social Development, and with technical assistance from COPR. The aim was 
to pursue the possibil ity of eradicating tsetse (mainly Glossina pallidipes, but 
also G. longipennis and G. brevipalpis) from an area of approximately 
13 000 sq km of forest and thicket along the Shabeelle and Jubba river sys-
tems. 
The first five-year phase of the NTTCP involved tsetse surveys, land use 
studies and trials of tsetse control by SAT using fixed-wing aircraft, with a 
view to large-scale eradication in a second phase. In pilot operations in 1983 
and 1984, 3500 sq km were aerial sprayed using endosulfan. The insecticide 
was applied using fixed-wing aircraft in low level flight, in five spray cycles 
with 200 m swath widths, at 12 day intervals (NTTCP, 1985). Eradication 
was not achieved. Although meteorological conditions were not ideal, the 
failure was primarily attributed to an inadequate rate of application of the 
insecticide. In consequence a 'Transition Phase' of the project was implemen-
ted to further develop and test the SAT, before proceeding with Phase 11. 
A large-scale aerial spraying operation was conducted between January 
and March 1988, as a turn-key operation covering 3500 sq km, in which 
endosulfan was applied in five cycles. Pockets of flies survived the aerial 
spraying. These were dealt with by a combination of semi-residual insecti-
cide application from the ground and by helicopter, and by the use of insecti-
cide-impregnated targets. In early 1989, it appeared that eradication had 
been achieved Oordan and Holmes, 1989) but the NTTCP was subsequently 
disrupted by the outbreak of civil war. 
The Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control 
Programme in southern Africa 
Meanwhile, there was renewed interest in aerial spraying in southern Africa. 
A substantial area in Zimbabwe was lost to reinvasion by the fly during the 
period of hostilities prior to achievement of majority rule in 1980. 
Zimbabwe's TTCB lacked the resources to regain control of the situation 
using ground spraying alone so, in addition, aerial spraying was tried. A 
large-scale trial was undertaken in 1982 with technical support from COPR 
(Hursey and Allsopp, 1983). Good results were obtained, while pressure was 
increasing to discontinue DDT ground spraying. 
At this time, plans were prepared for a Regional Tsetse and 
Trypanosomiasis Control Programme (RTTCP) to be funded by the European 
Community (now the European Union), covering the so-called 'common fly 
belt' extending over parts of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique 
(EC, 1983). The area of the common fly belt was approximately 320 000 sq 
km and the aim was to completely and permanently eradicate tsetse from the 
entire area. Aerial spraying was the control method advocated in the project 
documents (PTNMinster, 1983; Lovemore, 1987). 
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The first phase of the RTTCP commenced in 1985, with the objective to 
further explore the technical feasibility and economic viability of the operations 
to be undertaken in Phase Two. Phase One included the establishment of an 
Aerial Spraying Research and Development Project (ASRDP), implemented by 
TDRI (now NRI), with the objective of determining the capabil ities and limita-
tions of aerial spraying, particularly in rugged terra in. Most of the research took 
place in Zimbabwe, in collaboration with the TTCB. Some research and one 
large-scale operation (in 1987, described above) took place in Zambia. 
Other SAT operations 
Small-scale or pilot SAT operations have been implemented in numerous 
countries, including Nigeria (Putt et al., 1980), Kenya (Coutts, 1981; Turner 
and Brightwell, 1986), Tanzania (Gao and Mwashala, 1981 ), Cote d'lvoire 
(one operation in 1979) and Uganda (Sserunjoj i Ssebalijja, 1981 ). However, 
the technique has not been used extensively outside Botswana, Somalia, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Twelve aerial spraying operations against tsetse have taken place in Zimbabwe 
since the technique was first tried in the mid-1950s. The total area treated was 
just under 20 000 sq km, of which more than 90% is represented by the seven 
operations conducted between 1982 and 1988 (Table 4.3). 
Experience in the 1950s 
The first aerial spraying in Zimbabwe was conducted in 1953 and 1954, over 
an area of 260 sq km west of the Urungwe Reserve. The TTCB employed the 
same contractors involved in the famous Zululand operations (du Toit, 1954). 
Owing to a combination of bad luck, inexperience and inadequate planning, 
the experiment was apparently a fiasco (Thomas et al., 1955). 
In 1956, an area of about 20 sq km near Kariba township was sprayed by 
air with ten applications of benzene hexachloride (BHC), with technical sup-
port from the Colonial Insecticide Research Institute in Tanzania. The objec-
tive was to reduce the risk of human trypanosomiasis t ransmission during 
construction of the Kariba dam. The operation was considered successful. 
As a consequence of the Kariba dam construction, the African population 
resident within the inundated area were moved (at their choice) to the Lubu 
Valley. Perhaps ironically, this was their ancestral land, from· which their 
parents' generation had been forcibly removed by the Rhodesian 
Government, because of an outbreak of human trypanosomiasis in 1912. The 
Lubu Valley was still heavily infested with tsetse f lies in 1957. So, aerial 
spraying was undertaken before the people moved back. 
The Lubu Valley operation in 1957 involved treatment of approximately 
260 sq km, using BHC applied in six cycles through the exhaust stack of 
Anson and Tiger Moth aircraft. A 'good level of control' was achieved, but 
not eradication. Cattle were subsequently introduced into the area and were 
protected from trypanosomiasis by drugs (Cockbill et al., 1963). The cost of 
the aerial spraying at Lubu was estimated at 14.2 shillings per acre. Two 
years later, in preliminary trials, ground spraying cost 6.6 shillings per acre. 
In 1960, the very successful ground spraying at Maseme cost only 1.5 shil-
lings per acre. lt is understandable that, in following years, the TTCB concen-
trated on ground and not aerial spraying for its large-scale operations. 
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Table 4.3 Summary of operational statistics for aerial spraying operations 
in Zimbabwe, 1982-88 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Area treated (sq km) 2400 2100 1700 1681 3200 4700 1984 
Insecticide used* E D,E E E E E D 
Swath w idth (m) 200 200 200 200 200 250 250 
Application rate (g/ha) D E 
Cycle 1 25.0 0.28 24.0 24.6 22.1 24.0 0.25 
Cycle 2 21 .9 25.2 18.0 22.0 17.0 20.0 0.25 
Cycle 3 15.6 18.0 14.8 16.2 13.9 16.0 0.25 
Cycle 4 15.9 13.2 18.8 14.5 14.3 14.0 0.25 
Cycle 5 15.4 13.6 19.3 14.9 14.3 14.0 0.25 
Cycle 6 18.0 
TOTAL 93 .8 0.28 70.0 94.9 92.2 81 .5 106.0 1.25 
Spray aircraft used 
Piper Aztecs 2 2 
Ayres Thrush 1 1 
Cessna 401 2 2 2 2 2 
Baron Beechcraft 2 2 1 
Bell 206 )et Ranger 
Flying efficiency 
Piper Aztecs 48.0% 50.3% 43.5% 
Ayres Thrush 57.0% 
Cessna 201 
Baron Beechcraft 
Navigation equipment 
Decca Doppler *** 
Decca Doppler+ TANS *** *** *** *** *** 
DIMS/SGP 500 *** 
Atomizer used 
Micronair AU 3000 *** 
Micronair AU 5000 *** *** 
Micronair AU 4000 *** *** *** *** 
Source Hursey and Allsopp (1983 and 1984); Al lsopp and Hursey (1986); Hursey et al. (1987); unpublished 
reports of the RTTCP and ASRDP. 
* E: endosulfan; D: deltamethrin. 
Experience in the 1970s 
Interest in aerial spraying was not revived until the mid-1970s, when pressure 
increased to reduce the use of DOT ground spraying for environmental 
reasons (Cockbill, 1975 : pp 78-81 ). By this time, aerial spraying had been 
proven in Zambia and Botswana. 
In 1974, an area of 260 sq km within the Chirisa game reserve was treated 
with endosulfan applied as a ULV formulation (Chapman, 1976). Eradication 
was not achieved, which was inconclusively attributed to two possible factors: 
• the trial area was too small, so that flies found in the block after the spray-
ing may have been invaders; and 
• the dose rate had been insufficient to kill all adult females, especially in 
the case of Glossina pallidipes. 
A larger area of 732 sq km, again within the Chirisa reserve, was treated in 
1975, using five cycles. A good level of control was achieved. The operation 
was costed at Z$115.45 per sq km (TTCB annual report, 1975), whereas 
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ground spraying between 1977 and 1979 cost between Z$60 to Z$80 per sq 
km (current prices). The rapidly deteriorating security situation prior to major-
ity rule in 1980 precluded further development of the technique. 
Experience from 1982 to 1988 
Seven large-scale aerial spraying operations were conducted between 1982 
and 1988 (Table 4.3), with an average area just over 2500 sq km. Endosulfan 
was used except in one operation, in which deltamethrin was used for all 
cycles, and another in which deltamethrin was used for the first cycle only. 
Although a standardized method was subsequently recommended (AIIsopp, 
1991 ), operational procedures were modified continually during the 1980s. 
Accordingly, each operation is reviewed, briefly. 
1982 
When aerial spraying was re-introduced into large-scale control operations in 
Zimbabwe in 1982, the objectives were: 
• to increase the capability of the TICB to recover the large areas reinvaded 
by tsetse flies during the war; and 
• to explore the technique in broken hilly terrain, typical of much of 
Zimbabwe's remaining tsetse-infested area. 
The areas selected for the 1982 operation were due south of Lake Kariba in 
the Western Region of Zimbabwe (F igure 4.1 ). A large proportion of the 
aerial spraying block had been ground sprayed with DOT in the previous 
year, so that the fly population had already been suppressed. On the other 
hand, the terrain was rugged and uneven, presenting potential difficu lties for 
aerial spraying. Most of the area immediately surrounding the aerial spray 
block was ground sprayed in 1982. 
The operation was described in detail by Hursey and Allsopp (1983). The 
main spray aircraft were two two-seater Piper Aztecs, supported by an Ayres 
Turbo Thrush. This was used mainly for 'filling in' areas of difficult terrain, 
where droplet penetration was expected to be more difficult to achieve. A 
Bell 47 helicopter was used for ferrying warning beacons and other monitor-
ing equipment. The spray aircraft were fitted with wind-driven Micronair 
rotary atomizers and Decca Doppler navigation systems. Navigation was 
assisted by ground marker-teams, equipped with flares and mobile beacons. 
Entomological surveys before, during and after the campaign used a combi-
nation of bait-ox teams, F-3 traps and VETs. Meteorological and droplet mon-
itoring was continual throughout the operation. 
At the time, it appeared that complete eradication had been achieved 
throughout the block. At the end of December 1982, three months after the 
end of spraying, despite intense surveying, no flies were captured in the area 
which had been aerial sprayed, except for one fly, ambiguously caught on 
the boundary between aerial and ground spraying. By Apri l 1984, about 15% 
of the block still had a population of C. morsitans, which was subsequent ly 
retreated by ground spraying. lt was undecided whether these were surviving 
or invading flies. 
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Figure 4.1 Aerial spraying operations in the Western Region of Zimbabwe, 
1982-85. 
1983 
Since the aerial spraying in 1982 had been successful over relatively rugged 
terrain, a further 2100 sq km were treated in even more rugged terrain. The 
triangular block lay between the Kariba lakeshore and the Chizarira escarp-
ment (Figure 4.1 ). As in 1982, part of the area adjacent to the aerial spraying 
block was ground sprayed with DOT. 
The design of the operation was as in 1982, except that 'filling in' with the 
Ayres Thrush was abandoned, to test whether conventional spraying alone 
would be sufficient to achieve eradication (Hursey and Allsopp, 1984) . 
Furthermore, it was decided to test whether deltamethrin (already being used 
in Botswana) could replace endosulfan. Unfortunately, there were widespread 
survivors following the first cycle, in which 0.4% deltamethrin was applied at 
0.25 glha. Consequently, endosulfan was used for the remaining four cycles. 
Following the second cycle, no surviving tsetse were found, except within the 
Ruziruhuru river valley in the north-eastern part of the block, where some flies 
were surviving every spray cycle. The fly population was dense to the north of 
the spray block and commenced reinvasion ofthe cleared area. Six months after 
aerial spraying, two-thirds of the treated block appeared to remain tsetse-free. 
1984 
The campaign in the Western Region continued with the 1984 spray block 
overlapping the 1983 block by 30 km (AIIsopp and Hursey, 1986; Figure 
4.1 ). New operational features included the introduction of Cessna 401 twin-
engined aircraft, which were more powerful and manoeuverable than the 
Piper Aztecs. Only one formulation (30%) of endosulfan was used, instead of 
the two formulations (20 and 30%) used previously. 
The results were disappointing, as flies survived the first and third spray 
cycles. Although the insecticide application rate was raised to 18 glha 
(instead of the normal 14 glha) for the fourth and fifth cycles, a low density 
residual population was eventually discovered throughout much of the 
sprayed area. The reasons for failure were not clear. Suggested factors 
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included the use of only the 30% endosulfan formulation, the fact that the 
operation had commenced late in the season, when temperatures were 
higher than in previous operations, and the fact that peripheral ground spray-
ing had failed to eradicate, so leaving a source of reinvasion. 
1985 
Two adjacent blocks were sprayed in 1985 (Figure 4.1 ), one of which was a 
re-treatment of part of the 1984 block. The main novelty was the establish-
ment of a line of targets, baited with acetone and octenol, along 70 km of 
the perimeter of the aerial spray block, to protect against reinvasion. The 'tar-
get barrier' was 600 m wide comprising four lines, 200 m apart, with an 
overall density of 27 targets per linear km. 
Aerial spraying still failed to eliminate G. pallidipes from the Siakobvu 
valleys, despite dosing with insecticide at apparent levels which had 
achieved eradication elsewhere. This pocket, covering an area of some 100 
sq km, was eventually cleared up by ground spraying. 
One year after the 1985 operation, both the north and south blocks 
appeared to be clear of tsetse, despite the discovery of surviving G. pallidipes 
after the first and second cycles. The 1985 operation was considered success-
ful at the time, but the block required partial retreatment by ground spraying 
in 1986. Most of the block was ground sprayed in 1987, and yet again in 
1988, before eradication was achieved. No further aerial spraying took place 
in the Western Region after 1985. 
1986 
The shift in operations from the Western Region to the north-eastern part of 
Zimbabwe was partly due to the implementation of the RTICP, which made 
EC funds available to support an operation in the Chesa small-scale farming 
area. In 1986, the TICB undertook a large-scale control operation which 
covered almost 10 000 sq km in the northeast of the country. This involved a 
combination of ground spraying, aerial spraying, targets and applying delta-
methrin to cattle (Hursey et al., 1987; Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 Aerial spraying operations in the northeast of Zimbabwe, 1986-88. 
44 
The aerial-sprayed block covered some 3200 sq km of land that was 
mostly under smallholder agriculture. The tsetse population was of low to 
medium density, G. morsitans only. Tsetse were largely confined to residual 
natural vegetation located along main drainages, and to areas of poor soils 
and low agricultural potential. The operation followed the lines of the 1985 
operation, with the addition of two Beechcraft Baron aircraft to cope with 
the unprecedented scale of the operation. 
A low-density tsetse population was eradicated over almost all of the 
aerial sprayed block, but residual flies were found close to the block treated 
using targets, where the tsetse population was high. This residual population 
was successfully eradicated by ground spraying. The incidence of trypanoso-
miasis dwindled to zero, except for two cases recorded immediately adjacent 
to the target block in early 1987. lt was unclear whether the residual flies 
had survived the aerial spraying or had invaded from the target block, where 
eradication had not yet been achieved by the time the aerial spraying was 
completed. 
1987 
The 1987 operation covered some 4700 sq km of smallholder farming land 
below the Zambezi escarpment, adjacent to the Mozambique border (Figure 
4.2). Tsetse species present included G. morsitans at low to medium density, 
and G. pallidipes at low density. The spraying block was protected from re-
invasion by a target barrier. After five cycles, G. morsitans was eliminated 
throughout the block, but not G. pallidipes. A sixth spray cycle was conduc-
ted, but, within two months, 32 G. pallidipes were caught at distances of 5 
to 25 km inside the perimeter of the block. Many if not most of these flies 
were probably survivors. The residual tsetse population was tackled by 
deploying targets, and cattle in the area were treated regularly with delta-
methrin at an application rate designed to kill tsetse. 
1988 
The 1988 operation covered some 2000 sq km to the west of the 1987 block, 
again below the escarpment on the relatively flat floor of the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley (Figure 4.2). The density of both G. morsitans and G. pallidipes was 
much higher than in the 1987 operation. While the main objective was to 
achieve eradication, an additional function of the 1988 operation was to test 
the effectiveness and environmental acceptability of deltamethrin as a substi-
tute for endosulfan. 
Five cycles were conducted in which deltamethrin was applied at 0.25 F) 
ha throughout. G. morsitans appeared to have been eradicated from the 
sprayed areas, but not G. pallidipes. As in the 1987 operation, targets were 
deployed in an attempt to complete eradication. Cattle in the area were trea-
ted regularly with deltamethrin. 
Direct costs 
TICB and RTICP reports of aerial spraying generally included castings of the 
insecticide used, the staff and vehicles directly involved in the operation, and 
the charges of the aerial spraying contractor (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 Summary of cost data for aerial spraying operations in 
Zimbabwe, 1982-88 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Area treated (sq km) 2400 2100 1700 1681 3200 4700 
Total cost/sq km Z$, 1990 prices 653 657 707 751 789 820 
Flying chargest 56 58 59 53 59 59 
lnsecticidet 41 35 37 39 35 36 
lncidentalst 3 7 4 8 5 5 
1988 
1984 
1036 
60 
35 
5 
Source Hursey and Allsopp {1983 and 1984); Allsopp and Hursey (1986); Hursey et al. {1987); unpublished 
reports of the ASRDP and RTTCP. 
* Incidentals include catering, stores and equipment, transport and labour. 
t as%. 
Between 1982 and 1988, over the total treated area of 17 765 sq km, the 
cost of aerial spraying averaged Z$780/sq km, in 1990 prices. This is well 
within the range, but above the average cost (about Z$670/sq km), for past 
operations in Zambia (Table 4.1). 
The real cost of operations in Zimbabwe rose steadily, from about Z$650/ 
sq km in 1982-83, to over Z$1 000/sq km in 1988. As the rate of insecticide 
application did not change greatly during these years (Table 4.3), an expla-
nation must be sought in changes in the flying charges and the cost of insec-
ticide, which account for more than 90% of the costs. 
Insecticide costs 
With adjustment for inflation, the cost per litre of endosulfan (Thiodan, 
Hoechst Zimbabwe Ltd) was only 10-15% higher in 1988 than in 1982. The 
deltamethrin used in the 1988 operation was significantly more expensive 
per unit area treated than previous endosulfan costs. However, this is anom-
alous, as the contracted price for the deltamethrin used in this operation was 
specifically based on the equivalent price if endosulfan had been used. The 
high price was due to inflation and exchange rate movements which were 
not anticipated at the time of the contract preparation. 
Flying charges 
Flying charges per sq km treated increased moderately in real terms between 
1982 and 1988. The apparently very high cost in 1988 is partly due to 
exchange rate and inflationary factors. The 1987 cost of Z$481 per sq km 
was still some 30% above the 1982 cost, even though the 1987 operation 
was on a much larger scale and overheads should have been lower. 
Increased costs are partly due to changes in the type of service provided, and 
partly to changes in real unit costs, reflecting growing distortions in the 
Zimbabwe economy in the 1980s. 
The 'flying charges' given in Table 4.4 are the overall cost of hiring aerial spray-
ing contractors to provide the aircraft and pilots to apply the insecticide, including 
so-called 'fixed' and 'variable' costs. Some of the fixed costs do in practice relate to 
the size of the operation, albeit less directly than the 'variable' costs, and include: 
• preparation of the aircraft, including procurement and fitting of special 
lights for night flying, navigation equipment, insecticide tanks, rotary ato-
mizers, and other equipment, and subsequent calibration trials; 
• preparation of the airstrip, including provision of fuel bowsers, insecticide 
storage, landing lights, accommodation and operational facilities; 
• pilot training in low-level night formation flying and use of the specialized 
navigation and spraying equipment; 
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• salaries and allowances for all pilots, ground crew and support staff; and 
• aircraft insurance and charges for equipment other than the aircraft. 
The variable costs are those incurred in the flying operation once the spraying 
is actually under way, and correspond to direct costs according to the method-
ology given in Section 2. Table 4.5 gives a breakdown of the flying charges for 
the 1987 and 198-8 operations in Zimbabwe. The variable costs per sq km are 
not significantly different in the two years, whereas fixed costs per sq km were 
much greater in 1988 (62% of total costs) than in 1987 (48%), because of the 
difference in scale of operation. Unfortunately, disaggregated fixed and vari-
able cost data are not available for operations prior to 1987. 
Table 4.5 Breakdown of flying charges for the 1987 and 1988 aerial 
spraying operations in Zimbabwe (Z$'000, 1990 prices) 
Year of Operation 1987 1988 
Z$'000 As percentage of Z$'000 As percentage of 
c B c B 
General Fixed Costs 
Mobilization/demobilization of 
overall operation 1027 45.4 715 57.1% 
Insurance 77 3.4 62 5.0 
A SUB-TOTAL, FIXED COSTS 1104 48.8 777 62.1 
Variable Costs 
Mob/demob for each cycle* 31 1.4 2.7 15 1.2 3.2 
Flight preparationt 
11085 
42 3.4 8.9 
Ferry flyingt 55 4.4 11.7 
Flight line flying~ 48.0 93.7 207 16.6 43.6 
Turning time§ 113 9.0 23.7 
Helicopter duties§§ 41 1.8 3.6 42 3.4 8.8 
B SUB-TOTAL OF VARIABLE COST 1157 51.2 100.0 475 37.9 100.0 
C TOTAL FIXED AND VARIABLE COSTS 2261 100.0 1252 100.0 
Area of operation (sq km) 4700 1984 
Total flying charges per sq km (Z$, 1990) 481 631 
Source R. Allsopp, ASRDP team leader, personal communication. Based on tender documentation for RTTCP 
operations. 
* Aircraft and staff may return to headquarters between spray cycles. 
t Up to 15 min per aircraft per sortie may be required for pre-flight checks with engine 
running and for the entire formation to become airborne. 
t Ferrying refers to the flight time between the airstrip and the spray block. 
,-r Actual time spent dispensing insecticide in the spray block. 
§ lt takes 2-4 min to turn the aircraft round between each run . 
§§ The helicopter is used for deployment of beacons and monitoring equipment. 
There is no evidence that operations differed greatly in operational 
efficiency. Hursey and Allsopp (1983) estimated that the 1982 operation 
required 510 flying hours, of which 48% of the Piper Aztecs' time was spent 
in insecticide spraying. Allsopp (unpublished ASRDP reports) estimated that 
the equivalent 'flying efficiency' of the aircraft used in the 1988 operation 
was 43.5%, which he considered to be a typical figure. 
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In earlier operations, the spraying contractors used older aircraft (Piper 
Aztecs and an Ayres Thrush) which were modified for the tsetse control oper-
ation. In later operations, new aircraft were acquired (Cessna 401 s and 
Beechcraft Barons) with fittings purpose-built for tsetse control. The contrac-
tor invested in expensive navigation and computer-controlled atomizer equip-
ment, which probably resulted in higher charges to recover these costs. 
Indirect costs 
Indirect costs of an aerial spraying operation include: 
• access provision and maintenance; 
• ground marker teams; 
• entomological monitoring; 
• meteorological monitoring; and 
• aerosol droplet (physico-chemical) monitoring. 
The technical requirements for these activities have been described by 
Allsopp (1991 ). General indirect and overhead costs of the TICS were exam-
ined by Barrett (1994). The cost data in Table 4.4 include manpower and 
vehicles used in ground duties. Unfortunately, the published reports from 
which the data are drawn do not provide a breakdown of the expenditure. 
Most of the indirect costs incurred in the 1987 and 1988 operations are 
explained in records held by the RTICP and TICS. Substantial expenses 
were incurred on research and development, and to establish and maintain a 
target barrier around the block. These should be discounted in assessing the 
basic cost of aerial spraying. 
The main cost item excluded from Table 4.4 is physico-chemical monitor-
ing. During aerial spraying operations in Zimbabwe in the 1980s, physico-
chemical monitoring has been undertaken by TDRI/NRI staff in a research/ 
consultancy role. Barrett (1994) undertook a detailed analysis of the costs 
incurred in droplet monitoring. These are about Z$1 00 000 per operation, 
where technical consultants are employed to work with local support staff. 
For straightforward operations over a number of years, local staff could be 
trained to do the physico-chemical monitoring. This would reduce the annual 
cost by between 25% and 50%, depending on the number of years over 
which training costs could be spread. 
Cost per unit of area treated 
Table 4.6 presents a cost model of aerial spraying in which three scenarios 
are examined. 
In the basic scenario, based upon recent experience in Zimbabwe, the 
overall cost amounts to Z$933 per sq km treated, represented mainly by the 
spraying contractor's charges (60%) and the insecticide cost (32%). 
The optimistic scenario shows costs decreasing to Z$715 per sq km where 
lower insecticide application rates are feasible, for example in flat, open ter-
rain against C. morsitans, in the absence of C. pallidipes, and for a large 
operation with economy of scale. 
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Table 4.6 Cost model of aerial spraying (1990 prices, Z$) 
Basic Optimistic 
scenario scenario 
Operational area (sq km) 3000 6000 
Insecticide applied/sq km (g a.i.) 90 72 
A DIRECT COSTS (Z$/sq km) Z$ % Z$ % 
Insecticide* 290 31 232 32 
Flying chargest 240 26 240 34 
Sub-total 530 57 472 66 
B INDIRECT COSTS Z$ % Z$ % 
Aerial flying contractor's 'fixed' Total ('000) 950 1200 
chargest Per sq km 317 34 200 28 
Physico-chemical monitoring~ Total ('000) 100 100 
Per sq km 33 4 17 2 
Ground marker teams§ Total ('000) 20 30 
Per sq km 7 5 
Tsetse survey teams§§ Total ('000) 15 30 
Per sq km 5 5 
Access provision, camp and airstrip Total ('000) 75 so 
construction and maintenance** Per sq km 25 3 8 
Other indirect costs** Total ('000) so so 
Per sq km 17 2 8 
C. TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS/SQ KM 933 100 715 100 
Pessimistic 
scenario 
1500 
120 
Z$ % 
387 30 
240 19 
627 49 
Z$ % 
700 
467 36 
100 
67 5 
20 
13 
15 
10 
100 
67 5 
so 
33 3 
1283 100 
* The basic scenario assumes application rates and costs comparable with past operations in 
Zimbabwe as shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. A lower application rate used for the optimistic 
scenario is upon controlling only G. morsitans, in flat terrain. The higher rate used in the 
pessimistic scenario allows for possible need to increase dosage to eradicate G. pa/lidipes, 
especially in less-than-ideal terrain. 
t See Table 4.5. 
t Estimated on the basis of data in Table 4.5. Although given as an indirect cost, many of the 
cost components are related to the size of the operation. 
~ See Barrett, 1994, Appendix D. 
§ A marker team comprises one TFO with driver and field assistant, equipped with a four-
wheel drive vehicle fitted with telescopic beacon and ground-to-air radio. Two teams are 
budgeted for the basic and pessimistic scenarios and three teams for the optimistic 
scenario. Cost includes manpower, vehicle and equipment costs. 
§§ A budget is provided for a TFO, three field assistants and six general hands for carrying out a 
variety of survey techniques. The budget includes manpower and vehicle costs specifically 
incurred for operational monitoring. The budget is doubled for the 6000 sq km operation. 
** Budgeted on the basis of historical expenditure levels on ground spraying operations (Table 
3.5 with a downward adjustment). 
The pessimistic scenario shows the implications of higher application 
rates, for example to achieve eradication of C. pallidipes, especially in less-
than-ideal terrain. A smaller scale of operation is also considered, which 
increases the overhead costs. Total cost increases to Z$1283 per sq km. 
Cost per unit of area reclaimed 
Few aerial spraying operations in Zimbabwe have eliminated tsetse from the 
entire treated area. This is partly because some operations have deliberately 
aimed to test the limits of the technique, particularly in respect of terrain. In 
some cases, re-invading flies were the problem. 
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Failure to eradicate G. pallidipes in the 1987 and 1988 operations leaves 
some uncertainty about the feasibility of the technique against this species of 
fly. The ASRDP concluded that the failure to eradicate G. pallidipes was 
probably due to underdosing, particularly in the later spray cycles when 
application rates were reduced. lt remains to be demonstrated that higher 
application rates would achieve eradication, and that the environmental 
impact of such rates would be acceptable. 
Confidence that aerial spraying can achieve eradication has increased in 
recent years, as a result of improved aerosol production technology and 
better aircraft navigation systems. However, aerial spraying cannot yet be car-
ried out with complete confidence that sufficient insecticide will reach all 
parts of the tsetse habitat within the treated area. Underdosing can result 
from pilot error, mechanical failures on the aircraft, adverse localized meteor-
ology and peculiar topographical or vegetat ion features. Supplementary aerial 
spraying is commonly necessary in such underdosed areas, or complemen-
tary tsetse control measures are needed to consolidate eradication. 
Since some surviving flies are anticipated, an aerial spraying operation 
should always achieve eventual eradication, providing that the failure is not 
widespread and all pockets of survivors are identified and dealt with. The 
proportion of the treated area needing re-treatment will depend on the cir-
cumstances. Important factors will include the geography of the area, meteor-
ology at the time of spraying, competence of the contractors, and the 
efficiency of the ground-based teams in detecting and following up localized 
underdosing. Complete eradication could be achieved in one attempt in a 
well-organized operation in flat, open terrain with low to medium fly popu-
lation. In more rugged terrain, still well within the limits of the technique, 
and with medium to high fly densities, up to 20% of the treated area may 
require supplementary treatment of one kind or another. Higher failure rates 
reflect poor planning and implementation, or use of the technique in inap-
propriate circumstances. 
On this basis, the cost per unit of area reclaimed should be less than 20% 
above the cost of treatment, provided that aerial spraying is carried out 
within the limits of the technique. 
Environmental impact monitoring 
A controversial issue in aerial spraying operations has been the environmen-
tal impact of the insecticides used. Environmental impact monitoring can 
have considerable financial implications, as exemplified by the Scientific and 
Environmental Monitoring Group (SEMG) established by the EC {succeeded 
by the European Union) with responsibility for monitoring all aspects of pesti-
cide impact related to the control operations of the RTICP. 
The total expenditure on environmental monitoring of the four RTICP 
aerial spraying operations conducted in Zambia and Zimbabwe between 
1986 and 1988 was 800 000 ECU (Putt et al. 1989; about Z$2 million in 
1990 prices). Over the total operational area of 14 300 sq km, the environ-
mental monitoring charge was thus approximately Z$140 per sq km treated, 
which is about 15% of the cost of spraying (Z$933 per sq km) in the basic 
scenario of Table 4.6. 
A substantial proportion of the SEMG expenditure was attributable to 
research studies which would not be necessary in routine monitoring. Some 
environmental monitoring will be required in any aerial spraying operation, 
although there is no consensus yet on what level of activity is appropriate. 
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Where the likely impact is understood, on the basis of past studies, environ-
mental monitoring may be confined to identifying and responding to prob-
lems resulting from incorrect handling or spraying of the insecticide. More 
detailed work may be necessary in operations covering new or special eco-
systems, or where insecticide application rates are increased significantly 
above previous levels. This could apply, for example, in operations against 
G. pallidipes. 
lt is not possible to prescribe a general level of expenditure on environ-
mental monitoring of aerial spraying operations. However, this is a significant 
cost which should be considered in planning and appraisal. 
The use of helicopters for dealing with rugged terrain 
The use of helicopters for SAT operations is unlikely to be cost-effective where 
fixed-wing aircraft can be used. However, the application of non-residual insec-
ticides by helicopter may be an option in small , isolated areas of rugged terrain, 
within a larger area otherwise well-suited to aerial spraying with fixed-wing air-
craft. Tsetse control in rugged terrain can be problematical for ground spraying 
or target operations, especially where vehicular access routes are difficult to 
establish and maintain. Parts of the area may be difficult to reach, even on foot. 
In July and August 1989, a trial was carried out at Shamrock Mine on the 
Zambezi escarpment in northern Zimbabwe to test the technical feasibility of 
using helicopters for the SAT. A cost analysis based on the experience of that 
trial is included in Appendix 1. This considers a situation where a large-scale 
operation with fixed-wing aircraft is already under way, including the use of 
a helicopter for ferrying beacons and other field equipment. In such a situ-
ation, the marginal cost of using such a helicopter for spraying small areas of 
rugged terrain could be close to the average, overall cost of a fixed-wing 
operation. In such circumstances, and in the absence of cheaper alternatives, 
the use of helicopters could in theory be justifiable. 
Although the technical results of the Shamrock Mine trial were encourag-
ing, further work will be required to prove the technical feasibility of the 
technique, to establish recommended operational procedures and to define 
the limits of application. 
Using the SAT for control rather than eradication 
Previous large-scale aerial spraying operations have mostly aimed to eradi-
cate tsetse within the treated area. However, in some circumstances, the SAT 
might have a useful role for reducing the tsetse population without attempt-
ing eradication. For example: 
• to suppress fly populations threatening to expand into presently fly-free areas; 
• to break trypanosomiasis transmission in epidemic outbreaks; and 
• routine annual spraying could represent a practicable barrier to fly re invasion 
along fronts where ground operations are problematic or not practicable. 
The cost of the technique reduces dramatically once the eradication objec-
tive is sacrificed. The number of spraying cycles can be reduced from five. 
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Their timing is less critical. Insecticide application rates can be reduced. The 
requirements for accurate navigation and precise droplet del ivery are less 
stringent. Because of the reduced support requirements, it is feasible to treat 
much larger areas w ithin a single operation, so that overhead charges per 
square kilometre treated are reduced. 
Table 4.7 summarizes the costs for a hypothetical aerial spraying operation 
in which the objective is to achieve a reduction in the fly population of at least 
95%, without expecting eradication. Three scenarios are considered, with the 
common assumption that three cycles are carried out. In the basic scenario, in 
wh ich 5000 sq km are sprayed, the total cost amounts to Z$591 per sq km, ran-
ging from Z$457 to Z$774 per sq km for optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. 
Table 4.7 Cost model of aerial spraying to achieve 95% control but not 
eradication (1990 prices, Z$) 
Basic Optimistic 
scenario scenario 
Operational area (sq km) 5000 10 000 
Insecticide applied/sq km (g a.i.) 
A DIRECT COSTS (Z$/sq km) 
Insecticide* 
Flying chargest 
Sub-total 
B INDIRECT COSTS§§ 
Aerial flying contractor 's 'fi xed' Total ('000) 
chargest Per sq km 
Physico-chemical monitoring~ Total ('000) 
Per sq km 
Access provision, camp and airstrip Total (' 000) 
construction and maintenance§ Per sq km 
Other indirect costs§ Total ('000) 
Per sq km 
C. TOTAL DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS/SQ KM 
* Basic scenario: three cycles of 25 g a.i./ha. 
Optimistic scenario: three cycles at 20 g a.i./ha. 
Pessimistic scenario: three cycles at 30 g a.i ./ha. 
t Three spraying cycles, pro rata on Table 4.6. 
75 
Z$ % 
242 41 
144 24 
386 65 
Z$ % 
800 
160 27 
100 
20 3 
75 
15 3 
so 
10 2 
S91 100 
:t: Based on data in Table 4.6, with adjustment (author's estimate) . 
~ See Barrett (1994); (Appendix D). 
§ As in Table 4.6. 
60 
Z$ 
193 
144 
337 
Z$ 
1000 
100 
lOO 
10 
50 
5 
so 
5 
4S7 
§§ lt is assumed that no ground marker or tsetse survey teams are used. 
% 
42 
31 
74 
% 
22 
2 
lOO 
Pessimistic 
scenario 
2500 
90 
Z$ % 
290 37 
144 19 
434 56 
Z$ % 
600 
240 31 
100 
40 5 
100 
40 s 
50 
20 3 
774 100 
If aerial spraying was repeated annually as a method of preventing re-inva-
sion of flies into a tsetse-cleared area, it would probably be necessary to treat 
a band of width between 15 km and 25 km, incurring recurrent annual 
expenditure of between Z$ 7000 and Z$18 000 per I i near km of front. These 
costs are compared with those of alternative approaches to protection from 
reinvasion in Section Eight (page 1 06). 
52 
The advantages of fixed-wing aerial application of insecticides for tsetse con-
trol are that: 
• the feasibility of controlling C. morsitans is well established in flat terrain; 
• relatively large areas can be treated over a short period; and 
• there is no need for extensive ground-based operations involving large 
numbers of people and vehicles, with associated logistical problems. 
The disadvantages are that: 
• aerial spraying is relatively expensive; 
• a significant proportion of the costs may be in foreign exchange, reflecting 
the requirement for specialized equipment and expertise; 
• technical feasibility is uncertain in more rugged terrain and against some 
species of tsetse; and 
• although independent scientific studies have shown that the long-term 
environmental impact of insecticides used in aerial spraying operations 
can be minimal, the widespread application of insecticides in the environ-
ment remains controversial; donor funding will depend upon costly moni-
toring being undertaken. 
In Zimbabwe, aerial spraying was not continued after 1988. This was partly 
because remaining tsetse-infested areas where the TICB planned to 
implement control were not suited to aerial spraying. Also, it was becoming 
increasingly evident by 1989 that other techniques for tsetse control were 
highly cost-competitive with aerial spraying. 
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Section 5 
Treatment of Cattle with 
Insecticides 
This approach involves applying a residual insecticide to cattle, such that 
tsetse flies pick up a lethal dose when they alight on the animals to feed. 
Interest in treating cattle with insecticide goes back many years. 
Vanderplank (1947), Whiteside (1949) and Burnett (1954) showed in East 
Africa that cattle could be treated with DOT to kill tsetse flies. However, the 
insecticide had to be applied frequently and in large quantities, making the 
technique impracticable and costly. 
The method became feasible only in the late 1980s, with the development 
of effective and persistent formulations of synthetic pyrethroids, which can 
be applied either as a cattle dip, spraywash or pour-on treatment. Much of 
the progress has been made in Zimbabwe. 
At the time of the Commission of Enquiry on human and animal trypanoso-
miasis in Southern Rhodesia (Thomas et al., 1955), numerous witnesses rec-
ommended spraying or dipping of cattle with insecticides. However, the 
approach was dismissed at that time as difficult and uneconomic. Interest 
revived in 1967 and 1968, when the TICB undertook research into applying 
insecticides to cattle in the form of pour-ons, oral drenches and sprays (TICB 
annual reports, 1967 and 1968). Over 30 different chemicals were investi-
gated but none of the tested chemicals proved sufficiently persistent on the 
cattle. 
Over a decade later, insecticides were again screened by the TTCB, pri-
marily to choose insecticides for use on targets (Section 6). Deltamethrin 
proved highly effective against tsetse flies and emerged as the favoured insec-
ticide. This synthetic pyrethroid was known to be effective against a wide 
range of ectoparasites of cattle and was commercially available in Zimbabwe 
as an acaricide (Decatix: Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd). 
In 1983/84, the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) undertook a trial 
to investigate the scope for tsetse control by dipping cattle with deltamethrin, 
in the Chesa farming area in northern Zimbabwe, where a severe trypanoso-
miasis problem existed (Thomson et al., 1991 ). The trial covered five cattle 
dipping centres attended by some 2400 cattle. Approximately 330 cattle 
were treated by deltamethrin dipping (37.9 ppm a.i.), while the remaining 
animals continued with the normal acaricidal treatment with dioxathion 
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(Delnav, Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd). Over the following three months, trypano-
somiasis incidence halved among the cattle on deltamethrin and doubled in 
the dioxathion group. 
In 1985, in a research study at Rekomitjie, deltamethrin was applied to an 
ox, as a 46 ppm a.i. spray (Thomson, 1987). The mortality of alighting flies 
was close to 1 00% for two weeks after the treatment. Knockdown was above 
70% for eight weeks. Similarly good results were obtained using a pour-on 
formulation (Thomson et al., 1991 ). 
In June 1986, a large-scale trial of deltamethrin dipping was initiated in 
an area covering some 2500 sq km along the eastern border with 
Mozambique (Hursey et al., 1987; Thomson and Wilson, 1989). Cattle were 
dipped fortnightly in a deltamethrin dip of strength 37.5 ppm ai at thirteen 
cattle dipping centres serving some 22 000 cattle. Four months later, a further 
11 667 cattle commenced deltamethrin treatment involving a proprietary 
pour-on formulation (Spoton, Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd). The incidence of trypa-
nosomiasis fell to nil - within three months of starting the dip regime, and 
within six months of starting treatment with the pour-on formulation 
(Thomson et al., 1991 ). 
The deltamethrin cattle dipping area was extended, with the objective of 
consolidating the northern front. By 1991, nearly 200 000 cattle were being 
treated regularly within 28 300 sq km of land along the Zambezi Valley, 
which includes all locations considered to be at risk of trypanosomiasis 
(Figure 5.1; Shereni, 1991 ). 
0 
area of cattle 
treatment 
consetVation area 
(no cattle present) 
Figure 5.1 Area where cattle were treated directly with deltamethrin, 1990. 
Zimbabwe has an excellent rural infrastructure for veterinary services, 
including approximately 2500 dip tanks located in the Communal Lands (see 
Appendix 2). The Cattle Cleansing Regulations of 1976 require all cattle in 
the Communal Lands to be presented regularly for acaricidal treatment at 
Government dip tanks. Thus, it was relatively easy to change the acaricide to 
a deltamethrin formulation suitable for tsetse control, and to treat a high per-
centage of cattle in an area. In effect, the only cost incurred was the 
additional expense of deltamethrin compared with the previous acaricide. At 
inspection races, where cattle numbers were too low to justify building a dip 
tank, cattle were treated with the pour-on formulation. 
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In Zimbabwe, treating cattle with deltamethrin has thus served several pur-
poses: 
• to ensure that complete fly elimination is achieved and sustained in areas 
where other techniques have been used in the recent past; 
• to suppress, and potentially eliminate, tsetse in areas yet to be treated by 
other methods; and 
• re-inforce a target barrier to fly reinvasion from neighbouring Mozambique. 
Several other countries in eastern and southern Africa have investigated the 
transferability of the Zimbabwean findings to their specific situations. 
Tanzania 
The method has been used on Mkwaja ranch , which is some 100 km south 
of Tanga on the coastal plain, and infested with G. morsitans, G. pallidipes, 
G. austeni and C. brevipalpis. Up to 10 000 cattle have been kept on this 
49 000 ha ranch, despite a heavy trypanosomiasis challenge. During the 
1980s, the problem was managed by regularly treating cattle with prophylac-
tic drugs, but drug resistance became serious. The interval between necessary 
drug treatments became so short that cost was becoming prohibitive. Cattle 
were at risk of drug toxicity and herd productivity was declining. 
From August 1989 onwards, all cattle on Mkwaja ranch were treated by 
regular deltamethrin dipping (Gao et al., 1990). The tsetse population was 
substantially reduced, although eradication was not feasible as the ranch is 
surrounded by dense tsetse infestation. Trypanosomiasis was not entirely 
eliminated, but incidence reduced sufficiently to allow cattle production. The 
interval between isometamidium treatments was extended to three or four 
months, compared with an interval of five weeks before the introduction of 
deltamethrin dipping (Gao et al., 1990). Herd mortality reduced, while herd 
health and productivity improved markedly (Fox et al., 1991 ). Calving per-
centage increased from 58% to 77%. The average weaning weight of calves 
increased from 125 kg to 142 kg. Steers were attaining a body weight at 30 
months which they previously attained at 36 months. 
In Zanzibar, 700 cattle were treated every 15 to 18 days with a deltame-
thrin pour-on in an area of some 33 sq km infested with G. austeni. The 
apparent tsetse density fell to nil in just over one month (Thompson et al., 
1991 ). 
Kenya 
In Kenya, the use of a pour-on formulation of deltamethrin was reported from 
Galana ranch in an area with a high population of G. pallidipes (Stevenson 
et al., 1991 ). As in Tanzania, tsetse numbers and trypanosomiasis incidence 
reduced, but not to zero, in the trial area. The interval between prophylactic 
treatments with homidium was extended. Herd productivity improved. 
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Zambia 
In Zambia, Chizyuka and Luguru (1986) briefly reported a trial in an area 
implied to be infested with G. morsitans, in which 400 cattle were dipped 
weekly in deltamethrin at 37.5 ppm, during eight months. The trypanosoma! 
infection rate was reduced to about 5%, compared with 40% before the trial 
commenced. 
In 1991, another small trial was undertaken in Sesheke District of Western 
Province. Some 400 cattle were treated with deltamethrin pour-on, in 
approximately 100 sq km where the tsetse (G. morsitans) and trypanosomia-
sis challenge was high. After six months of treatment, trypanosomiasis inci-
dence apparently ceased (unpublished information provided by the DVfCS, 
Western Province). 
Deltamethrin has also been used recently on commercial farms near 
Lusaka and Chisamba, with good results (R. Connor, personal communi-
cation). 
Malawi 
A trial of deltamethrin treatment involving 12 000 cattle was initiated in the 
Lower Shire Valley in March 1989, under the auspices of the RTTCP. The 
area was infested with both G. morsitans morsitans and G. pal/idipes and 
free of East Coast Fever. Some 10 000 animals owned by traditional farmers 
were included in the trial, of which 7000 were treated with deltamethrin 
pour-on at crush-pens, and another 3000 head were treated by dipping. The 
remaining 2000 animals, on the Shire Valley Cattle Ranch, were treated by 
spraying. In March 1990, the tsetse population and trypanosomiasis inci-
dence were very low but not zero. Monitoring ceased in May 1990 (D. 
Lovemore, personal communication). 
Burkina Faso 
In Burkina Faso, the treatment of cattle with a deltamethrin pour-on formu-
lation was shown to have a persistent effect against Glossina palpalis gam-
biensis under fly chamber conditions (Bauer et al., 1992b). lt was reported 
that the commercial formulation, Spot On, was being evaluated in 
Samorogouan. 
Other than deltamethrin, flumethrin (Bayticol, Bayer AG, FRG) is the only 
synthetic pyrethroid which has been reported to control tsetse by application 
to cattle. Bauer et al. (1988) undertook laboratory studies in Burkina Faso 
which led to subsequent field investigation. Twelve, monthly treatments at 
1 mg per kg of bodyweight were given over one year, in a large-scale trial 
involving 2000 head (unpublished report of F. Meyer, cited by Lohr et al., 
1991; Bauer et al., 1992a). Tsetse catches and trypanosomiasis incidence 
dropped to zero within months of commencing the trial. 
Flumethrin has also been investigated in eastern Kenya, on a farm located 
in an area of high tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge in Lamu District 
(Lohr et al., 1991 ). In February 1989, 2000 cattle were put onto a bi-weekly 
treatment with a flumethrin pour-on, at 1 mg per kg of liveweight, for one 
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year. The tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge was greatly reduced in a very 
short period, but not entirely eliminated because of continual fly reinvasion 
from neighbouring untreated areas. 
Alphacypermethrin (Fendona, ICI Ltd) was investigated for possible use in 
direct treatment of cattle for combined tick and tsetse control in a field trial 
in Zimbabwe in 1987/88. Since preliminary results were less promising than 
with deltamethrin, the study was discontinued (unpublished data of R. 
Kujeke, cited by Shereni, 1991 ). 
Reported costings 
There are only limited data from which to evaluate the economics of treating 
cattle with insecticides on an operational scale. 
Hursey et al. (1987) reported that, for the 1986 trial in north-eastern 
Zimbabwe, 274 litres of 18.75% strength deltamethrin were purchased to 
treat 22 000 cattle for one year, at a total cost of Z$82 200 (1986/87 price). 
Later reports of the trial (Thomson and Wilson, 1989; Thomson et al., 1991) 
did not give details of the total insecticide usage, inclusive of wastage and 
losses. Taking the figures of Hursey et al. (1987), the cost was equivalent to 
approximately Z$6.00 per head in 1990 prices. The cattle occupied 2500 sq 
km, equivalent to an insecticide cost of just under Z$53 per sq km. The 
stocking density was approximately 8.8 cattle per sq km. Hursey et al. (1987) 
noted that the cost of the deltamethrin regime was nearly double the cost of 
the previous acaricide dioxathion (Delnav, Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd), which 
could be discounted from the cost of the tsetse control operation. Thus the 
incremental cost of tsetse control was only Z$26.50 per sq km per year. 
Cattle were treated routinely with deltamethrin in the trial area as the 
threat of fly reinvasion from Mozambique was continual. The cost was, there-
fore, a recurrent annual expenditure. 
By comparison, the cost of deltamethrin dipping for a herd of BOO cattle 
on Mkwaja ranch in Tanzania was reported as US$3.50 (832 Tanzanian shil-
lings) per animal per year, equivalent to Z$8.60 per animal in 1990 prices 
(Fox, 1991 ). 
Comparison with the manufacturer's recommendations 
Costings based on the manufacturer's recommendations are presented in 
Appendix 2. Replenishment of dipwash is recommended at a rate of 2.25 ml 
per animal treated, equivalent to a 1990 cost of 28.13 cents per animal per 
treatment. For 26 treatments per year, as recommended, the annual chemical 
cost is Z$7.31 per animal. This is between the cost estimated by Hursey et 
al. (1987) and the cost for Mkwaja ranch as given above. 
Costings for pour-on treatment of cattle with deltamethrin have not been 
published. Following the manufacturer's recommendations, and on the basis 
of Zimbabwe Government Tender Board prices, the use of Spoton costs more 
than double the cost of applying deltamethrin by dipping (Appendix 2). The 
cost of hand spraying would be similar to that of the pour-on method. 
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Costs of cattle dipping to the farmer 
In the economic evaluation of controlling tsetse by treating cattle with insec-
ticide, costing should in principle include the losses incurred by the farmer 
in bringing his cattle for treatment, such as: 
• loss of the farmer's labour in agricultural activities while taking animals to 
and from the dip tank; 
• loss of the on-farm use of draught animals on the dipping and inspection 
days, of particular importance during the ploughing season; 
• loss of animal productivity (milk, weight gain, draught capability) due to 
the effort of trekking to and from the dip tank, which may be up to 15 km 
from the farmer's home; and 
• injuries and stress-induced abortions associated with the dipping proce-
dure. 
Losses associated with dipping which are incurred by farmers have not been 
studied in Zimbabwe. For the present analysis, they will be ignored on the 
assumption that such losses are small in relation to the DVS expenditure on 
dipping services. 
Annual treatment costs 
The principal factors determining the cost of tsetse control by treating cattle 
with deltamethrin are: 
• the method of application; 
• the cattle density in the treatment area; 
• the time for which the treatment must be implemented; and 
• whether cattle are already being treated regularly with acaricides, so that reek-
enable costs are only those additional to current expenditure on tick control. 
A spreadsheet cost model was set up (Table 5.1) for treating cattle with insec-
ticide, at population densities between 5 and 20 livestock per sq km, by dip-
ping, pour-on treatment or by spraying, separately showing 'full' and 
'incremental' costing. The following discussion focuses on comparing dipping 
and pour-on treatment, since spray-washing has a similar cost to the pour-on. 
For the specific assumptions underlying the analysis (Table 5.1), the dip-
ping method is much cheaper than the pour-on method and is the preferred 
technique where there are sufficient animals to justify establishing a dip. 
The cost of dipping is highly dependent on the number of animals treated 
at a dip tank. If few animals pass through a dip, fixed overheads per animal 
are higher and the chemical is only partly used up. Views conflict as to 
whether deterioration, for example through bacterial fermentation, occurs to 
a significant extent between one dip-day and the next. The rate and extent of 
deterioration would depend on factors such as the ambient temperature and 
the degree of contamination with dirt and dung during the dipping process. 
No information is available concerning deterioration rates in deltamethrin 
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dips in Zimbabwe to enable an assessment of the break-even point at which 
dipping becomes more cost-effective than pour-on treatment. A technical 
evaluation of deltamethrin dip deterioration is needed. 
Table 5.1 Cost model of tsetse control by treating cattle with insecticide 
(Z$, 1990 prices) 
APPLICATION METHOD 
Dipping Pour-on Spray 
A COSTING PER ANIMAL 
Insecticide cost per treatment (Z$)* 0.28 1.38 0.63 
No. of treatments per year* 26 12 26 
Insecticide cost per year (Z$)* 7.31 16.56 16.25 
Delivery cost per year (Z$)t 5.30 1.50 1.50 
Full annual cost (Z$ ) ~ 12.61 18.06 17.75 
Normal acaricide cost (Z$)~ 2.50 nil nil 
Cost incremental to tick control (Z$)§ 4.81 16.56 16.25 
8 FULL COST, Z$/sq km~ 
Cattle density/sq km 5 63.07 90.30 88.75 
10 126.14 180.60 177.50 
20 252.28 361.20 355.00 
C INCREMENTAL COST, Z$/sq km§ 
Cattle density/sq km 5 24.07 82.80 81.25 
10 48.14 165.60 162.50 
20 96.28 331.20 325.00 
* Based on manufacturer's recommended treatment regime, Government of Zimbabwe 
Tender Board prices; see Appendix 2 for details. 
t See Appendix 2. For dipping see Table A2.2. For pour-on and hand spraying, expenditure 
of Z$1 .50 is estimated. 
~ The full annual cost includes the establishment and recurrent costs of the dipping service, 
which would have to be considered if planning tsetse control by cattle treatment in an area 
without existing dipping facilities . 
~ The acaricide cost for dipping is taken as the average for amitraz and dioxathion, as 
discussed in Appendix 2. Cattle are not normally treated with acaricide in Zimbabwe's 
Communal Lands except through dipping. 
§ The incremental cost excludes acaricide and delivery costs in the case of dipping. In the 
case of pour-on and spray application the cost of delivery is excluded as cattle races are 
used for routine inspections and staff visit regularly. 
The present policy of the DVS is to establish dip tanks where cattle num-
ber between 1500 and 2000. This would be the case where cattle population 
densities are 1 0-20 animals per sq km. In such situations, the cost of tsetse 
control would be the incremental cost of changing the acaricide to deltame-
thrin, amounting to between Z$50 to Z$1 00 per sq km per year (Table 5.1 ), 
which is about 30% of the incremental cost of treating the same number of 
cattle by pour-on. The full annual cost would be between Z$125 and Z$250 
per sq km, which is about 70% of the full cost of pour-on treatment. In areas 
where tsetse control will require long-term, regular treatment of cattle with 
deltamethrin, it may be worthwhile to establish dip tanks where cattle are 
fewer than 1500. 
In places of lower cattle density, a dip tank may not have been estab-
lished. At five animals per sq km, the annual cost of using pour-on would be 
Z$83 per sq km per year (incremental) or Z$90 per year (fully overheaded). 
This figure has limited significance without knowing the relationship between 
the number of insecticide-treated cattle per sq km and the rate of tsetse popu-
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lation decline, and consequent decrease in trypanosomiasis incidence. 
Virtually no data are available on this matter, which needs urgent investi-
gation in order to improve the basis for design and evaluation of the tech-
nique. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
Advantages of the technique are that: 
• it is very cost-effective where cattle are routinely assembled for inspection 
and veterinary care; 
• the method is simple and does not require sophisticated equipment or 
expertise; 
• farmers gain additional benefits from control of other cattle ectoparasites 
such as ticks and biting flies; 
• it can be integrated easily with other bait methods of tsetse control, such 
as target deployment; and 
• it does not involve indiscriminate application of insecticides in the eco-
system, and has environmental impact comparable to routine acaricidal 
treatment of cattle, which is not currently controversial. 
Disadvantages are: 
• the technique cannot be used to control tsetse flies in areas where dom-
estic livestock are not present; 
• in cattle areas, the method may reduce trypanosomiasis incidence to zero 
without eradicating tsetse, if tsetse persist in areas where cattle do not 
graze, by feeding on wild hosts; 
• the limits of the technique are not fully understood and optimum pro-
cedures are yet to be defined where long-term treatment is envisaged; and 
• there is a possibility of resistance to deltamethrin developing in ticks, per-
haps also in tsetse. 
The need for more technical information 
At present, the technical information available concerning the effectiveness 
of cattle treatment using deltamethrin is insufficient to allow definition of: 
• a reliable and least-cost procedure; 
• the limits to the technique. 
The present recommendation is to treat all cattle in an area facing a tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis risk. This may be effective, but may also be unnecess-
arily costly in areas of dense cattle population, particularly if the procedure 
is to be routine, over a long period. lt may be possible to treat only a propor-
tion of the cattle herd and still achieve eradication, which would represent a 
substantial economy, but no information on this matter is available. 
On the other hand, treating five cattle per sq km in an area where the cat-
tle density was 20 per sq km may not achieve the same result as treating all 
animals if the cattle density was 5 per sq km. The rate of decline of the tsetse 
population is likely to be determined by the ratio of toxic to non-toxic hosts 
(including both untreated cattle and wild animals) encountered by the flies. 
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Unfortunately, there is as yet very little scientific evidence on which to 
base suitable treatment regimes or to define the limits of the technique. Most 
of the trials to date have simply put all animals on the deltamethrin regime 
and observed the effect on trypanosomiasis incidence and tsetse numbers. 
Where eradication is the objective, an all-out effort to treat all possible hosts 
is probably justified as overhead costs will be minimized by reducing the 
time required to eradication. However, where deltamethrin treatment is going 
to be a long-term regime, a more conservative approach to application is 
probably needed, using an economic threshold approach to optimization. 
Further technical and economic study of this issue is required urgently. 
Implications for tick and tick-borne disease control 
Zimbabwe has remained committed to a nationwide veterinary policy of 
intensive dipping (total tick control) for the last eighty years. The dependence 
of cattle production on this veterinary intervention was demonstrated drama-
tically during the independence war, when veterinary services were seriously 
disrupted. Major outbreaks of tick-borne diseases occurred, particularly in the 
higher rainfall area; approximately one million cattle died (Lawrence et al., 
1980). 
Following the collapse of the dipping service, the level of herd immunity 
to tick-borne diseases rose, and losses due to tick-borne diseases declined 
steadily. With present knowledge of tick ecology and the epidemiology of 
tick-borne diseases, intensive dipping may not be necessary in much of 
Zimbabwe, including most of the tsetse-affected areas (Norval, 1983). The 
alternative and more cost-effective strategy being considered in Zimbabwe is 
to rely upon enzootic stability (natural immunity) to tick-borne diseases. 
Acaricidal treatment then could be reduced to the minimum level necessary 
to prevent direct production losses due to tick infestation (Perry et al., 1990; 
Norval et al., 1991 ). As a first step towards planning future dipping strategy, 
a national survey of the immune status of the cattle herd was in progress at 
the time of preparation of this report. 
A change in the national dipping policy could have implications for inten-
sive dipping with deltamethrin to achieve tsetse control, especially with long-
term cattle treatment. A short-term programme aimed at tsetse eradication 
may not be problematical. In a longer-term programme, young cattle could 
be excluded from dipping; through exposure to tick challenge they could 
acquire immunity to babesiosis and anaplasmosis, the main tick-borne dis-
eases in this area. However, persistent acaricide can be transferred between 
cattle by rubbing against each other in the cattle pens where the animals are 
kept overnight. This requires investigation. 
A second concern is that ticks in the tsetse-affected area might develop 
resistance to deltamethrin. At present, apart from flumethrin, no other acari-
cide has been shown to be effective for tsetse control. lt might arise that cat-
tle would have to be treated twice - once with deltamethrin, for tsetse 
control, and again with another insecticide, for tick control. 
Present and future trials of deltamethrin treatment of cattle should include 
detailed monitoring and evaluation of tick control aspects of the regimes 
which are investigated. 
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Implications for cost recovery of veterinary services 
Numerous African Governments are looking towards cost-recovery of some 
state-run veterinary services. Both Malawi and Zambia have already intro-
duced policies for recovery of drug costs, including trypanocides and acari-
cides. Zimbabwe may consider similar policy changes in the foreseeable 
future. 
Tsetse control by ground or aerial spraying is conducted and funded 
entirely by a central tsetse control organization. In contrast, tsetse control by 
cattle treatment offers the prospect of cost-recovery from farmers. However, 
cost-recovery may prove politically difficult, and the method by which pay-
ment is collected could determine whether vector and disease control is sus-
tainable. 
If tsetse are controlled in some parts of the country, for example using tar-
gets, at no direct cost to the farmer, it will prove difficult to convince farmers 
in other parts of the country to pay for the treatment of their cattle with delta-
methrin. Also, since tsetse and trypanosomiasis control is a national problem, 
the financial burden for the control programme should not rest upon the 
unfortunate people who live at the frontier of tsetse challenge, while the 
majority of the direct beneficiaries of tsetse control live elsewhere. 
On the other hand, if there is a substantial tsetse problem in an area, and 
farmers are paying substantial private costs for drugs to manage trypanoso-
miasis, they may be keen to pay for deltamethrin treatments if this would 
cost less than their expenditure on trypanocides. To some extent, this would 
depend upon a degree of co-operation and agreement among the cattle-own-
ers in an affected area to agree a common action. 
A potential problem is that once a high level of tsetse control is achieved, 
farmers will stop bringing their cattle for treatment, and full eradication will 
not be achieved. 
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Section 6 
Odour-baited Traps and Targets: 
Past and Present 
In much of tsetse-infested Africa, cattle are not present in sufficient numbers 
to enable tsetse control by treating them with insecticide (as described in 
Section 5). Artificial baits can be used in a wider range of situations, and 
with a much higher degree of planning and control. 
The technique involves a combination of visual and olfactory stimuli, 
which cause tsetse flies to approach and enter or land upon the device which 
traps or kills them. Since different species of tsetse fly have different host-
seeking behaviour, various designs have developed in different parts of 
Africa. For example, riverine species of fly (the palpalis group, found mainly 
in West Africa), which inhabit relatively restricted linear habitats of dense 
vegetation, respond to baits differently from the wider-ranging species which 
occupy savanna. 
The so-called target is an odour-baited insecticide-treated screen widely 
used in southern Africa, where savanna species of tsetse predominate. The 
target method of tsetse control has been developed to the present stage of 
large-scale operational use in Zimbabwe. Prospects for further improvement 
in target design and use are examined in Section 7. 
Early trapping technology 
The idea of 'catching-out' the tsetse fly, by attracting it to live hosts or arti-
ficial devices, has caught the imagination of entomologists since the turn of 
the century (Vale et al., 1985). In the 1920s and 1930s, various ingenious 
designs of trap were invented with a view to use for tsetse control, for 
example by R. Harris in South Africa, and C. Swynnerton and his colleagues 
in East Africa (Swynnerton, 1933). While the traps were moderately effective, 
their performance was not good enough to justify widespread application 
(Hargrove, 1977). 
The biconical trap 
A breakthrough in trapping technology came in West Africa in the 1970s, 
when Challier and Laveissiere (1973) developed the so-called biconical trap 
for sampling riverine species of tsetse fly. In 1979, a trial showed that a high 
level of control of G. tachinoides and G. palpa/is gambiensis could be 
achieved in a riverine forest, using biconical traps impregnated with a 
residual insecticide (deltamethrin) to kill flies before they could escape 
(laveissiere and Couret, 1980). 
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The biconical trap has been used in different parts of Africa for sampling 
various species of tsetse fly (e.g. Kupper and Douati, 1985). To date, tsetse 
control using the biconical trap has proved technically feasible and cost-
effective only for a limited number of riverine species, principally G. palpalis 
palpalis. Attempts have been made to simplify the design and to reduce the 
cost of the bicon!cal trap. The so-called monoconical (Lancien, 1981) and 
pyramidal (Gouteux and Lancien, 1986) traps have been used in some 
countries. The latest design from French-speaking Africa is the Vavoua trap 
(Laveissiere and Grebaut, 1990). Very simple designs of the screen type, now 
used in Zimbabwe, have not proved very effective for eradication of riverine 
tsetse flies, although they have been used for suppression and in barriers to 
reinvasion (e.g. Cuisance et al., 1990). 
The efficiency of a single biconical trap in catching-out riverine tsetse is 
much lower than that of a single odour-baited Zimbabwean-type trap (e.g. 
the F3 trap) in catching out savanna species. The technical and economic 
feasibility of catching-out riverine tsetse using the biconical trap relies upon 
the limited habitat occupied by the fly. Large numbers of people and cattle 
can be protected from trypanosomiasis, by treating only a small proportion of 
the land they occupy. Therefore, relatively inefficient traps can be deployed 
cost-effectively in large numbers within the appropriate habitat, in particular 
at watering points. 
The unbaited biconical trap was not considered technically suitable or 
cost-effective for control of the savanna species of tsetse (Vale et al., 1985). 
The breakthrough in bait technology was the discovery of odours attractive to 
tsetse flies, odours which significantly improved the technical and economic 
effectiveness of traps and targets for use with the savanna species of tsetse. 
Host odour work in Zimbabwe 
Swynnerton (1933) had observed that tsetse flies, especially G. pallidipes, 
were strongly attracted to the scent of their host animals and suggested 
almost sixty years ago that "the next big object to be worked for is the pro-
duction of a scent, attractive to the flies, that is not dependent on the pre-
sence of an animal and not too evanescent for use in the traps". 
Research in Zimbabwe (Vale, 1974) reconfirmed that some savanna 
species of tsetse fly are attracted by the smell of host animals, as well as by 
their appearance. Acetone and carbon dioxide were quickly identified as 
powerful attractants (Vale, 1980) but carbon dioxide is too expensive and 
inconvenient to use in large-scale operations. A programme of collaboration 
was established between the TICB in Zimbabwe and NRI and the Tsetse 
Research Laboratory (TRL) in the United Kingdom. This led quickly to the 
identification of octenol (1-octen-3-ol) as an attractant (Hall et al., 1984; 
Bursell, 1984) and its effectiveness was confirmed in field work (Vale and 
Hall, 1985a and 1985b). 
Initial field trials and large-scale operations used targets baited with 
acetone and octenol. Subsequently, two more attractants were identified from 
cattle urine, namely 4-methyl phenol and 3-n-propyl phenol (Bursell et al., 
1988; Vale et al., 1988a), which were soon used in the field. 
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Research and development of the target design 
The enormous potential for using odour-baited traps or targets for control of 
savanna tsetse species was recognized early in the study of the host-odour 
responses (Hargrove and Vale, 1979; Vale, 1981). Accordingly, in parallel 
with the work on odours, traps and targets were developed with which the 
odour attractants could be used. 
Trials on Antelope Island 
The first field trials of baits for the control of G. morsitans and G. pallidipes 
were conducted between 1979 and 1983, on a small island (Antelope Island, 
area 4.5 sq km) in Lake Kariba (Vale et al., 1986). Initial work involved traps, 
which in 1983 were replaced by an early design of target known as the R-type 
(see Figure 6.1 ). This comprised a screen of black cloth, flanked by panels of 
mosquito netting, mounted on a frame, suspended from a pole which allowed 
the screen to move in the wind. The target had a roof to protect the insecti-
cide from rain and sun. The only odours used were octenol and acetone. The 
populations of both tsetse species were eradicated in a short period. 
Side View Perspective View 
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Figure 6.1 Evolution of the target design as used in Zimbabwe. (a) R-type as 
used in early trials (from Vale et al., 1986), (b) Swinger, with net 
side-panels. Later versions had an all-cloth panel, without netting. 
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The Rifa Triangle experiment 
A much larger target trial started in 1984, in a part of the Zambezi Valley 
known as the Rifa Triangle, covering some 600 sq km between the Zambezi 
river and the steep escarpment of the Zambezi Valley (Vale et al., 1988b). R-
type targets, baited only with acetone and octenol, were deployed at a den-
sity of approximately 4 per sq km. Within one year, the tsetse population was 
reduced to zero, except at the periphery of the block, where invading flies 
were caught occasionally. 
Originally, the Rifa exercise had been envisaged as a research trial, not as 
a control operation, and was located within a state-owned Safari Area with-
out a human or cattle population. The tsetse population was very high in 
neighbouring areas from which it would re-invade. Although there was no 
benefit to Zimbabwe, the targets were maintained operational since the trial 
reduced the tsetse problem in adjacent parts of Zambia. 
The targets were eventually handed over to the TICB field staff, but main-
tenance proved problematic, largely because the TICB had priorities else-
where at that time, including the Umfurudzi large-scale operation described 
below. Although in the short term the area was not kept fly-free, the potential 
of the technique had been well demonstrated. The results of the Rifa trial 
provided an adequate basis for the TICB to introduce targets into control 
operations in following years. 
Subsequent TTCB research 
While the Rifa experiment showed that tsetse control using targets was tech-
nically feasible, substantial scope was evident for further improvement in the 
method. Accordingly, research and development into all aspects of the bait 
technique continued at the Rekomitjie research station throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s, in collaboration with numerous other organizations. 
Consequently, the design and operational use of targets for tsetse control 
have been subject to almost continual modification. 
The method of dispensing odours has evolved from using bottles, to the 
use of controlled-release polythene sachets. The physical design of the target 
has been modified in various ways, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Firstly, the 
use of roofs on the targets was discontinued, and then the use of mosquito 
netting. In Zimbabwe, the 1991 design involved an all-black cloth panel 
mounted on a metal frame, suspended from a pole. Different types of cloth 
material, insecticide, dye and UV-inhibitor were investigated, as was the 
scope for using higher rates of application of insecticide to the target cloth, 
to reduce the frequency of insecticide application. The possible use of odour-
baited semi-natural targets such as tree stumps with visual enhancement was 
investigated. 
Doma-Angwa 
Between 1987 and 1991, a large-scale target trial was undertaken in the 
Angwa-Manyame area with EC funding under the auspices of the RTICP 
(Pollock, 1991 ). The project covered 1900 sq km bounded to the west and 
the east by the Angwa and Manyame rivers respectively. The northern section 
included part of the Zambezi Valley floor, while the southern section reached 
the commercial farms above the escarpment. Most of the project fell within 
the Doma Safari Area - very rugged terrain (including the Zambezi escarp-
ment) with abundant wildlife and a dense tsetse population in the northern 
part. 
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The main research aim of the project was to assess the most economical 
and efficient placement of targets for achieving tsetse eradication in such dif-
ficult terrain. Different blocks were demarcated, in which targets were 
initially deployed at densities ranging from 1 to 4 per sq km. In 1989, when 
it became obvious that the lower densities were unsatisfactory, target densi-
ties were increased from 3.5 to 5.4 per sq km. By this stage, it was con-
cluded that the most efficient approach in such difficult terrain would be to 
eradicate the tsetse population in the shortest possible time, in view of the 
operational difficulties and overheads involved. 
A total of 1 0 458 targets were deployed between May 1988 and 
December 1990. At the end of the trial, tsetse flies had not been completely 
eliminated from the area. This was attributed to a combination of factors, 
including inappropriate deployment patterns of the targets, and logistical 
problems of target maintenance during wet periods, when access was 
impossible. Jt was concluded that different deployment patterns might be 
appropriate for G. morsitans and G. pallidipes in rough terrain (see Section 7 
for further discussion). 
The problem of wet-season servicing was overcome, by treating the target 
cloth with more insecticide, so that the service interval was extended. In 
1991, improved deployment patterns were being investigated under the aus-
pices of research projects funded by the ODA and the RTICP. 
Other research 
Much research is in progress in other African countries to extend the tech-
nique to tsetse species other than G. morsitans and G. pallidipes, and to a 
wider range of operational circumstances. 
As yet no standard design of target or of operational procedure has 
emerged, and perhaps no standard would be ideal, in a continually develop-
ing technique. The bait techniques of the future are likely to have higher effi-
cacy, wider applicability and lower cost than the present methods. 
Since 1984, bait technology has accounted for a steadily increasing propor-
tion of Zimbabwe's large-scale tsetse control operations, and has now largely 
replaced both aerial and ground spraying of insecticides. By 1990, over 
50 000 targets were deployed in eradication operations or as barriers to fly 
movement (Table 6.1 ). 
Target operations expanded rapidly between 1984 and 1988, but then sta-
bilized, with some 54 000 operational targets (Table 6.2). This was about the 
maximum number that the TICB could then handle with the staff and 
vehicles available, given the need for regular servicing. Approximately equal 
numbers of targets have been deployed in barriers and in control operations. 
Now that tsetse are widely controlled in Zimbabwe, the main future role of 
targets is likely to be in barriers. 
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Table 6.1 Breakdown of the targets deployed in Zimbabwe, 1990. 
Operational Area Specific location Number of 
targets 
A CONTROL OPERATIONS Area of Targets/ 
operation sq km 
(sq km) 
Kotwa Ruenya 2286 600 3.8 
Mashumbi Muzarabani 1856 775 2.4 
Angwa-Manyame 9405 1900 5.0 
Makuti Rifa Triangle 3341 600 5.6 
Charara 6958 1400 5.0 
Gokwe Busi/Sengwa 2167 275 7.9 
Gungugwe 108 100 1 .1 
Matusadona 504 250 2.0 
Sub-total 26 625 5 900 4.5 
B TARGET BARRIERS Length of Targets/km 
barrier (km) 
Mozambique Kotwa section 5118 130 39.4 
Border Rushinga section 5634 240 23.5 
Barrier Msengezi section 6606 220 30.0 
Mid-Zambezi Sundi-Mahuwe 1604 53 30.3 
Valley Mahuwe-Angwa 2441 81 30.1 
Makuti Msango harbour 1718 100 17.2 
Gokwe Omay 4800 160 30.0 
Sub-total: 27 921 984 28.4 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TARGETS 54 546 
Source Shereni (1991). 
Table 6.2 Total number of targets in operational use in Zimbabwe, annually, 
1984-90*t 
Control operations 
Deployed in the year 
Total in use 
Area under targets (sq km) 
Target barriers 
Deployed in the year 
Total in use 
TOTAL 
Deployed in the year 
Total in use 
1984 
2400 
2400 
600 
3000 
3000 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
2400 5600 8800 8800 (1 000) (400) 
4800 1 0 400 19 200 28 000 27 000 26 600 
1200 2600 4500 6500 6000 5900 
2500 
5500 
2000 6900 11 500 11 00 900 
7500 14 400 25 900 27 000 27 900 
5400 4900 7600 15 700 20 300 1 00 500 
5400 1 0 300 17 900 33 600 53 900 54 000 54 500 
Source TTCB files and unpublished reports. 
* The number of targets deployed each year is a net figure (deployments minus upliftings). 
The 'total in use' refers to targets operational in the field. The negative figures (denoted in 
brackets) for deployment on control operations in 1989 and 1 990 are because targets were 
redeployed from eradication arrays in the Umurudzi to target barriers on the Mozambique 
border. 
t As targets are deployed and redeployed at any time during the year, the above figures are 
approximate and do not correspond to a specific date in the year. 
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Use of targets as a barrier to fly invasion: 1985 
Targets were first used operationally in the 1985 aerial spraying operation in 
the Western Region of Zimbabwe (AIIsopp and Hursey, 1986; see also 
Section 4, page 44). Fly reinvasion was a major problem in aerial spraying, 
and targets offered a way of reducing such reinvasion. 
The concept of using lines of dense target deployment as barriers to fly 
invasion had been implicit in the design of the Rifa experiment. In 1984, 
1200 targets had been deployed at 100 m intervals all round the Triangle as 
a 'barrier to invasion', supported by another line of dense deployment some 
5 km within the trial block (Vale et al., 1986). The design of this 'barrier' 
was intelligent guesswork, and its function was not crucial to the design of 
the Rifa experiment. The objective was to reduce severely all fly movement 
into the Triangle, without necessarily preventing completely such movement. 
This is an important point, as the target barrier became an established 
operational tool in Zimbabwe and other countries with very little research 
and development of this particular application of the bait technique. Only 
recently has attention been given to assessing the efficacy and optimum 
design of such barriers for preventing fly population movement (Shereni, 
1990b; Hargrove, in press; see Barrett, 1994; Appendix G). 
The ad hoc target barrier used in the 1985 aerial spraying operation was 
70 km long and 600 m wide, comprising four lines of targets 200 m apart, 
with an overall density of 27 targets per linear km. Targets were baited with 
acetone and octenol only. The barrier did not prove very effective, partly 
because of logistical problems in maintaining the targets, which provided 
useful lessons regarding their field use. The targets were uplifted after a year, 
for use in the 1986 operation in Umfurudzi. 
First operational use of targets for eradication: 1986 
Following the promising results of the Rifa experiment, a large-scale target 
trial was incorporated as part of the 1986 operations in north-east Zimbabwe 
(Hursey et al., 1987). Aerial and ground spraying were undertaken in areas 
adjacent to the target block. The aerial spraying was in a relatively flat area, 
with a low to medium density population of G. morsitans. Ground spraying 
was carried out in much of the area which was too rugged for aerial spray-
ing. The targets were deployed mainly in the Umfurudzi Wildlife Area, where 
ground spraying would have caused undesirable environmental impact. A tar-
get barrier was established to prevent reinvasion of the aerial-sprayed block 
by flies from the target block. 
The target block covered some 1300 sq km in which 8000 targets were 
deployed. This included approximately 5200 targets deployed at an average 
density of four per sq km throughout the block. The remaining 2800 targets 
were deployed in the barrier, which extended for 70 km with an average 
density of 40 targets per linear km. The targets were of S-type design, baited 
with acetone and octenol only, and serviced at three-month intervals. 
The tsetse population was reduced to zero at the centre of the target block 
within nine months of deployment, demonstrating the feasibility of the tech-
nique in very rugged terrain with difficult access. Problems were encountered 
in the south-eastern part of the block, where targets had been deployed at 
only 2.5 per sq km, without an invasion barrier. This residual population was 
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eliminated when additional targets were deployed to bring the density up to 
4 per sq km, and the area of deployment was extended to include the reinva-
sion source (Shereni, 1991 ). 
The targets were maintained in the Umfurudzi Wildlife Area while exten-
sive surveys confirmed that the population had indeed been eradicated. All 
8000 targets were eventually uplifted by March 1989. The area has remained 
apparently free of tsetse infestation. 
While the Umfurudzi operation was highly successful as an eradication 
operation, the effectiveness of the target barrier between the target block and 
aerial-sprayed block was questioned. Some time after the aerial spraying, flies 
were found within the aerial-sprayed block, close to the target block. lt was 
unclear whether these flies had survived the aerial spraying or had originated 
from the target block. This residual tsetse population was eliminated by a 
small ground-spraying operation in 1987. 
Subsequent use of targets in Zimbabwe 
As most of the target operations subsequent to 1986 have lasted several 
years, they are reviewed on a geographical basis (see Figure 6.2) rather than 
year by year. 
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Figure 6.2 Location of target operations in Zimbabwe, 1990. 
Rifa-Charara 
Targets were put onto an operational (as opposed to trial) basis in the Rifa 
Triangle in 1987, and the area planned for treatment was extended to include 
the Charara Safari Area between the Triangle and Lake Kariba (Figure 6.2). 
The total area under targets in 1991 was 2000 sq km, although eradication 
was not yet achieved throughout the treated area. Target barriers were still to 
be deployed to consolidate the tsetse frontier between this operation and 
control activities to the east and west. 
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Mid-Zambezi Valley and the Mozambique border target barrier 
Target barriers were established round the blocks aerial-sprayed in the Mid-
Zambezi Valley in 1987 and 1988 (see pp 44-45). The targets deployed 
along the Mozambique border eventually became part of a barrier stretching 
for some 590 km from the Angwa river in northern Zimbabwe to the Eastern 
Highlands (Figure 6.2). Ad hoc target operations were conducted in the Mid-
Zambezi Valley to complete the eradication of G. pallidipes which had sur-
vived the aerial spraying operations. Tsetse control was further consolidated 
by regularly treating all cattle in the Mid-Zambezi Valley with deltamethrin 
(see Section 5, page 55). 
Eventually, the only targets deployed in the area were those in the border 
barrier, designed to suppress potential invasion and to minimize trypanoso-
miasis incidence in cattle near the border. A wider band of targets was 
deployed to the west of the Mid-Zambezi Valley, where cattle numbers were 
low, to protect the Valley floor to the east. 
In 1991, the target barrier along the Mozambique border comprised three 
distinct sections (Table 6.1 ). The Kotwa section extended from the southern 
extremity of the Kotwa target operation (the junction of the Jambura and 
Gairezi rivers) for 130 km to the Mazowe river. lt comprised approximately 
5200 targets, deployed at 40 per linear km. The Rushinga section stretched 
240 km from the Mazowe river to the Musengezi river, and comprised just 
over 5600 targets deployed at an average density of 23 per linear km. The 
section from the Musengezi to the Angwa river (the Musengezi-Mana section) 
was approximately 220 km long, comprising some 6600 targets deployed at 
30 per km. 
Kotwa-Ruenya 
In north-east Zimbabwe, treating cattle with deltamethrin had proved highly 
effective in 1986 (page 55). However, tsetse control had not been achieved 
over all of the area, because cattle were not present throughout. Accordingly, 
the Kotwa target operation commenced in 1987, to consolidate tsetse control 
on the Zimbabwean side of the planned target barrier along the border. 
The Kotwa operation covered 600 sq km, in which some 2300 targets 
were deployed in a diffuse pattern along existing roads and tracks, at 200 m 
intervals (Shereni, 1991 ). The overall density of deployment was about 3.8 
targets per sq km. In 1991, these targets were still being maintained and dur-
ing the year no flies were caught further than 10 km from the Mozambique 
border. 
Busi-Sengwa 
An isolated tsetse population had apparently survived tsetse control oper-
ations in the mid-1980s, along the Busi-Sengwa drainages well behind the 
general tsetse frontier (see Figure 6.2). This was detected in November 1987, 
when almost 2200 targets were deployed over 275 sq km, to recover the situ-
ation (Shereni, 1991). The average deployment density was 7.9 per sq km. In 
1991, eradication had apparently been achieved. Targets were maintained in 
the area while extensive fly surveys continued. 
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Matusadona 
When aerial spraying operations were discontinued in the Western Region 
after 1985, the rolling-back of the tsetse front toward the neck of Lake Kariba 
continued with ground spraying. Target barriers were deployed to protect the 
ground-sprayed areas from reinvasion. The barriers were moved forward as 
operations progressed. In 1990, the main barrier extended for 135 km, from 
the Sanyati river through the southern part of the Matusadona National Park 
and across the Omay Communal Land to Lake Kariba (Figure 6.2). A 25 km 
branch of the barrier extended around the perimeter of Matusadona, to 
restrict fly invasion into Omay Communal Land. 
The 40 km section known as the Matusadona block (between points A 
and B, Figure 6.2) was constructed between October 1985 and February 
1986. lt comprised 984 S-type targets arranged in four rows 333 m apart, 
with an overall deployment rate of 25 targets per linear km of barrier. For 
three rows, the inter-target distance was 200 m, and in the fourth row the tar-
gets were spaced 100 m apart. This barrier was the northern edge of the area 
ground-sprayed with DOT in 1986. 
In September and October 1986, the barrier was extended for a further 40 
km (the 'Sanyati' block; between points B and C, Figure 6.2) with a further 
1015 targets deployed in a pattern similar to the Matusadona block. 
Between November 1987 and January 1988, the Negande and Chunga 
blocks (between points A and 0, Figure 6.2) were constructed 5 km within 
the northern boundary of the 1987 ground spraying operation. This 55 km 
section comprised 1071 targets deployed at 20 per linear km: four rows, 333 
m apart, with 200 m inter-target distance. The 25 km spur to Tashinga was 
established between July and October 1988. 
Zambia 
To date, the main use of targets outside Zimbabwe has been in Zambia, where 
various research projects and control operations have been undertaken. 
Choma-Kalomo 
The first targets used for tsetse control operations in Zambia were deployed in 
the Choma-Kalomo area of Southern Province, in 1986. These were used as an 
invasion barrier, prior to the RTTCP aerial spraying in 1987. The barrier was 70 
km long and comprised S-type targets, imported from Zimbabwe, deployed at 
an overall average of 44 per linear km. By early 1988, 2760 of the 3048 targets 
had been stolen or seriously damaged by grass fires or by animals. 
Senanga West 
The Dutch Government funded a project to investigate the technical and econ-
omic feasibility of using Zimbabwean-type targets for controlling C. morsitans 
centralis in the Senanga District of Western Province {Figure 6.3). The first tar-
gets were deployed in 1987. In the first phase of the project, which ended in 
March 1989, tsetse control using 5-type targets proved technically feasible at 
an overall deployment density of 3.8 per sq km. However, as deployed, the tar-
gets were not cost-effective compared with drug control of trypanosomiasis 
(Willemse et al., 1989; Putt et al., 1988; Willemse, 1991; Knols et al., 1991 ). 
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Control Project at Senanga West. 
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The two main factors limiting the economic viability of target operations in 
Western Province were considered to be the low cattle density in the project 
area, and the high overhead costs due to the small scale of the trial. In the 
second phase of the project, which ended in 1992, the operation was 
expanded to include some 8000 sq km of cattle country. Two major changes 
in target design were investigated: 
• the all-black design of target used in Phase 1 was replaced by a much cheaper 
design, the so-called 'stick' target, based upon a blue-black cloth rectangle 
attached to wooden poles planted in the ground, cut on site by the target team; and 
• the need to revisit targets regularly, for retreatment with insecticide and 
replenishment of odour-attractants, was overcome (on the basis of research 
findings in Zimbabwe), reducing manpower and vehicle requirements. 
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In late 1991, technical results with the new target design were promising. The 
author undertook an economic evaluation of the project, which indicated that, 
in Senanga West, tsetse control using stick targets was probably more cost-
effective than reliance upon drugs for trypanosomiasis control (Barrett, 1992a). 
An economic comparison of stick and S-type targets is made in Section 7 
(page 96ff). The economics of trypanosomiasis control in Senanga West are 
examined in Section 10 (page 141 ff). 
Gwembe Valley 
Tsetse control operations undertaken by the Zambian Department of Veterinary 
and Tsetse Control Services in various areas of the Gwembe Valley from 1988 
onwards have been funded under the RTTCP. These operations include the area 
on the opposite side of the Zambezi river from the Rifa Triangle. Reports of the 
work were not available at the time of writing this report. 
Chipata 
The Belgian Animal Disease Control Project was set up in 1984 in Zambia's 
Eastern Province, to assist with control of East Coast Fever. In 1986, the pro-
ject expanded to include tsetse and trypanosomiasis control. Small-scale trials 
compared Zimbabwean-type targets with locally made designs incorporating 
bamboo frames and locally made material. In 1990, EC funding was pro-
vided through the RTTCP for a 400 sq km trial in Petauke District to test the 
locally made design of target. 
Malawi 
A large-scale trial of Zimbabwean-type targets was established in the Kasungu 
National Park in Malawi, under the auspices of the RTTCP. This area has a sub-
stantial G. morsitans morsitans population, which was the vector of a human try-
panosomiasis outbreak near the Park. Between October 1989 and March 1990, 
some 2800 targets were deployed over 750 sq km. Early entomological results 
were encouraging, with a 70% reduction in the tsetse population. However, 
theft of the targets and their components threatened the success of the project. 
Kenya 
Galana ranch occupies 6000 sq km on the Kenyan coastal plain and is partly 
infested by Glossina longipennis, G. austeni, G. brevipalpis and G. palli-
dipes. The latter species is the main vector of animal trypanosomiasis on the 
ranch. Until the mid 1980s, the disease had been controlled by chemo-
therapy but during the 1980s drug resistance became unmanageable (Dolan 
et al., 1991 ). A trial of Zimbabwean-type targets was initiated in 1986 by the 
Kenya Trypanosomiasis Research Institute (Opiyo et al., 1987). The results 
were so impressive that the ranch management started using targets for tsetse 
control over a large part of the ranch. The author visited Galana in April 
1989, at which time the ranch manager, Mr B. Heath, was very pleased with 
the level of tsetse control achieved by the targets. 
At Nguruman, bait techniques were investigated with different objectives 
from the Zimbabwean work, under the auspices of the International Centre 
for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE). A low-technology odour-baited 
trap was designed, which could be made, deployed and maintained by 
Masai pastoralists with a minimum of support from government services 
(Brightwell et al., 1987 and 1991; Dransfield et al., 1990). The trap was 
extensively tested in an area of about 100 sq km, in the Kajiado District of 
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western Kenya. However, in 1990 the so-called Nguruman trap had not been 
used elsewhere under operational circumstances. The trap was developed 
primarily as an appropriate technology for control of C. pal/idipes with com-
munity participation, discussed later in the report. 
Somalia 
Zimbabwean-type targets were used as barriers to reinvasion in large-scale 
aerial spraying operations along the Shabeelle Valley, in 1988 (page 39). 
Unfortunately, most of the 1200 targets deployed by the project were very 
quickly stolen Uordan and Holmes, 1989). The targets were replaced, but 
maintenance was problematic. Eventually, tsetse control was consolidated by 
treating cattle in the area with a deltamethrin pour-on. The project was termi-
nated at the outbreak of civil war. 
Ethiopia 
In south-west Ethiopia, a serious problem of resistance to trypanocidal drugs 
was detected at Ghibe, a research site of the African Trypanotolerant 
Network. In 1990, odour-baited targets were deployed over 125 sq km to 
control G. pallidipes, the main vector of trypanosomiasis in the area. After 
one year, results were promising (Mulatu et al., 1991 ). 
Experience in West and Central Africa 
At the beginning of the 1990s, most large-scale control operations against riv-
erine species of tsetse in Central and West Africa were still using unbaited 
traps or insecticide-treated screens, which re ly on visual attractiveness to 
tsetse flies. NRI scientists have collaborated w ith French and German workers 
to develop attractants to improve the performance and cost-effectiveness of 
traps and targets used against riverine species of tsetse in West Africa. The 
results so far have been less dramatic than in the case of savanna speci es of 
tsetse. This seems to be related to the different ecology of the riverine species 
of tsetse compared with savanna species. Research on this aspect of bait 
technology continues (Merot et al., 1986; Merot and Filledier, 1991; Wall 
and Langley, 1991 ). 
Operations before 1988 
The cost-competitiveness of targets in achieving tsetse control was noted in 
the report of the Antelope Island trial (Vale et al., 1986), although actual 
costs were not given. 
The first report of the Rifa Triangle trial (Vale et al., 1988) estimated that, 
if conducted as a control operation, the trial would have cost about US$170 
per sq km per year compared with an estimated US$11 0 for ground spraying 
and US$240 for aerial spraying (historical prices). 
No further cost information was given, although some data exist concern-
ing inputs and outputs. Target deployment teams in the Rifa Triangle con-
sisted of 16 persons, who were able to erect 30 to 40 targets per day, at 
intervals of approximately 300 m along tracks (Vale et al., 1988). The aver-
age productivity was therefore about 2.2 targets deployed per man-day. The 
productivity was approximately half this rate for placement of targets 
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between tracks, due to the time lost in walking. Target 'maintenance teams' 
were smaller, comprising only five or six persons who were able to service 
up to 60 targets per day (about 15 per man-day) along tracks, and at about 
one quarter of this rate for targets between tracks. 
The monitoring of the Rifa operation was exceptional, as this was a 
research study. For- the same reason, the productivity was not representative 
of routine control operations. The amount and quality of supervision was 
high, and worker morale and motivation on research projects tend to be 
good. However, the Rifa figures show what can be achieved. There are few 
other reported data on team productivity. 
The costs of the 1986 Umfurudzi target operation, as identified by Hursey 
et al. (1987), are shown in Table 6.3. The costs relate to 8000 targets 
deployed throughout 1300 sq km. They include the costs of the 70 km long 
target barrier between the target block and the aerial-sprayed block. The 
overall average cost was Z$138 per target (1990 prices), inclusive of access 
provision, without distinguishing between the targets deployed for eradication 
and those in the barrier. About 70% of this cost was accounted by the target 
materials, odours and insecticide. At a deployment density of 4 per sq km, 
the cost of the eradication component of the trial is estimated at Z$554 per 
sq km (1990 prices), inclusive of access provision . Ground spraying in the 
same operation was costed at Z$340 per sq km and aerial spraying at Z$756 
per sq km (1990 prices). 
Table 6.3 Costing of the Umfurudzi target operation in 1986 (Z$'000, 1990 
prices) 
ITEM Total Z$/target % 
(Z$ '000) 
A TARGET MATERIALS 
Targets 593.3 74.2 53.5 
Insecticide 92.2 11 .5 8.3 
Odour attractants 85.1 10.6 7.7 
Sub-total 770.6 96.3 69.5 
B MANPOWER, VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT 
Wages and rations 105.7 13.2 9.5 
Stores and equipment 19.9 2.5 1.8 
Transport 41.0 5.1 3.7 
Sub-total 166.5 20.8 15.0 
C ACCESS PROVISION 
Bulldozer hire 118.6 14.8 10.7 
Manpower and vehicles 52.9 6.6 4.8 
Sub-total 171.4 21.4 15.5 
TOTAl 1108.6 138.6 100.0 
Source Based on figures given in Hursey et al. (1987). 
Notes The cost of targets is the full purchase cost, not an annual charge. 
The cost includes 5200 targets deployed for eradication plus 2800 deployed in a 
barrier. Costs of entomologica l surveys are excluded. 
The costs include maintenance servicing for nine months. 
1990 prices are calculated using the Consumer Price Index. 
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Operations after 1988 
No standard method of planning or monitoring of target operations had been 
introduced by 1987, when the author took up post with the TICB. lt was dif-
ficult to evaluate the true costs incurred in earlier and ongoing target oper-
ations. There was no consensus concerning the best design of field 
operations, such as: 
• the size of field teams; 
• how the field tasks are allocated among team members; 
• whether targets should be deployed in lines along roads or rivers, or in sys-
tematic grid arrays. 
Different approaches were tried by the senior staff responsible for different 
operations. Although information was available concerning the number of 
targets deployed or serviced by field teams, it was usually impossible to dis-
aggregate effort according to different tasks -for example where a team was 
involved in camp construction, target deployment, target servicing or other 
activities. Therefore, a system of monthly reporting was instituted by the 
author, to collect reliable and accurate data on resources specifically used in 
routine target operations. 
A form called the 'Target Team Return' was designed in consultation with 
senior TICB staff, for completion by Tsetse Field Officers supervising target 
operations. A separate form was completed for each field team, for each 
three-week operational period.* Information reported on the form included: 
• the size and composition of the team; 
• the total consumption of insecticide, odours, and other materials used for 
target servicing and repair; 
• a daily account of hours worked and vehicle mileage logged; 
• a daily account of activities undertaken and numbers of targets deployed, 
serviced, repaired or uplifted. 
A preliminary version of the form was introduced into the Sebungwe region 
in January 1988, as a pilot exercise. An improved version was subsequently 
adopted for use throughout the country, from April 1988 onwards. Further 
minor refinements were made in 1990. The form as used by the TICB in 
1991 is reproduced as Figure 6.4. Barrett (1994; Appendix F) undertook a 
detailed analysis of the data produced up to 1991 (summarized in Table 6.4). 
These data provide evidence of the productivity of target teams in real 
situations, which was lower than initially expected by some of the senior 
technical staff. The overall rate of deployment of targets was about 1.3 per 
man-day, compared with servicing rates of about two per man-day (Table 
6.4). There was a high degree of variation about these average figures, 
depending on specific circumstances (Barrett, 1994; Appendix F). 
Apart from their value in modelling the costs of the target technique, the 
figures in Table 6.4 have prompted the TICB to pay increased attention to 
improvement in the field logistics of target operations, as opposed to concen-
trating on improvement in the technical efficiency of the target itself. 
*In Zimbabwe, field teams work continuously for approximately 20 days in the field and then have ten 
days 'off' . 
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Table 6.4 Analysis of target team productivity in Kotwa, Rushinga and 
Sebungwe, 1988-91 
Kotwa Rushinga Sebungwe 
A TARGET DEPLOYMENT 
Average team size_ 38 54 43 
Targets per man-day 1.90 0.87 1.19 
Vehicle km/target deployed 1.78 3.64 3.95 
B TARGET RETREATMENT 
Average team size 28 57 26 
Targets per man-day 2.57 1.70 1.54 
Vehicle km/target retreated 1.64 1.95 1.96 
Consumables/target 
Deltamethrin (ml) 2.43 1.54 1.9 
Acetone/MEK (ml) 190 270 280 
Odour sachets 0.62 0.57 0.81 
c TARGET REPAIRS 
Percentage of targets serviced requiring repair 9.6 9.3* 18.0 
Percentage of targets repaired requiring: 
Software 103 16* 87 
Hardware 
Wire frames 21 1* 5 
Vertical posts 5 5 
Horizontal beam 12 1* 14 
Bottle 26 3* 8 
Source Barrett (1994; Appendix F, Tables F.2 to F.S) . 
* The majority of target returns from Rushinga did not give details of materials used for target 
repairs and therefore the Rushinga entries in Part C are of limited value. 
Indirect costs of target operations 
The indirect and overhead costs of target operations are broadly similar to 
those incurred in ground spraying, as discussed in Section 3 and by Barrett 
(1994; Appendix C). The main indirect costs are for the provision and main-
tenance of access roads and field camps. As with ground spraying, it is diffi-
cult to identify historical expenditure on these items which can be directly 
and solely attributed to target operations. 
Indirect costs vary greatly according to circumstances. In flat, open terrain 
with an existing network of roads and tracks, the cost of access provision can 
be minimal. The other extreme is perhaps exemplified by the Umfurudzi tar-
get operation, where access had to be provided in very rugged wilderness. 
The expenditure on access provision in this operation was approximately 
15% of the total cost and was close to the expenditure on manpower, 
vehicles and equipment for the target deployment and servicing (Table 6.3). 
Methodological issues 
Several difficulties arise in comparing the costs of target operations with those 
of conventional techniques for tsetse control. Some difficulties have been dis-
cussed in Section 2, in particular the need to distinguish between the costs of 
reclaiming an area from tsetse and those of preventing reinvasion. 
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The resources allocated to ground or aerial spraying are decided in 
advance, and are expended over a short, finite period. By contrast, servicing 
of targets incurs recurrent costs, additional to the initial cost of deployment. 
The eventual total cost is therefore a function of the time during which the 
targets are deployed, and the frequency of servicing. These factors must be 
explicit in any costing. 
Bearing this in mind, the method of costing target operations is as follows: 
• the cost of preventing reinvasion is separated from the cost of eliminating 
flies from the treated area; 
• the cost of target operations is divided into materials costs (hardware, soft-
ware, insecticides, odours); manpower and vehicle costs for deployment, 
servicing and uplifting; and other indirect or overhead costs; 
• materials costs are calculated on an annual basis per target, allowing for 
hardware to be used for several years; and 
• manpower and vehicle inputs are evaluated in terms of the annual cost of 
keeping a 'target team' in the field. Costs per target are calculated accord-
ing to the daily work output of the team, for different target-related tasks. 
This section analyses the costs of operations designed to achieve tsetse eradi-
cation; target barriers are considered in Barrett (1994; Appendix G). The fol-
lowing cost model relates specifically to eradication of C. morsitans 
morsitans, for which the target deployment density is recommended as four 
per sq km. An operation against C. pallidipes would require a lower deploy-
ment density, of beween 1 and 2 targets per sq km. 
Materials and chemicals 
Table 6.5 identifies all of the materials and chemicals required for the S-type 
and all-black targets, which were the main types used in Zimbabwe between 
1988 and 1991. The 1990 price for an all-black standard cloth was exactly 
the same as for the S-type panel comprising a black cloth centre panel with 
netting side panels. Otherwise, the materials and chemicals used are the 
same for the S-type and the all-black. 
The cost per target for materials and chemicals amounts to Z$43.68 per year 
(Table 6.5). The main cost is for the software (i.e. cloth panel), accounting for 
42% of the annual cost, followed by the odours (29%, for acetone plus 
sachets), hardware (13%), insecticide (13%) and herbicide (4%). 
Although the purchase cost for the hardware is close to that for the soft-
ware, the metal poles and wire frame should last for several years, while the 
cloths wear out more frequently. Damage tends to occur when the poles are 
hammered into the ground, so that working life is shorter when the targets 
are uplifted and re-deployed. In working out the 'annual charge' for the hard-
ware, a working life of four years is assumed in the basic model. The need 
for replacing some hardware components, because of theft or damage, is 
covered in a contingency provision of 1 0% (Table 6.5). 
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Table 6.5 Materials costing for an S-type (all-black) target (Z$, 1990 prices) 
Annual %of Sub-
charge total (A) 
(Z$) 
Hardware Costs* Vertical post (1 .54 m) 7.00 Z$ 
Horizontal beam 6.60 Z$ 
Standard wire frame 2.35 Z$ 
Washer 0.20 Z$ 
Total cost per set 16.15 Z$ 
Estimated working life (years) 4 
Capital recovery factort 0.315 
Estimated annual charge 5.09 Z$ 5.09 12.8 
Software Cost/standard set*t 16.80 Z$ 
Estimated working life (years) 1 
Capital recovery factort 1.000 
Estimated annual charge 16.80 Z$ 16.80 42.3 
Acetone Cost/1 it re~ 3.31 Z$ 
Consumption per target per year 0.80 1 
750 ml bottle (one per year) 0.80 Z$ 
Bottle roof (one per year) 0.40 Z$ 
Total cost per year 3.85 Z$ 3.85 9.7 
Odour sachets Cost/sachet§ 2.49 
Number of sachets per year 3 
Annual cost of sachets 7.47 7.47 18.8 
Herbicide Bromacil, cost/kg (Z$)~ 7.50 
Amount used per target per year (g)§§ 200 
Annual cost of herbicide 1.50 1.50 3.8 
Insecticide Cost/1 it re§ 500 Z$ 
Amount used per target per yeaf1~ 10 ml 
Annual insecticide cost 5.00 Z$ 5.00 12.6 
A Sub-total of above cost items 39.71 100.0 
B Contingency allowance for theft, fire, other expected 
damage or loss 10% 3.97 
c Total annual cost of materials and chemicals/target Z$ 43.68 
According to the 1990 price list for Sonar Industries Ltd, Harare. 
t The capital recovery factor includes provision for repayment of the initial capital cost plus 
interest at an annual rate of 1 0%. 
t The software is costed as all black cloth, 1 x 1.8 m. 
Government of Zimbabwe 1990 Tender Board prices. 
§ See Table 6.6. 
§§ The use of herbicide for suppressing vegetation growth around the target is not essential 
but is useful, especially during the wet season. 
~ This is based on initial treatment with 600 ml of 0.1% a.i. deltamethrin and three resprays 
at 0.05% deltamethrin. This should require 7.5 ml of 20% w/v proprietary product 
(Giossinex). An additional 2.5 ml is allowed for overspraying and wastage. 
Methyl ethyl ketone can replace acetone as an attractant odour. In the 
relatively small quantities required for tsetse control operations, the costs of 
the two chemicals are about the same. Choice will depend on availability 
and relative prices from local suppliers. 
The basic costing assumes the use of 4 g sachets incorporating octenol 
and phenols in the standard ratio used in Zimbabwe (Table 6.6). The cost 
includes the odours and a charge for making the sachets, which are prepared 
at the TICB headquarters in Harare - not as a commercial venture. Each 
sachet should last about four months. Larger, longer-lasting sachets can be 
made, for a similar annual cost. 
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Table 6.6 Costing of the odour sachets (Z$, 1990 prices)*t 
A COST OF THE ODOURS Cost/kg g/sachet Z$/sachet 
1-octen-3-ol 
3-n-propyl phenol 
4-methyl phenol 
Total cost of odours per sachet 
Stg 
81.58 
913 
12.00 
Z$ 
355.31 
3976.48 
52.26 
B COST OF POLYTHENE AND SACHET PRODUCTION~ 
C TOTAL COST PER SACHET 
1.231 
0.308 
2.462 
* Prices as accepted by the Government of Zimbabwe 1990 Tender Board. 
0.437 
1.224 
0.129 
1.789 
0.70 
2.49 
t The standard sachet contains 4 g of a mixture in the ratio 1 :4:8 of 3NP-phenol:octenol: 
4M-phenol. 
t The 1990 average exchange rate was Z$1.00 = £0.2296 (own data). 
~ The cost/sachet is an estimate budgeted to include materials and cost of manufacture. 
Sachets are manufactured by the TICB using its own production unit. The only equipment 
required is a heat sealing unit costing about Z$2000, which requires little maintenance and 
can be used for several years. Polythene tubing is purchased in rolls of about 8 kg which 
will yield about 2200 sachets per roll. Three unskilled workers can produce about 900 
sachets per day. 
Table 6.7 Manpower and vehicle costs for a target team (Z$, 1990 prices) 
A MANPOWER* Number/ Monthly Monthly %total (C) 
team cost/man cost/team 
Tsetse Field Officer 0.33 1587 524 
Senior TFA 1 700 700 
Learner TFA 1 463 463 
Lorry driver 1 510 510 
Other graded employees 2 458 916 
Casual workerst 20 145 2900 
Total cost/team-month 25 6013 72 
B VEHICLESt km per Cost per 
team-
month km Month 
Team lorry 1800 0.79 1422 
TFO's four-wheel drive 500 1.43 715 
Spraying equipment, sundries~ 250 
Total cost/team-month 2387 28 
c TOTAL MANPOWER, VEHICLE AND 
EQUIPMENT COST/TEAM-MONTH 8400 100 
* Established and graded staff salaries are based on the upper range of the salary scale, 
calculated as 10% above the mean salary. An additional 25% is provided to cover 
subsistence and allowances. 
t The cost of casual workers includes wages plus rations. 
t Vehicle costs are based on CMED hire rates. Distances travelled per month are based on 
past levels of actual use. 
~ The provision for spraying equipment and minor consumables is an estimate based on SO% 
of expenditure incurred for ground spraying (see Table 3.4). 
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Overgrowth of the target with vegetation interferes with the visual attractive-
ness of the bait, and increases risk of damage from bush fires. Accordingly, 
when the targets are deployed, the vegetation is completely removed for a 
radius of some metres around the target. Regrowth is removed (so-called scuf-
fling) at each occasion when the target is serviced. The use of a herbicide, such 
as bromacil, to suppress regrowth around the target has proved very effective 
where it has been tried in Zimbabwe, al though this has not yet become stan-
dard practice. The cost model includes a financial provision for herbicide. 
Manpower, vehicles and equipment costs 
The manpower, vehicle and equipment costs for a field team assigned to tar-
get operations amount to Z$8400 per month (Table 6.7). The target team 
comprises 25 persons including 20 casual labourers and is supervised by a 
Field Officer who is responsible for three teams. The cost per target depends 
on how many targets the team is able to work on per day. The following 
analysis examines three scenarios of differing productivity (Table 6.8). 
The team would normally operate for 20 days in the field. Some time is 
lost in travelling to and from the base camp to the field camp, and in moving 
from one field camp to another. The average number of effective working 
days per month is taken as ranging from 16 to 18 days. Time spent produc-
tively on duties other than target operations (e.g. trap servicing, road main-
tenance) is accounted for elsewhere, in the indirect and overhead costs of 
the operation. 
Rates of deployment, servicing and uplifting of targets are based on the 
analysis of target return forms (Table 6.4). The basic scenario uses the overall 
average figures from routine operations in Zimbabwe. Higher and lower 
values are used in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios respectively. 
Frequency of servicing has normally been at three or four month intervals 
during the dry season, with two-monthly intervals during the wet season. In a 
one year operation, this would involve three service visits in addition to 
deployment and uplifting. The service interval might be reduced or extended 
following an inspection visit by senior staff. Therefore, in a routine operation, 
the number of servicing visits could range from two to four. This is reflected 
in the three scenarios of Table 6.8. 
In the basic scenario, the annual cost for manpower, vehicles and equipment 
(MVE) amounts to Z$48.80 per target, which is marginally more than the 
materials cost of Z$43.68. However the MVE cost could range from Z$30 to 
Z$80 (Table 6.8). 
Total costs of targets deployed for eradication 
With targets deployed at 4 per sq km, the total direct cost of tsetse control is 
between Z$ 290 and Z$5 1 0 per sq km per year, with Z$370 per sq km as the 
figure for the basic scenario. lt is assumed that indirect costs are similar to 
those for ground spraying, and include access provision, camp construction 
and maintenance, equipment, clothing and consumables. On this basis, the 
total cost of tsetse control is between Z$450 and Z$830 per sq km per year 
of deployment, with Z$607 for the basic scenario (Table 6.8). 
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Table 6.8 Cost model of tsetse eradication using targets (1990 prices, Z$) 
Scenario* 
Basic Pessimistic Optimistic 
A MANPOWER, VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT (MVE) 
MVE costs per team-montht 8400 8400 8400 
Effective working days per monthi 17 16 18 
Targets deployed/man-day:t 1.3 1 1.6 
/team-month 553 400 720 
MVE costs per target deployed 15.20 21 .00 11 .67 
Targets serviced/man-dayt 2 1.5 2.5 
/team-month 850 600 1125 
MVE costs per target service 9.88 14.00 7.47 
Number of services required 3 4 2 
Total MVE cost of servicing per target 29.65 56.00 14.93 
Targets uplifted/man-dayt 5 3 8 
/team-month 2125 1200 3600 
MVE costs per target uplifted 3.95 7.00 2.33 
Total MVE cost/target 48.80 84.00 28.93 
B MATERIALS AND CHEMICALS~ 43 .68 43.68 43.68 
c TOTAL DIRECT COSTS 
Total cost (A+B) per target/year 92.48 127.68 72.61 
Targets per sq km 4 4 4 
Total cost (A+B)/sq km 369.93 510.72 290.45 
%total F 61 61 64 
D INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS/SQ KM§ 
Access provision, camp construction 
and maintenance 187.5 250 125 
E OTHER INDIRECT COSTS/SQ KM§ 
Equipment, clothing and consumables 50 70 35 
F TOTAL OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS/SQ KM 607 831 450 
* All three scenarios apply to control operations against G. morsitans in which targets are 
deployed at 4/sq km . The 'basic' scenario involves controlling a medium density fly 
population in good tsetse habitat, with reasonable access. Operational parameters are 
based on the overall averages for productivity parameters derived from analysis of TTCB 
target return forms. The pessimistic scenario includes lower team productivity reflecting for 
example adverse terrain, and allowance is made for an extra service visit. In the optimistic 
scenario it is assumed that the fly density is light to moderate and team productivity is 
above average but still within the levels of past TTCB routine operations. Only two service 
visits are undertaken. 
t See Table 6.7 . 
t Based on analysis of target return forms: see Barrett (1994; Appendix F). The standard 
working period is 20 days but allowance is made for unproductive time due to breakdown 
etc. 
~ See Table 6.5. 
§ Access provision, camp construction and maintenance and expenditure on equipment, 
tools and uniforms is estimated on the same basis as for ground spraying operations (see 
Table 3.5). Item D is increased by 25% to reflect that in target operations access roads 
have to be maintained for the full year. 
The remaining factor determining the overall cost of tsetse control is the 
time during which the targets are deployed. In many operations in 
Zimbabwe, tsetse eradication has appeared achieved within 9 to 12 months 
of deployment of the targets. With more confidence in the techn ique, the tar-
gets would have been uplifted at this stage. However, to ensure that no flies 
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survived, the targets have often remained deployed for longer than necessary 
- in some cases for several years. This practice can lead to insidious over-
expenditure on tsetse control, if the targets are kept on a full maintenance 
programme. 
This is one area where the performance of targets as a method for tsetse 
control has not yet been tested stringently under operational conditions. If a 
deliberate and substantial overkill is to be built into the design of a tsetse 
control operation, this will have major cost implications. Senior managers 
must take a disciplined attitude to target operations, and uplift targets at the 
appropriate time. 
Advantages of the target technique include: 
• very low environmental impact- contamination with insecticide is negli-
gible; 
• cost- tsetse control using targets is cost-competitive with alternative tech-
niques in many situations; 
• robustness - operational problems such as a delay in servicing or the loss 
of a small number of targets will not jeopardize the eradication process, 
merely slow it down; thus the timing of operations according to season or 
weather is not crucial; 
• simplicity- where appropriate the method can be used by local farmers, 
with technical advice and input support from the government service; 
• wide applicability- target operations appear to be technically feasible in 
rough terrain, in the absence of a cattle population, and for both small-
and large-scale operations; 
• versatility- it can be used for prevention of tsetse invasion as well as for 
reclamation; and 
• ease of management - operations can continue throughout the year and, 
therefore, do not have high peaks of requirement for labour and vehicles, 
as is the case with ground and aerial spraying. 
Disadvantages and potential limitations include: 
• substantial losses of the targets through theft and damage can be proble-
matic in some circumstances; 
• extensive ground access is required for manpower and vehicles, which 
may be undesirable in areas designated as wilderness sites or in national 
parks; 
• establishment and maintenance of necessary ground access in difficult ter-
rain can be very expensive; 
• large-scale target operations require large numbers of staff and vehicles, 
which must be effectively organized and supported; 
• most of the research and development completed to date has been con-
fined to G. morsitans morsitans and G. pallidipes. 
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Tsetse control by use of artificial baits is probably the most promising tech-
nique for tsetse control being developed currently, in terms of technical feasi-
bility, environmental acceptability and economic viability in large parts of 
southern and eastern Africa. 
Although targets are being widely used already in large-scale operations, 
the technique is by no means perfected. Scope exists for considerable 
improvement. Some of the prospects for such improvement are discussed in 
the following section. 
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Section 7 
Future Prospects for the Target 
Technique 
~·.~··· 
To date, in Zimbabwe, large-scale tsetse control using artificial baits has been 
confined to use of the S-type and all-black targets (Section 6). Various aspects 
of design are still changing and the prospects are for cheaper, yet more effec-
tive bait techniques in the near future. This section examines some of the 
opportunities for further improvement in bait technology, and how this might 
affect costs, with two objectives: 
• to demonstrate that bait techniques are likely to become cheaper in the 
future; and 
• to show how economic analysis can contribute to identifying the priorities 
for research and development relating to targets. 
Alternative insecticides 
Deltamethrin is the only insecticide presently used in large-scale target oper-
ations in southern Africa. A wide range of other synthetic pyrethroids has 
been investigated at Rekomitjie. As yet, none has appeared promising as an 
alternative to deltamethrin. Alphacypermethrin has been used in West Africa 
(Laveissiere et al., 1990) but at equal application rate does not perform as 
well as deltamethrin under Zimbabwean conditions. Comparative studies on 
a cost-equivalent basis have not been reported; such studies should be under-
taken, since the identification of insecticides alternative to deltamethrin 
would be of strategic value. Apart from the possibility of future technical 
problems with deltamethrin, competition could result in lower prices for such 
insecticides. 
Dieldrin 
Dieldrin is cheaper than deltamethrin and is relatively persistent on targets. 
Dieldrin has been investigated for use on targets in West Africa, but per-
formed poorly in tests on the palpalis group (Laveissiere and Couret, 1981 ). 
Dieldrin was used for early target trials in Zimbabwe (Antelope Island: see 
page 66). This experience, and other limited studies, suggest that dieldrin on 
target cloths performs effectively against savanna tsetse species under 
Zimbabwean field conditions (Vale, personal communication). 
Dieldrin has adverse environmental effects when used in the larger quan-
tities required for most agricultural purposes. Accordingly, the chemical has 
been banned in many countries, for most uses. However, for tsetse control, 
very small quantities of insecticide would be necessary on each target and 
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potential environmental contamination would be minimal. Target cloths can 
be impregnated with insecticide before they are taken to the field, which 
would eliminate the need for field teams to spray the target with insecticide 
when they are deployed. This would reduce possible environmental contami-
nation and health risk to field workers. 
Owing to the sinister reputation of the persistent organochlorine insecti-
cides, many organizations are reluctant to promote their use. Dieldrin may 
no longer be manufactured in the future, because of the collapse in the world 
market for this chemical. However, dieldrin could be considered for use on 
targets in those places where it is still available, and in situations where its 
use would be acceptable. This could reduce costs significantly, depending 
upon the application rate required. 
In 1990, the price of dieldrin (50% a.i. wp) was approximately Z$55 per kg 
in Zimbabwe. Vale (personal communication) estimated that targets would 
remain effective if treated twice per year with 600 ml of 4% a.i. dieldrin sol-
ution. This would require 96 g of commercial product at an annual cost of 
Z$5.28. This is more costly than the expenditure for deltamethrin (Z$5.00 per 
year; Table 6.5). However, dieldrin-treated targets would need less frequent ser-
vicing, which would save manpower and vehicle costs. To extend the service 
interval to between 6 and 12 months, the required application rate of deltame-
thrin would cost more than Z$1 0 per target per year (page 91 ). On this basis, 
dieldrin would be a cost-effective substitute for deltamethrin. 
Pyriproxifen 
Recent research in Zimbabwe has investigated the use of a juvenile hormone 
mimic called pyriproxifen (Sumitomo Chemical Company, Japan) as a che-
mosterilant for tsetse flies. Unlike substances such as metepa, pyriproxifen is 
highly specific to insects and causes no health hazard to vertebrates. lt can 
be used successfully for sterilizing insects, using specially designed traps, or 
in the place of the insecticide on a conventional target (Langley and 
Hargrove, 1990). 
The technical advantage of using pyriproxifen is that there is evidence that 
sterilized males may, themselves, sterilize a proportion of the females with 
whom they mate. The rate of decline of the 'viable' tsetse population is 
therefore potentially higher than where a conventional insecticide is used. 
The disadvantage is that flies are not killed instantly. Therefore, several 
months pass before the fly population begins to die out. Disease transmission 
may continue during this period. lt is not easy to monitor what is happening, 
without extensive entomological surveys and dissection of caught flies, to 
confirm that they are sterile. 
At present, pyriproxifen is not commercially available. Without a price for 
this chemical, the financial implications of its use cannot be evaluated. 
Researchers are optimistic that it will be cost-competitive with deltamethrin 
at application rates with equivalent technical performance. If so, the cost of 
the target technique could be reduced. 
Partial treatment of the target cloth 
Current practice with the all-black type of target is to treat the entire cloth 
with insecticide. Recent research in Zimbabwe (Vale, in press) shows that 
flies, given a two-colour target (e.g. blue and black), land preferentially on 
one of the sides. This provides scope for restricting insecticide application to 
part of the target, reducing costs significantly without loss of efficacy. 
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Prospects for reduced insecticide use are intimately related to other aspects 
of target design, which are discussed below (page 96ff). This includes a finan-
cial analysis of targets with reduced area of insecticide deposition, as used in 
the Western Province of Zambia. 
lmproveme~t in insecticide persistence 
The cost of target operations can be reduced by improving insecticide persis-
tence on the target cloth. In the basic scenario for tsetse control using targets, 
the manpower, vehicle and equipment (MVE) costs account for just over 50% 
of the direct costs of a target operation (Table 4.9). Servicing accounts for 
67% of the total MVE costs. Accordingly, there is much interest in reducing 
costs by extending the service interval, which is determined mainly by the 
need to re-treat the target cloth with insecticide. 
Improvement in the persistence of insecticide deposits on targets was 
investigated at Rekomitjie in the late 1980s (Torr et al., 1992). Various modi-
fications were tried, including the use of ultra-violet absorbers to reduce 
photo-degradation, and different types of material. The simplest way to 
extend the life of a deposit was to apply a higher initial concentration of 
insecticide. At a 0.6% concentration, deltamethrin applied to cotton cloth 
produced fly mortalities greater than 90% for 300 days in research studies. 
This suggests that all-cloth targets treated in this way will have an effective 
life of about one year (Torr et al., 1992). 
Changing the rate of insecticide application in this way would increase 
the insecticide cost by Z$5.50 per year (detailed analysis is presented Barrett, 
1994; Appendix F). This is less than the MVE charge for a single service visit 
for any of the operational scenarios considered, suggesting that the new 
regime would be financially viable even if the number of visits is reduced by 
only one per year. Further economy could be made by treating only part of 
the target cloth with insecticide, as discussed in the previous section. 
The conclusion is that treating targets with more insecticide than currently 
used would improve the persistence of the insecticide, extend the service 
interval and could, thus, reduce significantly the cost of tsetse control. 
~~~ ~ il 
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Seeking cost-effectiveness 
Taking into account the manpower and vehicle costs required in deployment 
and servicing, the most cost-effective target design will not necessarily be the 
one which is technically most effective, nor the cheapest design which is 
effective in eradicating tsetse: there is a trade-off between efficacy and cost 
in the design of a target. Some measure of how performance changes in 
relation to design changes is needed to optimize the design. 
This is particularly important in relation to modification of the visual and 
olfactory stimuli presented by the target. Changes in the visual aspects of tar-
get design are considered below (page 96ff); this section concentrates on the 
scope for improvement in cost-effectiveness of targets by modification of the 
odour component of the bait technique. 
Many researchers are convinced that some of the tsetse-attractant compo-
nents of host odour have not yet been identified. Scientists at NRI have spent 
several years trying to identify and characterize the mysterious component in 
ox odour referred to as 'omega' but to date have not been successful. Other 
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researchers are investigating odours from sources such as ox-sebum and the 
secretions from the eye-gland of warthogs, which affects tsetse behaviour in 
a way which might be exploited to improve the performance of targets. 
Apart from the possibility of discovering new odours, scope may exist for 
improving the use of the existing odours. This would include the rate and 
ratio of release of the odour components. 
Methodology for quantifying tsetse response to odours 
There is limited published information which quantifies the response of tsetse 
flies to different rates of release of the various attractant odours under field 
conditions (Hargrove and Vale, 1978; Vale and Hargrove, 1979; Vale and 
Hall, 1985a and 1985b; Torr, 1990). The degree of attraction is generally 
related to the concentration of odour, with incremental response diminishing 
at higher rates of odour release. Some odours become repellent at high con-
centration. Evaluation of dose-response relationships is complicated by the 
fact that combinations of odours often do not affect tsetse flies in a simply 
additive manner; there is usually some degree of synergism. Tsetse flies 
respond to odours differently according to the time of day, season, and place, 
which complicates the interpretation of measurements. 
The value of precise knowledge of dose-response relationships is limited 
by some practical considerations. For example, the odours permeate the 
polythene sachets at slightly different rates, which means that the content of 
the sachet has a constantly changing composition. Therefore, the rates of 
odour release change throughout the lifetime of a sachet. Absolute release 
rates also vary over time and from place to place depending on temperature, 
air movement and humidity. All of these factors suggest that trying to fine-
tune the formulation to a high degree will have limited impact. 
The method devised for cost analysis of odour aspects of target design is 
as follows. 
Use of the 'catch index' 
The performance of an odour formulation is assessed in terms of the 'catch 
index' of a bait with which it is used. This parameter is the ratio of the num-
ber of flies which contact (and are killed by) an S-type target baited with the 
given formulation, relative to the number caught on an identical target, with-
out the test odour but baited with acetone (at a defined and constant release 
rate). The catch rates are determined using electric grids. 
At Rekomitjie, Or G. Vale studied extensively the effects of different odour 
formulations on the performance of targets. He developed a computer model 
(presently unpublished) to estimate the catch index for targets baited with dif-
ferent combinations of odours. Parameters specified in the model include: 
• the width, length and wall thickness of the polythene sachet; 
• the initial weight ratio of the odours, and the total weight; 
• the loss constants for each odour (i.e. the rate at which they are lost 
through the sachet wall); 
• the frequency at which new sachets are added; and 
• activity constants for each species of fly for each odour component. 
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The model then estimates: 
• loss rates for each chemical for each individual day (allowing for changes 
in the sachet composition owing to differential losses); and 
• daily catch indices and the mean catch index for the total period of operation. 
All of the catch indices used in the following analysis were estimated using 
Dr Vale's computer model and his estimated parameters for loss and activity 
constants. At present no alternative method of estimation exists and field data 
are limited with which to cross-check the estimated parameters. 
The 'standard effect' 
The implication of an increased catch index is that tsetse eradication can be 
achieved with the same deployment density of targets over a shorter period, 
or alternatively within the same time but using a lower density of targets. In 
the following financial analysis the second of these options will be evaluated. 
A 'standard effect' is defined as the overall rate of tsetse population reduction 
which is achieved by deployment of 4 targets per sq km baited with one 
standard sachet and acetone. The density of target deployment required to 
achieve this standard effect is estimated for alternative odour formulations. 
Rate of release of odours 
Table 7.1 presents the theoretical consequences of increasing the number of 
odour sachets per target. For both G. pallidipes and G. morsitans, the catch 
index increases as more sachets are added, but with diminishing effect, par-
ticularly in the case of G. morsitans. The number of targets required to 
achieve a standard effect declines as the number of sachets is increased. The 
materials cost per target increases linearly as more odour is used. 
For G. pallidipes, the annual direct costs per sq km decrease steadily to 
Z$89 per sq km with eight sachets per target, compared with Z$238 per sq km 
with one sachet per target. This indicati~s that in an operation against G. palli-
dipes it would be cost-effective to increase the use of odours by an order of 
magnitude above the standard level of use in recent operations in Zimbabwe. 
For G. morsitans the effects of extra odour are less dramatic but still sig-
nificant. Increasing the number of sachets to three or four per target would 
reduce the direct costs of tsetse control from Z$370 per sq km to about 
Z$300 per sq km. As shown in the bottom line of Table 7.1 this would bring 
the overall cost of a typical tsetse control operation in Zimbabwe down from 
the present level of Z$607 per sq km to about Z$540 per sq km -a potential 
reduction of about 10%. At higher levels of odour use, the costs per sq km of 
controlling G. morsitans begin to increase. 
As in the case of increased use of insecticide discussed on page 91, the 
economic advantages of using increased amounts of odour may be less than 
the financial advantages. In general, such an economic optimum is likely to 
be slightly lower than the number which is financially optimal. 
As a result of the above analysis, the TICB began to increase the number 
of odours used per target in some of its operations. This was constrained in 
the short-term because of a fixed annual budgetary provision for imported 
chemicals. Given the number of crucial assumptions underlying the analysis, 
it is important that the technical performance of targets using increased 
odours is closely monitored and evaluated in the field before wider adoption 
is recommended. 
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Table 7.1 Financial analysis of using increased number of odour sachets 
per target (1990 prices, Z$) 
Sachets per target* 0 2 4 8 
Catch indext G. pal/idipes 1.000 2.351 3.666 6.046 9.130 
G. morsitans 1.000 1.511 1.847 2.256 2.404 
T argets/sq km to G. pallidipes 6.092 2.570 1.648 0.999 0.662 
achieve standard effect G. morsitans 6.092 4.000 3.272 2.679 2.514 
Annual direct cost per targett~ 
Materials 35.47 43.68 49.58 61.39 85.01 
MVE 48.80 48.80 48.80 48.80 48.80 
Total 84.27 92.48 98.38 110.19 133.81 
Annual direct cost/sq km (Z$) 
G. pallidipes 513 238 162 110 89 
G. morsitans 513 370 322 295 336 
Total of direct and indirect costs/sq km 751 607 559 533 574 
to eradicate G. morsitans (Z$) 
* The standard sachet contains 4 g of a mixture of 3-n propyl phenol, octenol and 4-methyl 
phenol in a ratio of 1 :4:8. Sachets are replaced every four months. 
t The catch indices were estimated using a computer model (SACHET2.bas) designed by Dr 
G Vale, Harare. Sachet dimensions were specified as 6 cm by 4.5 cm with wall thickness 
150 ~m. Loss and activity constants were specified as follows, on advice of Dr Vale: 
3NP Oct 4MP 
Loss constant for odour release 48 43 1 00 
Activity constant: G. pallidipes 0.5 0.5 0.5 
G. morsitans 0.3 0.6 0.6 
t In calculating the annual cost per target the only extra cost is considered to be the cost of 
the odours, i.e. no additional costs of sachet manufacture are included. See Table 6.6. 
~ Costs for manpower, vehicles and equipment, and indirect costs are as specified for the 
'basic' scenario given in Table 6.8. 
Ratio of release of odours 
Much scientific research and field testing has gone into the development of 
the appropriate formulation of odours in the sachets. The odours differ greatly 
in unit cost - the 3-n-propyl phenol costs nearly Z$4000 per kg compared 
with just over Z$350 for the octenol and just over Z$50 per kg for the 4-
methyl phenol (Table 6.6). This has been considered in developing the for-
mulation currently in use, but without a rigorous financial analysis. In the 
cost-optimal formulation, an extra unit of cost spent on any of the component 
odours should make an identical contribution to target efficacy. 
Table 7.2 presents the results of an analysis of the marginal contribution of 
each odour to improvement in the catch index, using Vale's simulation 
model. In this particular case, the activity constants were specified in relation 
to the catch index of a trap rather than a target. The absolute value of the 
catch indices would be different for a target, but the conclusion about rela-
tive performance of the different odours remains valid. 
Table 7.2 shows that the effect of adding five cents worth of odour to the 
basic sachet formulation is different according to which odour is added, sug-
gesting that the formulation is not cost-optimal for either species of tsetse. 
The marginal contribution (effect per unit of cost) of each odour is different 
against G. morsitans compared with G. pallidipes, especially in the case of 
4-methyl phenol where extra use powerfully increases the catch index 
against G. pallidipes but actually depresses the catch of G. morsitans. The 
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model suggests that, for targets deployed against G. morsitans, the sachet 
should include a lesser quantity of the 4-methyl phenol and an increased 
amount of octenol. Against G. pallidipes, it appears worthwhile to increase 
the use of the 4-methyl phenol and decrease the use of 3-n-propyl phenol. 
Where both species of fly are present the analysis becomes potentially 
complex, especially if some targets were baited with 1 pallidipes sachets' and 
others with 1 morsitans sachets'. 
Table 7.2 Financial analysis of marginal adjustment to sachet composition 
(1990 prices, Z$) 
Sachet type standard extra extra extra 
octenol 3NP-phenol 4M-phenol 
Sachet content (g) 
Octenol 1.231 1.371 1.231 1.231 
3NP-phenol 0.308 0.308 0.32 0.308 
4M-phenol 2.462 2.462 2.462 3.418 
Total weight (g) 4.001 4.141 4.013 4.957 
Total cost of odours 1.79 1.84 1.84 1.84 
Catch index G. pa/lidipes 4.279 4.436 4.357 4.936 
G. morsitans 1.405 1.452 1.409 1.386 
Change in catch index 
relative to standard sachet G. pa/lidipes nil 0.157 0.078 0.657 
G. morsitans nil 0.047 0.004 0.019 
* The standard sachet contains 4 g of a mixtu re of 3-n-propyl phenol, octenol and 4-methyl 
phenol in a ratio of 1 :4:8. Prices a.re as speci fied in Tab le 6.6. 
t The catch indices were estimated using a computer model (SACHET2.bas) designed by 
Dr G Vale, Harare. Sachet dimensions and loss constants were as detailed in Table 7.1. In 
this particular analysis activity constants were used appropriate for traps rather than targets, 
as follows: 
Activity constant: G. pallidipes 
G. morsitans 
3NP 
1.0 
0.5 
Oct 
0.1 
0.1 
4MP 
0.1 
0.1 
Or Vale's computer model has been estimated on the basis of extensive 
research results but has been developed primarily as working tool for use by 
the research scientists at Rekomitjie. As such, it would be premature to make 
firm recommendations about operational practices relying upon the model for 
economic analysis. However, this section demonstrates the potential practical 
value of such analysis. lt will be worthwhile to further refine the scientific 
model and to validate it thoroughly in the field. The model could then be used 
to simulate the technical performance and cost-effectiveness of different sachet 
compositions, on which basis proposed improvements could be field tested. 
lt may be possible to reduce the cost of the target cloth and supporting frame 
without reducing the technical performance of targets. lt may be cost-effec-
tive to change to a cheaper design of target with lower performance, pro-
vided that the overall cost of tsetse control is reduced . 
The metal frame could be replaced by wooden or bamboo poles planted 
in the ground, between which the target cloth is suspended. The cloth panel 
is the most costly component of the target (Table 6.5), and offers scope for 
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economy. With the development of insecticide treatment regimes and odour 
dispensing systems that will last up to a year, cheap, disposable targets are a 
real prospect. In principle, such targets could be deployed and never visited 
again. 
Experience in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, Vale (in press) compared the performance of disposable targets 
of varying design. He showed that any loss of efficacy due to fixing the target 
(e.g. between poles) so that it would not swivel in the wind (as with the S-
type and all-black) was not significant. He evaluated varying the width of the 
target, the type of materials used and suggested several disposable targets that 
halve costs of materials and insecticides, with efficacy preserved for G. mor-
sitans morsitans and increased 50% for G. pallidipes. Vale has investigated 
even more radical ideas about the scope for using odour-baited insecticide-
treated natural objects such as tree stumps for tsetse control (Vale, 1991) but 
this approach does not yet appear promising. 
To date, none of the low-cost targets has been tested or proven on an 
operational scale in Zimbabwe. However, pole targets based upon Vale's 
ideas have been developed and used in field operations in the Western 
Province of Zambia, as discussed in the following section. 
Experience in Zambia: Tsetse Control Senanga West 
In December 1991, the author undertook an economic evaluation of the 
Tsetse Control Project at Senanga West (TCSW) implemented under the aus-
pices of the Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services (DVTCS) 
and funded by the Dutch Government (Barrett, 1992a; see also pp 73-75). 
Findings are presented here relating to the economics of pole targets. 
In the second phase of the project, the objectives were to improve the 
design of the target itself and to explore different strategies for deployment 
and maintenance which might improve cost-effectiveness. 
Development of the 'stick' target 
The all-black target was initially modified to be half blue and half black, with 
insecticidal treatment limited to the black half, on which the flies preferen-
tially land. To make the target 'disposable', the imported metal frame was 
replaced with three wooden poles, cut in the field, to which separate black 
and blue cloths were attached. Subsequently, a two-paled version was intro-
duced with the black and blue cloths stitched together and oriented side by 
side. In the version of late 1991, the size of the cloth was further reduced to 
a total of 1 metre square; the orientation was changed to black above blue 
(Figure 7.1 ). 
On the basis of research findings at Rekomitjie in Zimbabwe, the target 
cloths were treated with greater amounts of insecticide, to overcome the 
need to revisit targets at regular intervals for re-treatment. This reduced man-
power and vehicle requirements for target maintenance. 
The analysis in this section is confined to a summary comparison of the 
costs of the 'stick' target being used in Senanga in December 1991, with the 
S-type or 'swinger' target which was used in the earlier phase of the TCSW 
project. All Zambian Kwacha (ZK) costs are given in December 1991 prices. 
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Swinger target 
'Sticks' 
Half blue/black 
100 
+ + + + 
100 
All cloth target Half blue/black 
'Sticks' 'Sticks' 
Small blue/Small black Small blue/Small black 
Figure 7.1 Different designs of target used by the Tsetse Control Project at 
5enanga West. 
Source Bart Knols, TCSW. 
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Cost analysis of stick targets 
The 5-type target has an annual materials cost of approximately ZK1 067, 
compared with ZK441 for the stick target, which is almost 60% cheaper 
{Table 7.3). The reduction in software and insecticide costs account for over 
75% of the savings in materials costs {including a pro rata provision for con-
tingencies, freight and insurance). 
Table 7.3 Comparison of the material costs of the 5-type and 2-pole stick 
target used in Western Province, Zambia {Zambian Kwacha, 
1991 prices) 
Item 
Hardware 
Software 
MEK 
Octenol 
Insecticide 
Sub-total 
Contingency provision 
Freight and insurance allowance 
GRAND TOTAL COST(%) 
Source Barrett, 1992a. 
Cost per target 
S-type Stick 
ZK ZK 
104.36 10.00 
395.29 169.71 
43.53 43.53 
90.75 70.75 
209.46 65.46 
843.39 359.45 
84.34 35.94 
139.16 45.28 
1066.89 440.67 
(100.0) (41.3) 
Cost saving* 
ZK % 
94.36 15.1 
225.58 36.0 
nil nil 
20.00 3.2 
144.00 23.0 
483.94 77.3 
48.40 7.7 
93.88 15.0 
626.22 100.0 
(58.7) 
* The final column in the table gives the cost saving for each item as a percentage of the 
total cost saving for the stick target in comparison with the S-type. 
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This does not take into account differences in manpower, vehicle and equipment 
(MVE) costs (Table 7 .4). In Zambia, the size of the team used for field operations 
is much smaller than in Zimbabwe, usually comprising between 10 and 20 
people. Productivity per man-day at TCSW appears significantly higher than the 
average figures for Zimbabwean operations - two to three targets deployed per 
man-day compared with 1.3 in Zimbabwe; about six targets serviced per man-
day compared with about two in Zimbabwe. Various factors contribute to this 
difference, including the type of terrain, limited distance from the field camp to 
the area of operation, and the fact that the Senanga operation is a research pro-
ject with a relatively high input of senior management and technical support. 
The manpower and vehicle costs of deploying stick targets are approxi-
mately ZK1 00 greater than forS-types (Table 7.4). This is close to the cost-sav-
ing in changing from the metal frame to a pole frame (Table 7.3), so that, 
overall, the wooden pole element of the design change has little financial 
advantage. However, ifthe poles have to be imported, there would be a foreign 
exchange benefit. With no servicing, the stick target costs in total only ZK815 
per year, compared with ZK1778 for an S-type target which requires three ser-
vices per year- a reduction of almost 55%, which is very impressive. 
Table 7.4 Comparison of the total costs of the S-type and 2-pole stick targets used 
in the Western Province of Zambia (Zambian Kwacha, 1991 prices)* 
Stick Stick Stick S-Type S-Type S-Type 
Number of services per year 0 3 0 3 
A MANPOWER AND VEHICLE COSTS (M&V) 
Daily M&V cost of the target team 6740 6740 6740 6740 6740 6740 
DEPLOYMENT 
Rate of deployment/day 
M& V cost/target deployed 
SERVICING 
Rate of servicing/day 
M&V cost/service 
Annual cost of servicing 
UPLIFTING 
Rate of uplifting/day 
M&V cost/target uplifted 
Total annual M&V cost/target 
B ANNUAL MATERIALS COST/fARGETt 
C GRAND TOTAL ANNUAL 
COST/fARGET" 
Source Barrett (1992a). 
18.00 18.00 18.00 25.00 25.00 25.00 
374.44 374.44 374.44 269.60 269.60 269.60 
50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
134.80 134.80 134.80 134.80 134.80 134.80 
0 134.80 404.40 0 134.80 404.40 
n.a. 
nil 
n.a. 
nil 
n.a. 180.00 180.00 180.00 
nil 37.44 37.44 37.44 
374.44 509.24 778.84 307.04 441.84 711.44 
441 441 441 1067 1067 1067 
815 950 1220 1374 1509 1778 
* The figures in this table were derived by the author using the modelling approach 
described in Section 6. 
t Materials costs of the targets are detailed in Table 7.3. 
just under 60% of the overall cost reduction is due to change in the physical 
design in the target (Table 7.5). This component includes the saving in 
materials costs, offset by increase manpower and vehicle costs for deploy-
ment but also taking into account the saving in uplifting costs which result 
from making the target disposable. The remaining 42% of the total cost 
reduction is due solely to avoiding the need for service visits to the targets. 
This level of cost reduction would have been feasible with the old S-type 
design (Table 7.4). 
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Table 7.5 Breakdown of overall cost savings in the use of stick targets in the 
Western Province of Zambia (Zambian Kwacha, 1991 prices) 
Materials costs* 
M&V costs:t 
Deployment 
Servicing 
Uplifting 
Total Annual Cost/Target 
OF WHICH: 
(a) Savings due to change in physical design of the target 
(b) Savings due to not having to service the target 
Source Barrett (1992a). 
* Materials costs as in Table 7.3. 
t Manpower and vehicle costs as in Table 7.4. 
S-Type 
1066.89 
269.60 
404.40 
37.44 
1778.33 
Stick Savings 
440.67 626.22 
374.44 (1 04.84) 
404.40 
37.44 
815.11 963 .22 
558.82 58.0% 
404.40 42.0% 
The analysis has assumed that the stick target is equally effective as the S-
type, and that there is no loss of performance due to less frequent servicing. 
These assumptions are based on limited results from on-station work and 
have yet to be fully proven in the field. The transferability of these results to 
other locations is limited, as the TCSW operation is against G. morsitans cen-
tralis. This species has visual and olfactory responses to targets different from 
G. morsitans morsitans in Zimbabwe, where the smaller stick target appears 
significantly less effective than the S-type. However, the results of the analysis 
demonstrate that the cost of tsetse control might be reduced substantially, 
through further research and development specifically aimed at improving 
the cost-effectiveness of the target design. 
Independently of the target design, scope may exist for improving the way 
targets are deployed over time and space. 
Deployment over time 
The present strategy of deploying 4 targets per sq km against G. morsitans is 
designed to achieve population collapse over nine to twelve months. The 
precise period depends upon the initial fly density, degree of competition 
from live baits, and other factors contributing to growth or contraction of the 
fly population. This could be described as a 'minimalist' approach. Target 
deployment densities much below this level will simply not achieve the 
desired result, as has been demonstrated in the Angwa-Manyame trial dis-
cussed on pp 67-68. 
Deployment of targets at densities much higher than four per sq km is an 
alternative strategy that merits consideration; eradication may be feasible 
over a shorter time, in proportion to the increase in target deployment den-
sity. The materials cost per sq km treated should not be affected greatly. The 
advantages and disadvantages would depend upon whether the targets were 
traditional S-types requiring regular visits, or disposable targets not requiring 
visits. 
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-Where targets have to be serviced, the target density could be increased 
usefully, to shorten the eradication period. The operation could be scheduled 
for the dry season so that difficulties (and high cost) of wet-season servicing 
are avoided. lt may prove similarly cost-effective to increase the deployment 
density in areas of difficult access where manpower and vehicle costs of ser-
vicing are high. 
Such situations require financial analysis case by case, and would be sen-
sitive to assumptions made about team productivity. 
Where trypanosomiasis is a major problem in the area of operation, there 
are likely to be economic benefits of rapidly breaking disease transmission; 
all else being equal, eradication in six months with 8 targets per sq km 
would be preferable to eradication in twelve months with 4 targets per sq 
km. 
Where targets are disposable and will not be serviced or recovered, then 
increasing the target density will tend to increase the overall cost of the oper-
ation. The amount of odour and insecticide required per target will be less if 
the eradication period is reduced but this is very unlikely to offset the overall 
materials cost per sq km if target density is increased. 
Deployment patterns 
The way in which targets are deployed in the tsetse habitat will determine 
not only their effectiveness in tsetse control, but also the cost of field oper-
ations. This issue has not been investigated systematically, although various 
deployment strategies have been used in the field. 
• In the homogeneous terrain of the 1984 Rifa operation, targets were 
deployed diffusely within the Triangle. Most were placed at 300 m inter-
vals along the existing network of small tracks, and groups of 2-5 targets 
were deployed off the track where the habitat was particularly suited to 
tsetse. 
• In the 1986 Umfurudzi operation, targets were deployed in lines approxi-
mately 1 km apart, with 200 m intervals between each target. Extensive 
effort was required to establish the necessary access roads and to cut tracks 
for the field teams. 
• In Kotwa, targets were deployed diffusely along existing roads and tracks 
with easy access. 
• In the Angwa-Manyame project, an extensive network of access roads and 
tracks had to be greatly upgraded and partially created, in order to deploy 
targets in this unpopulated area of very rough terrain. Some targets were 
deployed along hill crests, usually where the roads were located. Others 
were deployed along drainage lines and river beds, which were often very 
inaccessible and difficult to negotiate. 
• In the 1987 operation against G. pallidipes in the Busi-Sengwa area, targets 
were initially deployed at 200 m intervals along tracks cut by the TICB 5-
10 km apart running east to west, resulting in an overall target density of 
1 per sq km. 
• In the Western Province of Zambia, flat grassland with pockets of wood-
land was treated by deployment of targets in lines along woodland periph-
ery. This did not prove successful. The subsequent strategy was to deploy 
targets in a grid pattern, in straight lines along compass bearings. 
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Significant economies will arise if satisfactory tsetse control can be achieved 
by heterogeneous deployment patterns. The main potential benefit is likely to 
be lower costs of access provision and maintenance, which will vary from 
operation to operation. Additional benefit is likely to arise through better 
team productivity if targets are more accessible, leading to reduced man-
power and vehicle costs for field operations. 
Cost-modelling can be used to evaluate changes in deployment pattern. A 
cost analysis of deployment patterns in target barriers, based on theoretical 
changes in technical performance modelled by J. Hargrove, shows that 
cheaper and more effective barriers could be designed by making them wider 
than at present (Barrett, 1994; Appendix G). 
The risk with heterogeneous deployment is that pockets of flies may per-
sist between target lines. At the moment there is very little evidence on this 
matter, which needs urgent research to provide a real basis for financial 
evaluation of alternative deployment patterns. 
If all of the research discussed above comes to fruition, it seems plausible 
that the cost of tsetse control using targets could be reduced by between 
25% and 50% in the near future and possibly yet further in the longer term. 
However, the scope for cost reduction through ongoing research and 
development may prove illusory unless large-scale control operations invol-
ving bait technology are conducted efficiently. Analysis of target team returns 
(Table 6.4; Barrett, 1994; Appendix F) suggests that the level of productivity 
of field teams involved in target operations in Zimbabwe is low. National 
organizations and donors should improve the management of such oper-
ations, through appropriate training, institutional strengthening and possible 
external technical support where needed. Otherwise continuing investment 
in research and development will be of limited benefit. 
The conduct of target operations is straightforward, but their planning is 
potentially complex in comparison with alternative techniques for control. A 
large number of variables can be adjusted to achieve the same result - the 
physical design of the target, the amounts of odour and insecticide used, the 
frequency of servicing, the density and pattern of deployment and so on. The 
most cost-effective design of a target operation is likely to change from one 
situation to another. Accordingly, senior staff in tsetse control organizations 
need to receive training in methods of financial analysis relevant to routine 
target operations. The need for development of an economics capability in 
national tsetse control organizations is discussed further in Section 11. 
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Section 8 
Cost Comparison of Different 
Methods of Tsetse Control 
This Section compares the costs of the different techniques for tsetse control. 
The benefits of each technique are broadly similar - savings in drug costs, 
improvement in livestock productivity, and facilitation of land use. The analy-
sis is therefore a comparative assessment of cost-effectiveness, rather than 
benefit-cost ratio. 
Since the problem of protecting tsetse-cleared areas from reinvasion is com-
mon to all eradication operations, the requirement for barriers is not included 
in the cost comparison of techniques for eradication. The costs of different 
techniques for management of reinvasion problems are considered separately 
(page 106). 
Factors affecting relative costs 
Sections 3 to 6 show that the costs of each technique vary greatly from one 
situation to another. Therefore, any comparison has to be based upon clearly 
defined circumstances. The main factors likely to affect the overall cost of an 
operation are shown in Table 8.1. Most of these factors are determined by 
the characteristics of the site where tsetse control is to be undertaken. 
General changes in the relative prices of the main inputs (labour, vehicles, 
imports) will also affect the cost-competitiveness of the different techniques; 
this is particularly relevant to economic as opposed to financial analysis 
(page 1 07). 
The costs of each technique are affected in very different ways by site-
related factors (Table 8.1 ). The most important factors (four or five stars in the 
table) are topography, scale of operation, fly species and cattle population. 
Topography is crucial to aerial spraying operations - as the terrain 
becomes less flat, the technical difficulty and risk of failure to eradicate 
increase until, in rugged terrain, the technique is simply not feasible with 
present methods. Topography also affects the cost of ground spraying and tar-
get operations, by decreasing team productivity and increasing indirect costs. 
The scale of operation is particularly relevant to the cost of aerial spraying 
since a large proportion of the price is fixed overheads. 
Regarding the fly species present, a target operation against G. pallidipes 
would require a much lower target density and therefore lower cost than one 
against G. morsitans. With aerial spraying, the reverse situation prevails -
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Table 8.1 Factors affecting the costs of different techniques for tsetse 
eradication 
Targets Aerial Cattle Ground 
spraying spraying treatment 
A SITE-RELATED FACTORS 
Topography 
Scale of operation 
Species of fly present 
Fly population density 
Fly habitat distribution 
Cattle population 
Ground accessability 
Veterinary infrastructure 
*** 
** 
* 
*** 
*** 
* 
*** 
* 
B FACTORS NOT RELATED TO THE SITE 
Labour costs *** 
Vehicle costs *** 
Import costs ** 
*** 
** 
**** 
*** 
*** 
* 
*** 
* 
*** 
*** 
** 
Key to effect on price: * Very little or no effect 
** 
*** 
**** 
***** 
Some effect but generally minor 
Moderate effect 
Major effect 
Crucial 
***** * 
***** * 
**** * 
*** *** 
* * 
* ***** 
** * 
* *** 
* * 
* *** 
**** **** 
there has been little difficulty in Zimbabwe in eradicating G. morsitans by 
aerial spraying. However, for operations against G. pallidipes, recent research 
suggests that the insecticide application rate should be increased above the 
levels used in the Zambezi Valley in the past. 
The density and distribution of the cattle population is crucial to the cost-
ing of a tsetse control campaign based on insecticidal treatment of cattle. 
Unfortunately, the limits to the technique are not as yet well understood -
such as the lowest cattle density at which tsetse control can be achieved, 
and the scope for treating only a proportion of the cattle present in densely 
stocked areas. 
Four different operational circumstances are evaluated, to give a full pic-
ture of the cost-competitiveness of the various tsetse control methods (Table 
8.2). The initial analysis compares only the costs of treating areas, and does 
not take into account the likely proportion of the treated area which is effec-
tively cleared of infestation. This will depend very much on the fly popu-
lation density in the operational area. 
In the central analysis, target operations are costed on the basis of the 
design of target and method of use as represented by recent large-scale target 
operations in Zimbabwe (Section 6). The implications of using cheaper bait 
technology (Section 7) are discussed subsequently. 
Rugged terrain, G. morsitans, and absence of cattle 
Substantial areas within the Zambezi Valley escarpment comprise terrain too 
rugged for aerial spraying with fixed-wing aircraft. This includes conservation 
areas where cattle are excluded, and also some communal farming areas 
where the number of cattle is low because of the tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
problem and lack of veterinary services. 
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Table 8.2 Comparison of costs of tsetse eradication using different 
techniques, in differing situations (Z$, 1990 prices) 
Operational characteristics Range of costs of tsetse eradication (Z$/sq km) 
Terrain Fly Cattle Ground Targets Aerial 
species present spraying spraying 
A rugged morsitans no 700- 8001 650-8002 700-9003 
B rugged pallidipes no 700-8001 450-6004 not considered 
C flat morsitans few 550-6505 460-6006 720-9007 
D flat mixed yes 550-6505 460-6006 900-11008 
1 Based on the figures for the basic and pessimistic scenarios, Table 3.5. 
2 Based on the figures for the basic and pessimistic scenarios, Table 6.8. 
Cattle 
treatment 
not considered 
not considered 
not considered 
100-2509 
3 These figures are based on use of helicopters assuming that the operation is part of a larger 
control operation using fixed·wing aircraft and only marginal costs are considered (see 
Appendix 1 }. Technical feasibility has NOT yet been demonstrated. 
4 This assumes that the target density can be reduced to 2/sq km and is recalculated from 
Table 6.8 for the basic and pessimistic scenarios. 
5 Based on the figures for the optimistic and basic scenarios, Table 3.5. 
6 Based on the figures for the optimistic and basic scenarios, Table 6.8. 
7 Based on the figures for the optimistic and basic scenarios, Table 4.5. 
8 Based on the lower range of the basic and pessimistic scenarios in Table 4.6, allowing for 
less generous economy of scale than in situation (C) above and allowing for increased rate 
of application of insecticide to cope with G. pal/idipes. 
9 Based loosely on Table 5.1, without specifying cattle density or method of treatment, but 
generally assuming that not more than 15 animals/sq km would have to be treated. 
In such situations, the choice of technique is between ground spraying and 
targets. The costs are closely similar for the two techniques, in the range of 
Z$650 to Z$800 per sq km (Table 8.2, part A). 
In situations of low to medium fly challenge, both techniques have 
reasonable prospect of eliminating flies within a single one year operation, if 
planned and managed properly. At higher fly density, ground spraying may 
not completely eliminate the fly population in a single treatment; a partial 
respray may be needed. In similar circumstances, a target operation might 
need to be sustained for longer than twelve months to be sure of the same 
result. Overall, the cost difference between the two techniques would be 
small. If bait technology becomes 25 to 50% cheaper than at present, as a 
result of the developments discussed in Section 7, targets will have a clear 
cost advantage over ground spraying. 
For practical purposes, aerial spraying in rugged terrain is not at present fea-
sible. As discussed on page 51, tsetse control may become feasible in such ter-
rain by aerial spraying with helicopters, with some further research and 
development. If only the marginal costs of using the helicopter are counted, this 
is likely to be only slightly more expensive than ground spraying or target oper-
ations (Table 8.2, part A). This situation could arise, for example, where the 
rugged terrain forms a small block within a much larger area where fixed-wing 
aircraft are being used for aerial spraying. In these special circumstances, it 
may make sense to use helicopters rather than try to integrate different tech-
niques on the same operation . Otherwise, helicopters are not cost-effective 
where ground spraying or a target operation is practicable. 
Rugged terrain, G. pallidipes, and absence of cattle 
The second situation which was evaluated (Table 8.2, part B) is a variant of 
the previous one, with G. pallidipes being the only tsetse species present. 
Targets are then significantly cheaper than ground spraying, since lower den-
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sities of target are required than where G. morsitans is present. This situation 
has arisen in parts of the western region of Zimbabwe and in the Mid-
Zambezi Valley, where pockets of G. pallidipes survived previous ground 
and aerial spraying that had successfully eliminated G. morsitans. 
Flat terrain, _G. morsitans, few cattle present 
The third situation evaluated (Table 8.2, part C) presents aerial spraying at its 
best advantage: a large-scale operation against G. morsitans in flat terrain. 
This is exemplified by the 1986 operation in north-eastern Zimbabwe. 
Even in this situation, a fixed-wing aircraft operation is likely to cost sig-
nificantly more than ground spraying or a target operation, especially where 
fly challenge is low to medium and all three techniques appear capable of 
achieving the desired result in a single year. 
Where the tsetse population is medium to high, the costs of tsetse elimin-
ation by ground spraying may increase because of the need for a partial respray 
in the following year. A target operation may also prove more costly if targets 
need to be maintained for longer than twelve months. If there is reasonable 
prospect t hat aerial spraying would still achieve complete elimination in a 
si ngle operation, then the cost competitiveness of the technique would be 
improved. Th is would be a matter for professional judgement by the entomolo-
gists concerned. O n the other hand, with further economy in bait technology, it 
would still be cheaper to deploy targets for two years than to carry out aerial 
spraying. lt is difficult to envisage a situation where aerial spraying will com-
pete on cost with targets, if both techniques are practicable. 
The current design of target operation is marginally cheaper than ground 
spraying against G. morsitans in flat terrain. Targets are significantly cheaper 
if it is only a G. pal/idipes population. Prospective economies in the bait 
technique will further increase its cost advantage. 
Flat terrain, mixed fly population, cattle present 
The final situation which was evaluated (Table 8.2, part D) allows for the pre-
sence of cattle within the operational area, in sufficient number to make 
tsetse control feasible by treating the animals with insecticide. Other charac-
teristics of the operation are modified to be less favourable to aerial spraying 
than in part C of the table. Mixed fly populations are more common than 
pure G. morsitans populations, and very large scale operations are often 
inappropriate. 
Treating cattle with insecticide appears likely to cost substantially less than 
any other method of tsetse eradication in most situations where it is practi-
cable. This remains the case even when the full cost of the insecticide is 
taken into account (i.e. not just considering the cost additional to the normal 
expenditure on acaricide), and even where the insecticide has to be applied 
as pour-on- at substantially higher expense than as a dip treatment. 
The cost of a target operation against G. pallidipes in flat terrain would 
probably be in the order of Z$300 to Z$450 per sq km. If the cost of bait 
technology reduces as a result of research and development (Section 7), then 
it is possible that targets could compete with insecticidal treatment of cattle 
in some circumstances. 
Where G. pallidipes is present and the operation is not large, aerial spray-
ing is about double the cost of ground spraying or using targets (Table 8.2: 
part D) . 
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Alternative strategies for responding to the threat of tsetse fly invasion 
include: 
• target barriers; 
• reliance upon treatment of cattle with insecticide; and 
• annual re-treatment of the invasion belt by ground or aerial spraying. 
Target barriers 
Approximately half of the targets used in Zimbabwe have been deployed in 
barriers to prevent fly movement (Table 6.1 ). Cost analysis of targets deployed 
in barriers is discussed at some length by Barrett (1994; Appendix G). 
The type of target barrier used in recent operations in Zimbabwe costs 
about Z$4000 to Z$7500 per linear km (Barrett, 1994; Table G.1, Appendix 
G), depending mainly upon the type of terrain. Such barriers comprise about 
40 targets per linear km, spread over a depth of about 1 km. This level of 
expenditure is highly cost-effective in comparison with the previous alterna-
tive of re-treating the invasion belt year-by-year, by ground spraying. For an 
invasion belt 20 km deep, and ground spraying costs at about Z$600 per sq 
km, the ground spraying option costs some Z$12 000 per linear km of front, 
per year. 
Recent research and computer modelling indicates that such barriers are 
not technically effective, although they may still be cost-effective (Barrett, 
1994; Appendix G). Hargrove (in press) suggests that by spreading the targets 
over a wider band, in the region of 8 km wide, a barrier would be effective 
with slightly fewer than 40 targets per linear km. For the following analysis, 
it is assumed that an effective target barrier can be established and main-
tained in flat terrain for about Z$5000 per linear km per year (middle of the 
optimistic and basic scenario costs, (Barrett, 1994; Table G.1, Appendix G)) 
and in more difficult terrain for about Z$6000 per linear km per year (basic/ 
pessimistic scenarios). 
This is still much cheaper than the alternative of ground spraying the inva-
sion belt annually. However, there are other options. 
Cattle treatment 
The annual cost of treating cattle with insecticide for tsetse control is 
approximately Z$13 per year per animal by dipping and Z$18 per year using 
a pour-on formulation (Table 5.1 ). For the same cost as a target barrier com-
prising forty targets per linear km, it would be possible to treat with insecti-
cide between 275 and 450 cattle per linear km of tsetse front. Experience 
with the technique suggests that containment of tsetse invasion pressure 
should be feasible by treating much fewer cattle than this number. In theory, 
such animals would still be under tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge; any 
recurrent expenditure on trypanocides would have to be taken into account. 
The results of the cattle treatment programme in Nyanga in Zimbabwe 
suggest that such expenditure can be very low (Thompson et al., 1991 ). 
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These findings suggest that where cattle are present in sufficient numbers 
to permit their use for tsetse control by cattle treatment, it is not cost-effective 
to build target barriers to reduce tsetse invasion. This brings into question 
current policy of the TICB in Zimbabwe to establish a target barrier along 
the entire length of the Mozambique border from Nyanga to the Angwa river, 
especially as cattle in most of the Zambezi Valley are already being treated 
with a deltamethrin acaricide. At the time of preparing this report, there may 
have been a very substantial over-expenditure on protection of this tsetse 
front. Unfortunately, there is insufficient understanding of the limitations of 
the cattle treatment method to enable the TICB to reduce its efforts, with 
confidence that the situation will remain under control. The need was urgent 
for much more detailed monitoring and evaluation of the north-eastern bor-
der operations. 
Aerial spraying 
Section 4 (page 51) considered the potential use of aerial spraying to achieve 
control but not necessarily eradication, along a tsetse invasion front. 
Depending on the scale of operation, a high level of control could be 
achieved for costs in the region of Z$450 to Z$750 per sq km (Table 4.7). At 
this price, and for the same expenditure as required for a target barrier, it 
w0uld be feasible to spray the tsetse frontier annually to a depth of 7-11 km. 
This is probably insufficient to prevent tsetse fly invasion other than close to 
the limit of the fly's natural distribution, or where invasion pressure was low 
for other reasons. Thus, aerial spraying does not compete in cost with a target 
barrier, even with only three cycles of aerial spraying. 
Aerial spraying should not be dismissed entirely; ground-based operations 
are precluded or problematical in some locations. In southern Africa, civil 
war and associated security problems have restricted the scope for tsetse con-
trol operations in parts of Mozambique and Angola, also affecting operations 
in neighbouring countries. On the other hand, it is dangerous to attempt 
aerial spraying with open hostilities on the ground - the NTTCP project in 
Somalia effectively came to an end when aircraft were prohibited from flying 
near the war zone (page 39). 
The financial costs of the different techniques do not reflect fully the national 
(economic) costs involved, nor government policies towards employment 
generation and foreign exchange. There is no official or generally accepted 
framework for economic (shadow) pricing of resources in Zimbabwe. In gen-
eral terms, the main adjustments that appear appropriate are: to discount the 
cost of unskilled labour inputs, and to place a premium on goods and ser-
vices which involve foreign exchange costs. The range of such discount and 
premium is assumed to be between 20% and 50%. 
A detailed economic analysis of the different techniques does not appear 
necessary, since the adjustments are unlikely to alter the conclusions based 
on financial analysis. 
Aerial spraying has the highest foreign exchange requirement of the tech-
niques considered, and minimal employment of unskilled labour. Economic 
(shadow) pricing would therefore tend to increase the cost of aerial spraying 
relative to the other methods of tsetse control. 
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-Ground spraying and target operations employ similar and substantial 
levels of unskilled labour although import requirements are still substantial in 
the form of vehicles and chemicals. Economic pricing would not greatly 
affect the cost of these two techniques relative to each other, and the dis-
count on labour costs would tend to be offset by the premium on imported 
components. 
For treatment of cattle with insecticide, the main cost is the insecticide 
itself, which is formulated locally but the ingredient is imported. The tech-
nique does not involve much employment, so that economic pricing would 
tend to reduce the cost-competitiveness of cattle treatment in relation to 
ground spraying and target operations. However, the method is so cheap 
(where practicable) that it is likely to remain cost-competitive even with a 
50% premium on the import component. 
11-si .,, 
General cost-competitiveness of eradication techniques 
Even though the costs of each technique vary considerably from one situation 
to another, and site-related factors affect the costs of each technique in differ-
ent ways, the overall pattern is clear: 
• treatment of cattle with insecticide is likely to prove the cheapest method 
of tsetse eradication in most situations where sufficient cattle and veterin-
ary infrastructure are present to make it practicable; 
• aerial spraying is likely to be the most expensive technique in any situ-
ation; 
• where treatment of cattle with insecticide is not feasible and G. morsitans 
is present, the cheapest methods of tsetse eradication are likely to be 
ground spraying and targets, with little cost difference; 
• where only G. pallidipes is present, the current target technique is signifi-
cantly cheaper than ground spraying; 
• with continuing improvement in the design and economy of artificial baits, 
targets are likely to become the cheapest method of tsetse control in all 
types of terrain, and against both G. morsitans and G. pallidipes; and 
• for preventing tsetse invasion, the relative merits of the different techniques 
are similar to those where the techniques are used for eradication. 
So far, the analysis suggests that the newly emerging techniques of tsetse con-
trol based on bait technology are more cost-effective than the established 
techniques of ground and aerial spraying. Is it time to discard ground spray-
ing, because of its reliance upon the use of DOT, and to discard aerial spray-
ing on grounds of cost? What balance of emphasis is appropriate between 
live and artificial bait techniques? Cost is an important consideration in 
choosing among techniques for tsetse control. However, other factors have 
also to be considered. 
Prospects for aerial spraying 
The main advantage of aerial spraying is that it can cover large areas in a 
relatively short period, without requiring large inputs of manpower and 
vehicles. Where the money is available, spraying contractors can be hired to 
carry out the work. This may be the only solution in a crisis, if the resources 
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of the national tsetse control agency are inadequate to mount a large ground-
based campaign. The 1986 operation in north-eastern Zimbabwe is a good 
example of this type of situation - the trypanosomiasis problem had become 
extensive and severe, following the collapse of veterinary services during the 
independence war. Emergency measures were needed. 
In some locations, exemplified by the Okavango delta in Botswana, 
ground-based operations are very difficult; aerial spraying may be the only 
technique which is feasible. The author visited the Okavango in late 1991, at 
which time the Chief Tsetse Control Officer (Dr R. Wooft) was undertaking 
large-scale trials of targets for tsetse control in the delta, with some success. 
So, even here, aerial spraying may have a limited future. 
Aerial spraying has often attracted criticism from conservationists, in 
relation to the widespread application of insecticides into the environment. lt 
is therefore ironic that the Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management in Zimbabwe recently expressed a strong preference for the 
Matusadona National Park to be cleared of tsetse by aerial spraying, where 
feasible, rather than by ground spraying or a target operation (Coulson, 
1991 ). This reflects the much-improved reputation of aerial spraying, follow-
ing recent environmental impact studies carried out in Zimbabwe. An aerial 
operation was favoured because it was feared that ground-based operations 
would damage the wilderness character of the area, hamper anti-poaching 
operations and have adverse impact on tourist activities. 
While such situations are not common, aerial spraying will probably con-
tinue to have a role in tsetse control operations in southern Africa, despite its 
higher cost relative to ground-based methods of control. In strategic terms, 
this role is likely to be minor, unless there are serious setbacks in the exten-
sion of Zimbabwean experience with bait techniques to other countries in 
southern Africa. 
Prospects for ground spraying 
Although ground spraying is significantly less expensive than aerial spraying, 
the future of this technique appears bleak in Zimbabwe. Few situations can 
be envisaged where targets or insecticidal treatment of cattle would not be 
equally as feasible as ground spraying, and at similar or lower cost. 
The scale of ground spraying operations in Zimbabwe reduced dramati-
cally in the late 1980s. In 1991, no ground spraying at all was carried out. 
The TTCB continued to mount small ground spraying operations in the early 
1990s, primarily to maintain an operational capability, until the use of targets 
was fully tested in routine operations. Otherwise, the TTCB was ready to 
abandon ground spraying. 
Bait techniques have not been fully tested against the wide range of tsetse 
species which are found outside Zimbabwe. While ground spraying appears 
to have little future in Zimbabwe, it would be premature to assert that the 
technique should be abandoned throughout Africa. 
Prospects for bait techniques 
The treatment of cattle with insecticide has one primary limitation: there are 
few cattle in most of the tsetse-infested areas of southern Africa. But, where 
cattle are present, the technique appears to be the cheapest method of tsetse 
control, both for eradication and for protection against reinvasion. 
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lt might be argued that, if the cattle in an area are few, tsetse control is 
not required. However, a range of situations can arise where tsetse control 
can be justified without cattle being present. 
In areas planned for resettlement, tsetse control can be advantageous in 
advance of people moving into the area with their livestock. Several large 
resettlement schemes are in prospect in the tsetse-infested Zambezi Valley, 
where tsetse control serves in this support role (Barrett, 1989b). The indigen-
ous population has little tradition of owning cattle, but immigrants, who are 
being resettled by the Government, come from heavily populated areas in 
southern Zimbabwe where cattle are important in the farming system. 
Tsetse control is needed in some cattle-free areas such as national parks, 
game and forest reserves, safari areas or other types of conservation area 
located within or adjacent to farming areas. 
In some situations, it may be financially worthwhile to clear tsetse from 
an area, independently of current or future land use, on the grounds of redu-
cing the length of the tsetse frontier to be defended (see page 13). This is the 
case in the western (Sebungwe) region of Zimbabwe, where the short-term 
objective is to clear the entire region up to the eastern end of Lake Kariba. 
Reduction of the length of the tsetse front is expected to reduce substantially 
the recurrent expenditure of the TTCB. 
Thus, tsetse control will be required in a range of situations where insecti-
cidal treatment of cattle is not feasible. In such situations, target operations 
are likely to be the cheapest method of tsetse control. The appropriate bal-
ance of emphasis between use of natural and artificial baits will not be clear 
until more detailed and comprehensive evaluation of the cattle treatment 
method has been carried out. 
Prospects for integration of the techniques 
Two types of situation could arise where two or more techniques for tsetse 
control are needed in one operation: 
• mosaic operations: where different techniques are used in adjacent areas 
(for example, in north-eastern Zimbabwe in 1986: Hursey et al., 1987); 
and 
• integrated operations: where different techniques are used simultaneously 
in the same area. 
Mosaic operations have proven problematic, particularly where attempts 
have been made to use bait methods in areas adjacent to areas which are 
ground or aerial sprayed, because of the different time-scales for tsetse popu-
lation reduction associated with the different techniques. There are also 
additional overheads in implementing two techniques within one operation. 
The mosaic approach was justifiable in the past simply because the gener-
ally favoured technique of the time (aerial spraying) was not feasible over the 
entire area of tsetse infestation. Bait techniques can be applied in most situa-
tions where ground or aerial spraying is feasible. Accordingly, and from the 
comparative cost analysis in this section, there is limited prospect that future 
operations in southern Africa will need to combine ground or aerial spraying 
with bait techniques. However, there may be scope for useful combination of 
targets with insecticidal treatment of cattle- the targets would be used to fill 
in areas where cattle numbers were insufficient. 
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To date, there has been little experience of true integration of the different 
techniques for tsetse control. The widely accepted understanding of inte-
grated pest management (IPM) is not in terms of mosaic operations, which is 
the way the term has been used by some members of the tsetse control frater-
nity. Rather, integrated pest management should refer to attack ing one pest 
population simultaneously with a variety of interventions. Th is is exempli fied 
by IPM in mal·aria control, which might combine: 
• physical methods such as filling in larval habitats, and covering of water 
pots and storage tanks; 
• biological control, for example using predatory fish; and 
• chemical control using insecticides. 
The need for IPM largely reflects that none of the methods is capable of 
achieving adequate control when used in isolation. In the past, a second 
method of tsetse control has been used in areas where a first technique did 
not achieve eradication - commonly the clearance of residual pockets of 
infestation in aerial spraying operations, using ground spraying or targets. 
This is hardly IPM in the widely accepted sense. 
The only rationale for the simultaneous use of multiple techniques in the 
same operation would be cost-reduction resulting from some degree of syner-
gism in effectiveness, or risk reduction. At the moment, there is little evi-
dence to indicate any advantage in combining the techniques in this way, 
apart from possibly integrating targets with insecticidal treatment of cattle. 
This is an area which merits technical study and, subsequently, economic 
analysis. 
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Section 9 
Management of Trypanosomiasis 
Using Drugs 
Drugs can be used to cure or prevent trypanosomiasis. Where disease chal-
lenge is low, it is cheaper to treat animals as they become infected. Under 
high challenge, treating animals regularly with a prophylactic drug is more 
cost-effective. 
The reader is referred to Jordan (1986) for a general discussion of trypano-
cidal drugs and to Leach and Roberts (1981) for a more detailed technical 
review. No new drugs for treatment of animal trypanosomiasis have been 
introduced over the last thirty years, so that Williamson's lengthy 1962 
review paper remains a useful treatise on the subject. 
Zimbabwe has a strong tradition of tsetse control - trypanocides have been 
used only where necessary, until tsetse control was achieved. The rationale for 
Zimbabwe's emphasis on vector control is that the fly could invade substantial 
areas of agricultural land where cattle production is important. The economic 
justification for Zimbabwe's strategy of tsetse control rather than reliance upon 
trypanocidal drugs is examined in Section 10. The present Section assesses the 
costs of controlling trypanosomiasis using drugs. 
The historical information on drug use in Zimbabwe has serious limita-
tions in this respect, since there are few examples of drug use to maintain 
large numbers of cattle for prolonged periods in areas of high disease chal-
lenge, without tsetse control. This situation contrasts with widespread experi-
ence of the use of trypanocides in other countries- within Africa as a whole, 
some 25 million treatments of animal trypanocides are administered annually 
(Murray and Gray, 1984; Tacher, 1988). Trypanocides are widely used as an 
alternative or complementary strategy to tsetse control in many of the 38 
African countries, where some 45 million cattle are under challenge from 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis (Murray and Gray, 1984). 
The technical feasibility and cost effectiveness of protecting cattle from trypa-
nosomiasis by using drugs has been well established at numerous locations 
throughout Africa, under a wide range of situations (e.g. Whiteside, 1962; 
Bourn and Scott, 1978; Logan et al., 1984; Trail et al., 1985; Njogu et al., 
1985; Maloo et al., 1988; ltty et al., 1988; Tacher, 1988; Dolan et al., 1991 ). 
Economic aspects of trypanocide use have been reported to a lesser extent 
than technical aspects, but various studies have specifically addressed this 
subject (e.g. jahnke, 1974; Putt et al., 1980; Wilson et al., 1981; Brandl, 
1988a and 1988b; Shaw, 1987; ltty, 1992). 
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Before 1960, tsetse control in Zimbabwe was carried out under the auspices 
of Research and Specialist Services in the Ministry of Agriculture, quite separ-
ate from the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS), which was responsible 
for diagnosis and treatment of trypanosomiasis. In the early 1950s, the DVS 
established a Trypanosomiasis Control Unit, which was incorporated into the 
Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Branch (TICS) when it was created as a 
part of the DVS in 1960. Data on trypanosomiasis incidence and use of drugs 
were well documented in official reports from 1961 onwards (summarized in 
Table 9.1 ). Previously unpublished data for the period 1980 to 1988 are 
given in Table 9.2, as extracted from a computerized database established at 
the TICB by the author, along with the most recent official figures (Shereni, 
1990b). 
The disease surveillance and drug administration programme is described 
in the TTCB field handbook (Cockbill, 1975), and is much the same today as 
it was in the 1950s. Small field teams, based at district veterinary offices, 
make monthly visits to cattle dips and inspection races. Blood samples are 
taken from animals suspected of infection and are examined under a field 
microscope. Animals with parasitaemia or clinical signs are treated with 
diminazene. Where infection is on a greater scale, the entire herd may be 
treated with diminazene (so-called block inoculation). Prophylaxis with iso-
metamidium is normally used when infection rates exceed 10% (Or j. Nyika, 
Provincial Veterinary Officer, Bindura, personal communication). In some 
places, prophylaxis has been seasonal - usually during the rains, when chal-
lenge is higher. In Zimbabwe, the standard dose rate for isometamidium is 1 
mg per kg (Cockbill, 1975), which is at the upper end of the manufacturer's 
recommended dose range of 0.25 to 1.0 mg per kg. This is to minimize the 
likelihood of drug resistance developing, which has occurred in Zimbabwe 
at lower dosages (Boyt, 1971 ). 
Each field team submits a monthly report, summarizing the numbers of 
animals presented for inspection, blood smears taken, positives (by species 
identified), and drugs administered at each location. The data are compiled 
at the TICB onto individual record cards for each inspection centre. 
Incidence of trypanosomiasis is transcribed onto maps for use by the TICB in 
assessing the current tsetse and trypanosomiasis situation in the various dis-
tricts. The TICB still holds almost complete records going back to the late 
1950s and early 1960s, when many of the cattle dips and inspection races 
were first established in tsetse-affected areas. 
Boyt (1979) described the history of chemotherapy in Zimbabwe since 
1907, when first trials were carried out using sodium antimony tartrate. Until 
the mid-1950s, dimidium bromide was the mainstay of chemotherapy but 
caused serious cattle losses due to photosensitization. Increasing resistance to 
dimidium was also a problem. Quinpyramine compounds (Antrycide, ICI plc) 
were first used on an extensive scale in 1955 and became the drug of choice. 
Antrycide dimethyl sulphate was used as a curative drug and antrycide pro-
salt was used as a prophylactic. 
In the early 1960s, resistance to antrycide became widespread (Boyt et al., 
1963; TICB annual reports for the early 1960s), while alternative drugs 
became available, including diminazene aceturate (Berenil, Hoechst A.G.), 
isometamidium chloride (Samorin or Trypamidium, Rhone-Merieux) and 
homidium bromide (Ethidium, FBC Ltd). Antrycide was kept in use until 
1967/68 and homidium was apparently last used in 1983 (Table 9.1 ). 
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..... Table 9.1 Official statistics on trypanocide use in Zimbabwe, 1961-84t 
..... 
~ 
Yeart Cattle Smears Infections in cattle* Treatments 
inspected 
T.c. T.v T.b. Mixed/other Total Antrycide Antrycide Ethidium Berenil lsometamidium Total 
DMS pro-salt 
1955-56 23 028 198 47 126 
1956-57 27 982 422 61 561 
1957-58 28 334 578 69 509 
1958-59 38 734 930 91 421 
1959-60 76 496 51 005 1398 115 773 
1960-61 101 960 35 714 822 468 5 12 1307 32 955 33 539 1087 15 230 nil 82 811 
1961-62 100 436 36 892 1085 496 16 17 1614 30 828 24 390 6806 32 474 4786 99 284 
1962-63 123 776 42 048 1968 793 10 34 2805 19 680 23 608 13 010 24 689 6602 87 589 
1963-64 248 801 66 423 3389 1814 ? 179 5382 16 307 45 912 13 468 46 583 3028 125 298 
1964-65 317 181 85 430 2739 2573 ? 54 5366 15 439 56 157 1940 80 478 21 390 175 404 
1965-66 337 201 109 302 2396 2773 ? 59 5228 13 342 51 580 975 74 747 37 796 178 440 
1966-67 382 177 130 553 4378 3331 ? 144 7853 1490 27 649 2625 109 231 40 531 181 526 
1967-68 388 683 144 652 3773 2444 19 77 6313 10 681 3705 72 258 78 235 164 879 
1968-69 446 030 146 285 4048 1182 47 79 5356 2401 47 577 71 376 121 354 
1969-70 439 765 164 768 5421 1207 4 85 6717 1616 46 601 50 323 98 540 
1970-71 493 836 186 586 4156 1415 4 135 5710 7656 52 333 57 860 117 849 
1971-72 495 905 178 298 4497 1098 nil 103 5698 1521 41 082 61 866 104 469 
1972-73 505 094 140 071 3138 886 nil 100 4124 504 37 336 37 442 75 282 
1973-74 513 234 114 169 ? ? ? ? 3362 ? 
1974-75 411 169 81 106 1691 378 nil 29 2098 29 232 11 578 40 810 
1980 95 800 938 4954 
1981 228 500 4692 22 739 22 739 
1982 461 300 80 610 4979 25 933 25 933 
1983 534 317 92 947 6172 1757 6 189 8124 7822 32 679 345 40 846 
1984 216 170 106 862 8931 2285 1 211 11 428 45 556 22 800 68 356 
Source Annual reports of the TTCB, Harare. 
* T.c. = Trypanosoma congolense T.v. = T. vivax T.b. = T. brucei 
Mixed/other T. simiae and unidentified or mixed infections. 
t Reports were produced irregularly after 1973 and none have been issued since 1984. 
t The above data include treatments administered by the DVS but exclude use of trypanocides purchased by farmers. 
_. 
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Table 9.2 Summary of trypanosomiasis cases and trypanocide use in Zimbabwe (1980-90*) 
Year Cattle at riskt Blood smears Positive cases of trypanosomiasis Treatments 
(census) 
T.c. T.v. T.b. Mixed/other Total As % of census lsometamidium Diminazene 
1980 31 119 10 672 1047 296 41 57 1441 4.6 . 127 9592 
1981 117 040 46 979 3864 613 8 100 4585 3.9 200 23 961 
1982 204 846 66 477 4002 690 5 91 4788 2.3 229 22 204 
1983 169 098 82 355 6113 1404 2 262 7781 4.6 281 34 202 
1984 176 058 81 316 7572 1407 0 123 9102 5.2 14 265 30 374 
1985 178 562 60 170 5653 981 0 64 6698 3.8 29 017 19 238 
1986 200 080 80 201 3627 459 0 39 4125 2.1 36 097 23 345 
1987 220 362 67 871 1140 203 0 14 1357 0.6 20 856 16 130 
1988 230 495 64104 432 25 0 3 460 0.2 0 778 
1989/90 240 628 53 739 345 39 0 17 401 0.2 0 2162 
* The figures for 1980-87 were extracted from a database established at the TICB by the author, into which all available information from TICB trypanosomiasis records was 
entered. The data for 1988 are estimates, based on partial data for the year. The figures for 1989/90 relate to the period October 1989 to September 1990, as given by Shereni 
(1990b). 
t Cattle at risk refers to the number of cattle registered at inspection centres situated within the area recognized by the TICB as threatened by tsetse and trypanosomiasis. The 
figures for 1980 to 1988 are the average of monthly census data for January and July, or nearest months for which data were available. 
In the 1980s, the DVS relied on diminazene as a curative drug and isometa-
midium as a prophylactic. This combination of drugs has the advantage that 
cross-resistance between the two drugs is very rare, so that diminazene can 
be used for annual 'sanative' treatment of animals under long-term prophy-
laxis with isometamidium, to reduce the likelihood of drug resistance. 
The highest levels of drug use occurred in the period 1984 to 1987, when 
a substantial number of cattle in north-east Zimbabwe were under sufficient 
challenge to require prophylactic protection. The tsetse control operations of 
1986 to 1988 more or less eliminated the problem over a very large area, 
such that trypanosomiasis incidence and drug use were reduced to an unpre-
cedented low level. 
Since independence, the Government's expenditure on trypanocidal drugs in 
Zimbabwe peaked at about 0.5% of the annual budget of the TTCB in the 
period 1983-86. This low proportion reflects the Government's preference 
for tsetse control rather than direct control of trypanosomiasis using drugs. 
Since 1987, annual procurement has fallen to about 200 packets of dimina-
zene (1 0 x 1 0.5 g sachets per packet; sufficient to give approximately 80 
standard treatments per packet) and 30 packets of isometamidium (1 0 g per 
packet; sufficient to give approximately 30 treatments per packet). This pro-
curement was sufficient for just under 17 000 treatments per year, at a cost 
in the order of 0.1% of the total TTCB budget. The TTCB normally keeps a 
stock of drugs in case of unexpected disease outbreak, so the expenditure 
does not directly correspond to actual drug usage in the year concerned. 
The policy of the Zimbabwe Government has been to keep the frontier of 
tsetse infestation towards the limit of current agricultural land use. The DVS 
has discouraged (by not providing services), and in some areas prohibited, 
the keeping of cattle in tsetse areas. The 'residual' role for trypanocides 
became even more marginal in the late 1980s, since all cattle in tsetse areas 
were treated regularly with deltamethrin (described in Section 5). Thus, 
recent information on disease incidence and trypanocide use in Zimbabwe is 
not representative of what might happen if flies were to invade long-estab-
lished farming areas, with denser human settlement and higher cattle popula-
tions. 
However, the trypanocide usage necessary for disease management in the 
absence of tsetse control activities can be assessed by examining data for the 
early 1980s. Trypanosomiasis was a major problem in large areas invaded by 
tsetse during the war, and where the TTCB was unable to mount tsetse con-
trol programmes until the late 1980s, because of shortage of staff and funds. 
In such areas, trypanocidal drugs were the only measure to contain the situ-
ation until tsetse could be controlled. 
Two case studies of trypanocide use in Zimbabwe are examined below. 
The first deals with part of the area covered by the 1986 large-scale inte-
grated tsetse control operation in Mashonaland East and Central Provinces. 
The second case study deals with part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley covered by 
the 1987 and 1988 aerial spraying operations. 
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Background information on Chesa 
The Chesa and Karuyana small-scale commercial farming areas (hereafter 
referred to simply as Chesa) occupy 795 sq km in the north-eastern part of 
Zimbabwe, close to the town of Mount Darwin. The two areas are admin-
istered by the Chesa Rural Council, within Mashonaland Central Province. 
To the north (across the Ruya river) and to the east, Chesa is bounded by 
the communal lands of Kandeya, Masoso, Chimanda and Pfungwe. The 
southern boundary is represented mainly by the Gwetera river (a major 
tributary of the Mazowe river system), across which lies the Umfurudzi 
Safari Area and State Land designated for resettlement schemes. 
Commercial farms and the Madziwa Communal Land lie towards the west 
and south-west. The area is relatively flat, at an altitude of between 900 
and 1 000 m above sea level. 
Most of Chesa is in Natural Region Ill* designated as a semi-intensive 
farming region with moderate rainfall (650-800 mm per year) although parts 
of Chesa extend into Natural Regions 11 (intensive farming region, rainfall 
750-1000 mm annually) and Natural Region IV (semi-intensive, rainfall 450-
650 mm). 
The category of land use now known as small-scale commercial farming 
dates back to 1930 when the Land Apportionment Act of that year made 
national provision of some three million ha for 'Native Purchase Areas' sub-
sequently renamed 'African Purchase Lands'. In such areas, land tenure is pri-
vate- an important difference from the communal lands, where farmers have 
traditional right of use but do not own land. The average farm size is several 
hundred hectares, compared with less than 1 0 ha per household in the com-
munal lands, and thousands of hectares in large-scale commercial farms. The 
main land use is mixed farming. The cattle population in Chesa has averaged 
about 15 000 head between 1983 and 1987 - a stocking rate of just under 
20 animals per sq km or 13.5 LU (500 kg), using the official conversion par-
ameter. Both grazing and arable areas are taken into account in calculating 
stocking rate, since the forage value of stover is comparable with that of 
open range. 
Tsetse and trypanosomiasis history of Chesa 
Chesa has been an established farming area for many decades, and had no 
tsetse or trypanosomiasis history prior to the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
when a tsetse belt began to encroach from the north-east. This expansion of 
the tsetse population from Mozambique was to reoccupy land from which it 
had disappeared in the course of the rinderpest pandemic at the end of the 
last century. 
Tsetse and trypanosomiasis were kept under control in the early 1970s by 
ground spraying operations along the border with Mozambique. The 1972 
operation just extended into part of Chesa. However, this border area was 
one of the areas of fiercest action during the independence hostilities and 
*Zimbabwe is divided into five Natural Regions (agro-ecological zones) according to the description of 
Vincent and Thomas (1961) as amended by AGRITEX (Surveyor General, 1984). 
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Government veterinary services began to break down in the late 1970s. 
Inspections became increasingly irregular and ceased completely in some 
areas, but resumed from 1980 onwards (Table 9.3). 
There was a major problem in Chesa in 1980, with further deterioration in 
the following year when the number of positive cases of trypanosomiasis 
peaked at 19% of the cattle presented for inspection. The percentage figure 
for this period may not be very reliable, as probably only a proportion of the 
cattle present in the area were being brought for inspection, likely to have 
included most of the sick animals. 
In 1981, a ground spraying operation was carried out in the north-east of 
Chesa and in the neighbouring communal lands to the east. This brought 
temporary relief, as shown by a sharp reduction in trypanosomiasis positives 
(Table 9.3). However, tsetse were soon discovered in an extensive area to the 
south and west of the area that had been ground sprayed. The rapid growth 
of the trypanosomiasis problem between 1982 and 1985 shows how rapidly 
tsetse can increase in number when the situation is appropriate - and this 
area is generally considered marginal to tsetse. 
Table 9.3 Trypanosomiasis records for Chesa Small-Scale Commercial 
Farming Area, 1980-87 
Year Cattle Blood Positives Treatments 
census* smears 
Number % of census lsometamidium Diminazene 
1980 4977 2231 466 9.4 0 2184 
1981 6251 6517 1176 18.8 0 5546 
1982 12 374 4940 333 2.7 0 2054 
1983 15 982 5814 741 4.6 0 4574 
1984 17 264 7624 1784 10.3 0 6298 
1985 15 315 8021 2085 13.6 2687 5855 
1986 13 398 2596 244 1.8 4241 3787 
1987 14 697 1431 2 0 345 
Source Own analysis of TICB record cards for monthly trypanosomiasis inspections. 
* The cattle census is the total number of cattle owned by farmers registered with the DVS at 
cattle dips and races w ithin the area. The figure in the table is the average of the figures for 
January and July (or nearest dates when inspected) in each year. 
In 1985, cattle in part of Chesa were given isometamidium prophylaxis. 
Accordingly, the number of positives dropped dramatically in 1986, although 
drug treatments remained at a high level. Chesa was aerial sprayed with 
endosulfan in 1986 with the result that the tsetse population disappeared. 
Only two positive cases of trypanosomiasis were found in 1987. Animals sus-
pected to have trypanosomiasis were treated with diminazene, but no further 
cases were confirmed in the following years. 
Cost analysis of trypanocide use in Chesa 
The TICB Annual Estimates of Expenditure for 1985/86 and 1986/87 costed 
a single diminazene treatment at Z$1.03 and a single isometamidium treat-
ment at Z$1.50 (adjusted to 1990 prices, as applies to all following prices 
unless otherwise stated). The trypanocide cost in 1986 and 1987 was just 
over Z$1 0 000 per year, equivalent to about Z$12 .50 per sq km per year 
averaged over the whole of Chesa. This is small in comparison with tsetse 
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control costs discussed in earlier sections of this report. However, only a part 
of Chesa was severely affected by trypanosomiasis, and the situation was 
eased during the year by a tsetse control operation. 
At the most seriously affected cattle centres, all animals presented for 
inspection received two isometamidium treatments and one diminazene 
treatment in 1986. If tsetse had not been controlled, all animals would have 
required at least a third isometamidium treatment. The 'full trypanocide 
regime' in Chesa would thus have cost Z$5.53 per animal. At the local stock-
ing rate of 20 animals per sq km, this is equivalent to a recurrent annual try-
panocide cost of Z$110.60 per sq km, not including the costs of equipment, 
staff and vehicles for delivery of the drugs, for which no historical data are 
available (costs are estimated on page 122). 
The net present value (1990 prices; 10% discount rate) of a ten year pro-
gramme of trypanocide use at the levels required in Chesa in 1986 would be 
Z$680 per sq km for the drugs alone. This does not consider possible future 
growth in the Chesa cattle population, which fluctuated without evidence of 
long-term growth over the period 1983 to 1987. 
Background information on the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
In the following discussion, the Mid-Zambezi Valley is taken to refer to the 
Communal Lands of Dande, Gutsa, Muzarabani, Mukumbura and Chiswiti 
and which cover an area of some 7000 sq km in the north of Mashonaland 
Central Province (Figure 9.1 ). To the north and north-east, the area is 
bounded by the Mozambique border, beyond which lie the Zambezi river 
and Lake Cabora Bassa. The Zambezi Valley to the west comprises an exten-
sive block of Safari Areas and National Park reaching to Lake Kariba. To the 
south, the valley floor is bounded by a very steep escarpment, above which 
there is both commercial and communal farming land. The valley floor is 
relatively flat, at an altitude of between 350 m and 450 m above sea level. 
Chewore 
Safari area 
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Figure 9.1 Aerial spraying operations against tsetse in the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley, 1987-88. 
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Most of the valley floor falls within Natural Region IV, according to 
official classification (Surveyor General, 1984), although parts of the valley 
are arguably within Region Ill. Barrett et al. (1991) reviewed literature and 
statistics for the area, concerning physical resource characteristics (see also 
Barrett, 1994). 
Tsetse and trypanosomiasis history of the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
Although there is some evidence of cattle production in the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley in pre-colonial times, Barrett et al. (1991) concluded that cattle did 
not feature in the farming systems of this area for over a century prior to their 
reintroduction in the last fifty years. After the rinderpest pandemic in the 
1890s, the Mid-Zambezi Valley was probably free of tsetse, but by the early 
1920s the TICB was carrying out regular game elimination in the area to try 
to contain expansion of the fly population to the west. In the 1930s, the 
Rhodesian Government removed the few existing cattle from African farming 
areas in the eastern valley, as part of the policy of starving out the fly. Cattle 
were re-introduced into the eastern part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley in the 
mid-1940s, and increased in number steadily over the next decade. Problems 
began to occur in the late 1950s, when a tsetse belt from the east expanded 
to coalesce with the longer-standing fly population in the western part of the 
Mid-Zambezi Valley. Trypanosomiasis incidence was low and sporadic for 
several years, but eventually ground spraying had to be undertaken in the 
eastern part of the valley in the early 1970s. 
Veterinary services to the eastern Mid-Zambezi Valley were suspended in 
1973, because of the deteriorating security situation along the Mozambique 
border. In the following years, all cattle in the area were removed or died of 
disease and other causes (Barrett et al., 1991 ). 
Farmers returning to the area after independence faced a serious tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis problem; some lost entire herds owing to the disease, 
before veterinary services were re-established in the area. From 1983 
onwards, the cattle population began to expand rapidly (Table 9.4). The dis-
ease situation was sufficiently serious that cattle in the valley were widely 
given isometamidium prophylaxis. The rapid growth of cattle numbers, 
despite the serious disease challenge, provides interesting evidence that tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis, per se, are not a major constraint to livestock develop-
ment, where effective veterinary services can provide trypanocides. 
The eastern part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley was aerial sprayed in 1987 
and the western part in 1988, as described in Section 4 (pp 44-45). Between 
1987 and 1989, the incidence of trypanosomiasis and the use of drugs 
dropped to a low level. 
The target barrier along the Mozambique border (see Section 6) runs 
through the northern part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley. There were still occa-
sional cases of trypanosomiasis in the following years. 
Cost analysis of trypanocide use in the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
Using the same unit costs for drugs as on page 118, the annual trypanocide 
cost for the Mid-Zambezi Valley peaked at Z$31 042 in 1987, equivalent to 
Z$2.99 per animal per year or approximately Z$4.44 per sq km, averaged 
over the entire area of the Mid-Zambezi Valley. However, a large portion of 
the valley was aerial sprayed in 1987 and the drug costs were therefore 
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Table 9.4 Trypanosomiasis cases and trypanocide use in the Mid-Zambezi Valley, 1980-90* 
Positive cases of trypanosomiasis Treatments 
-
YEAR Cattle census Blood T.c. T.v. T.b. Mixed/other Positives As % of census lsometamidium Diminazene 
smears 
January July 
1980 338 127 493 77 20 0 4 101 9.0 127 441 
1981 1910 1497 2568 497 75 2 8 582 31.4 200 2050 
1982 1798 2465 6503 1024 263 0 21 1308 59.0 229 6287 
1983 2634 2873 7051 1269 318 0 51 1638 56.4 281 11 456 
1984 3172 3799 6651 1239 180 0 21 1440 34.9 5850 6569 
1985 5091 5169 5171 930 103 0 5 1038 17.8 11 351 3377 
1986 6559 7962 5518 1156 88 0 12 1256 15.0 14 870 7049 
1987 10 172 10 623 6231 555 62 0 4 621 5.5 14 228 9418 
1988 12 220 12 494 4533 101 29 0 0 130 1.0 845 1292 
1989 14 036 15 018 3766 29 12 0 3 44 0.3 0 90 
1990 16 300 17 797 3431 41 4 0 0 45 0.6 0 79 
Source Own analysis of TTCB record cards for individual inspection centres. 
* Data for the following inspection centres are included: 
Chiswiti Cl: Chiswiti; Nyautande; Kamutsenzere; Kaitano I; Kaitano 11. 
Mukumbura Cl: Bandima; Chisecha; Gomo; Mukumbura; Zambezi; Zambara. 
Muzarabani: Muzarabani; Utete East, Kasekete; Hoya. 
Gutsa C.l.: Hwata; Utete West; Kamukamwe. 
Dande C.l.: Masomo; Dande. 
-' 
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reduced. The average drug cost per animal was actually higher in 1986 
(Z$4.07) than in 1987 (Z$2.99), but the total expenditure was less, because 
of the lower number of cattle in the area. 
In comparison with Chesa, cost analysis in the Mid-Zambezi Valley is 
more difficult, since the cattle population was growing rapidly in the 1980s, 
mainly through immigration of new settlers. The 1990 cattle population of 
just under 18 000 animals was equivalent to 2.6 animals per sq km over the 
whole area of the Mid-Zambezi Valley, although stocking rates were far 
higher locally. A recent resettlement project in the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
assessed the carrying capacity of some 32 340 ha of non-arable land at about 
10 ha per 500 kg livestock unit, or about 14 animals per sq km (ADF, 1986). 
This is typical of official views on carrying capacity in Natural Region IV 
(e.g. Mombeshora and Maclaurin, 1989). 
Farmers themselves widely considered such estimates to be conservative, 
and reckoned that the range can support up to double these stocking rates 
(unpublished findings from field interviews). Since 1988, the DVS has tried to 
limit the number of cattle being moved into the valley, with limited success. 
lt is uncertain what level cattle numbers will reach, and whether such popu-
lations can be sustained without serious environmental degradation (Barrett 
et al., 1991; Barrett, 1994). 
The problem in extrapolating the likely future cattle population is that 
some large areas of the Valley floor do not have access to surface water or 
boreholes, so that people and cattle tend to be concentrated in certain areas, 
especially along the major rivers where the soils are also more suitable for 
arable production. For the present general analysis, it is assumed that in sub-
stantial areas of smallholder settlement, the cattle population wil l probably 
reach stocking rates of at least 15 animals per sq km in the next 5 to 10 
years. At the levels of tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge faced in parts of 
the Mid-Zambezi Valley in 1986/87, such animals would require, annually, 
three treatments with isometamidium and one with diminazene. This would 
cost Z$82.95 per sq km per year for trypanocides. The net present value 
(1990 prices; 10% discount rate) of a ten year programme of trypanocide use 
at this level would be Z$51 0 per sq km for the drugs alone. 
The costs of drug delivery (manpower, vehicles and equipment) vary accord-
ing to the type of farming system and veterinary services. Where cattle are 
being routinely assembled for other veterinary purposes, such as acaricidal 
treatment, trypanosomiasis inspection can be carried out at the same time, 
with little additional overhead cost to the farmer or veterinary department. 
This is the case in Zimbabwe. Accordingly, this section considers only the 
additional costs of trypanosomiasis control. Analysis is confined to pro-
grammes in communal farming areas administered by the DVS. 
A trypanosomiasis field team normally includes an Animal Health 
Inspector, two or three field orderlies and a driver. Help is provided at each 
inspection centre by the local Veterinary Extension Assistant and Dip 
Attendant. Each month, the team normally spends three weeks in the field, 
and one week in headquarters for reporting and administration. The cost for 
such a team amounts to some Z$62 438 per year inclusive of manpower, 
vehicles and equipment (Table 9.5). 
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Ther~ is a routine schedule for visits to each cattle inspection centre. 
Dependmg on the number of cattle to be inspected and the distance b tw n 
centres, the team will cover two or th ree centres per day. This repre e tee 
b . h d h. h . . d I I sen s a as1c over ea cost w 1c IS m ependent of the precise eve of tsetse d 
trypanosomiasis challenge in the affected area. an 
Where there is a serious disease problem, the team takes longer to do its 
round, since more blood samples have to be examined and more time is 
spent injecting drugs. Often this means simply that the team works longer 
hours. Above a certain work load, additional staff will be required. The man-
power ceiling arises at the level of disease challenge where it is appropriate 
to change from a therapeutic to a prophylactic drug regime, beyond which 
there is no further increase in workload associated with increasing challenge. 
Assuming each field team covers 30 centres, with an average of 1600 ani-
mals per centre, the annual cost is Z$2081 per centre or Z$1 .30 per animal 
at ri sk (fable 9.5). At a stocking rate of 15 animals per sq km, this represents 
an annual charge of Z$1 9.50 per sq km, for which the net present value 
(1 0% discount rate) of a ten year programme would be about Z$120 per sq 
km. This is additional to the drug costs. 
Table 9.5 Costs of trypanosomiasis field teams (Z$, 1990 prices) 
A MANPOWER* 
Animal Health Inspector 
Field Orderly 
Driver 
Total manpower costs 
B VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT* 
Transport 
Equipmentt 
Total transport and equipment 
Number Annual cost per 
per team - --------
1 
3 
1 
5 
man team 
19 758 
4800 
6120 
19 758 
14 400 
6120 
40 278 
17 160 
5000 
22 160 
C TOTAL MANPOWER, VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT COSTS 62 438 
D TOTAL MVE COST/DIP/YEARt 2081 
E TOTAL MVE COST/ANIMAL AT RISK/YEAR~ 1.30 
* For a detailed analysis see Barrett (1994; Appendix E). 
t Estimated budget to cover depreciation and maintenance for a field microscope plus 
expenditure on glassware, syringes and needles. 
t lt is assumed that the field team spends fifteen days per month in the field and visits two 
inspection centres per day. 
~ lt is assumed that the average number of animals presented for inspection is 1600 per centre. 
The cost of a trypanocidal drug programme will depend firstly on the number 
of cattle to be protected, secondly on the severity of tsetse and trypanosomia-
sis challenge, and thirdly on the degree of drug resistance which has devel-
oped in the area. The development of drug resistance means that higher 
dosages of drug are required to achieve disease control and/or the interval 
between treatments has to be shortened. 
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The cost model (Table 9.6) considers the following four trypanocide 
regimes, corresponding to increasing degree of disease challenge and event-
ual drug resistance. 
Regime 1: low challenge, managed by curative treatment with diminazene 
(3.5 mglkg) of identified cases only. The example in Table 9.6 
corresponds to an average of one treatment per animal per year, 
although more frequent therapy would be justifiable before 
switching to a prophylactic regime. 
Regime 2 : higher challenge, requiring prophylactic treatment of all animals 
with three doses of isometamidium (0.5 mglkg) and one sanative 
treatment with diminazene (3.5 mglkg) per year. 
Regime 3: isometamidium dosage is increased to 1 mglkg to reduce the 
scope for (or to deal with early) drug resistance. 
Regime 4 : serious drug resistance, such that five isometamidium treatments 
(at 1 mglkg) are required and the diminazene dosage is increased 
to 7 mglkg. 
Table 9.6 Cost model of trypanocide drug regimes (Z$, 1990 prices) 
REGIME 2 3 4 
Trypanosomiasis challenge Low High High High 
Drug resistance None None Moderate Serious 
Trypanocide use 
Diminazene treatments per year 1 1 1 1 
Diminazene dosage (mglkg) 3.5 3.5 3.5 7.0 
lsometamidium treatments per year 3 3 5 
lsometamidium dosage (mg/kg) 0.5 1.0 1.0 
Annual cost of trypanocide 
per 500 kg livestock unit 1.72 5.47 9.22 15.93 
per 350 kg animal 1.20 3.83 6.45 11 .15 
BASIC SCENARIO: 10 ha/LSU 
Annual cost/sq km 
Trypanocides* 17.15 54.65 92.15 159.30 
Manpower, vehicles and equipmentt 18.57 18.57 18.57 18.57 
Total 35.72 73.22 110.72 177.87 
NPVt over ten years (1 0% discount) 219.51 449.95 680.38 1093.02 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO: 5 ha/LSU 
Annual cost/sq km 
Trypanocides* 34.30 109.30 184.30 318.60 
Manpower, vehicles and equipmentt 37.14 37.14 37.14 37.14 
Total 71.44 146.44 221.44 355.74 
NPVt over ten years (1 0% discount) 439 .02 899.89 1360.77 2186.04 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO: 20 ha/LSU 
Annual cost/sq km 
Trypanocides* 8.58 27.33 46.08 79.65 
Manpower, vehicles and equipmentt 9.29 9.29 9.29 9.29 
Total 17.86 36.61 55.36 88.94 
NPVt over ten years (1 0% discount) 109.75 224.97 340.19 546.51 
* Price per gram of active ingredient is budgeted at Z$0.98 for diminazene and Z$5.00 for 
isometamidium, on the basis of historical prices paid by the TTCB. 
t Manpower, vehicles and equipment are budgeted at Z$1 .30 per animal at risk (see Table 9.5). 
t The NPY is the net present value of a ten year programme of trypanocide use at the level 
specified in each regime, calculated using a discount rate of 10%. 
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Drug resistance has never been a widespread problem in z· b b 1m a we, 
although cases have been observed (Lewis and Thomson, 197 4) lh 1 k f . . . . · e ac o 
a problem IS due partly to the llm1ted past usage of trypanoc1des, and partl 
to the gre_at care t~k~n by the DVS to control the use of trypanocides. Fo~ 
example, 1sometam1d1um 1s used at higher dosages than commonly used el _ 
where. In con_sequence, it is difficult to predict what would happen if a Ja~e 
number of cattle had to be maintained on drugs under serious trypanosorn~~ 
sis challenge, for prolonged periods. 
Such problems have been encountered in other parts of Africa, and some 
cases are well-documented. For example, on Galana ranch in Kenya, drug 
resistance became so severe that it was impossible to protect the cattle from 
trypanosomiasis without administering trypanocides at dosages which were 
themselves toxic to the cattle (findings of a visit by the author in 1989). 
Similar problems have been reported from Mkwaja ranch in Tanzania, where 
Trail et al. (1985) had previously reported that cattle production could be sus-
tained under prophylaxis without development of resistance. However, Fox et 
al. (1991) reported that, by 1989, the required dose rate of isometamidium 
had risen to 1 mg per kg with treatment every five weeks, compared with 0.5 
mg per kg every three months in the 1960s. Closer to Zimbabwe, drug resist-
ance appears to be an increasing problem in parts of Zambia, although it is 
often difficult to establish that apparent drug resistance is not due to incorrect 
drug use, relapsing infections or other causes (Connor, 1989). 
To date, only Regimes One and Three in Table 9.6 have been widely used 
in Zimbabwe. Regime Two would probably be sustainable for some time, but 
is likely to lead to eventual development of drug resistance. Regime Four 
provides a shorter time period between treatments, and a higher dosage of 
diminazene to ensure complete elimination of infections as resistance 
increases. Regime Four would cost about 60% more than the current stan-
dard prophylaxis (Regime Three). 
In summary, the direct annual cost of a trypanocide programme could 
range anywhere between Z$20 and Z$350 per sq km, depending on the cat-
tle population density, the severity of the disease and drug resistance prob-
lems - a very wide range of cost. Over a ten year period, the net present 
value of the cost of such a programme would range between Z$1 00 and 
Z$2000 per sq km. 
~ ~~~~ 
Advantages and disadvantages 
Advantages of using trypanocides include: 
• trypanocidal drugs are relatively safe, reliable and effective when adminis-
tered correctly and in the absence of drug resistance; 
• trypanocidal drugs are cheap in comparison with many other veterinary 
treatments, have long shelf life in powder form, and are simple to formu-
late in the field; 
• drug management of disease provides scope for cost-recovery from farmers; 
and 
• trypanocides can be used by the individual farmer, independent of govern-
ment services. 
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Disadvantages include: 
• it is difficult to ensure that trypanocides are used correctly by farmers; 
• scope exists for development of drug resistance if use is not properly con-
trolled; and 
• trypanocides wi 11 not ki 11 or prevent movement of tsetse, so that the area 
under challenge may expand and the severity of challenge may increase. 
The advantages and disadvantages of controlling trypanosomiasis using 
drugs as opposed to controlling its vector the tsetse fly are considered in 
further detail in Section 1 0. 
Drug resistance 
Trypanocides are toxic compounds with relatively narrow therapeutic indices: 
the dose rates which cause toxicity to the treated animal are not greatly 
higher than those which cure trypanosomiasis. Hence, development of drug 
resistance soon makes the continued use of drugs such as diminazene and 
isometamidium impracticable. No other satisfactory drugs are currently avail-
able. Because of increasingly stringent requirements for the registration of 
new drugs, few companies are interested to develop new trypanocides for a 
market which is relatively small and confined to Africa. 
Livestock productivity 
The productivity of livestock is lower when trypanosomiasis is managed 
using drugs than in a situation of zero trypanosomiasis challenge. With thera-
peutic drug regimes at low levels of challenge, animals will be infected and 
debilitated for some time before they are treated. Sub-clinical infections may 
not be detected. With prophylactic regimes at higher levels of challenge, the 
effectiveness declines between treatments and infections can establish, lead-
ing to a degree of morbidity. 
The drugs themselves can cause adverse effects on the animals. Cattle 
treated with diminazene are sometimes unable to plough for two or three 
days after treatment. lsometamidium causes muscle destruction and fibrosis 
after repeated intramuscular injection at doses of 1 mg per kg at the same site 
(Lewis and Thomson, 1974; Boyt, 1971 ), leading to pain and stiffness in the 
neck, which can interfere with draught usage of the animal. Such tissue dam-
age also reduces the carcase value after slaughter. 
The extent of these productivity losses depends on a complex of factors 
including natural trypanotolerance, acquired immunity and other stresses on 
the animals. Such stress could relate to pregnancy or lactation in cows, 
nutrition, other diseases and parasitic infections, and work load in the case 
of draught animals. The cost to the farmer of such losses depends upon the 
economics of the production system. 
Most previous studies of the economic impact of trypanosomiasis have 
looked at pastoral and beef production systems, for which there is now a 
reasonable body of literature (e.g. Jahnke, 1974; Putt et al., 1980; Brandl, 
1988a; Shaw, 1987 and 1990; for an overview, see Barrett, 1991 ). However, 
few of these studies provide any objective data on the productivity of cattle 
maintained by prophylaxis under tsetse challenge, in comparison with pro-
ductivity in the absence of trypanosomiasis challenge. Furthermore, there is 
little evidence of the technical or economic consequences of trypanosomiasis 
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and its management in agropastoral farming systems, as found in Zimbabwe 
and neighbouring countries, where the main economic role of cattle is pro-
vision of draught power. 
Barrett (1992b) examined the economics of livestock production in 
Zimbabwe's communal lands, and concluded that the average value of out-
put from Zimbabwe's communal cattle herd was in the order of Z$200 per 
animal per year in 1991 prices, equivalent to about Z$1 70 in 1990 prices. 
Reduction in the productivity of livestock under prophylaxis in the order of 
only 5%, compared with productivity following tsetse control, would thus 
cost the farmer about Z$8.50 per animal per year. This is greater than the 
cost of the trypanocidal drugs required for prophylactic protection of the ani-
mals under Regime Three of Table 9.6. 
Where the comparative advantage of tsetse control over trypanocides is 
unclear, it will be important to assess carefully the likely changes in cattle 
productivity under alternative strategies. 
Possible new directions in trypanocide use 
With little prospect of new trypanocidal drugs being introduced, researchers 
tried to improve the formulation of existing drugs, to prolong their trypano-
cidal effect and to reduce undesirable side effects. Such development would 
be useful, but appears unlikely to affect greatly the cost-competitiveness of 
trypanocides. 
Significant savings in drug costs might be feasible in areas of intermediate 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge, by introduction of tactical or strategic 
approaches to trypanosomiasis (see Connor, 1989 and 1991 ), where other-
wise the approach would be full prophylaxis. Such approaches are likely to 
be essential in areas where the cost of trypanocides is to be recovered from 
farmers, if their full co-operation is expected. 
Tactical chemoprophylaxis involves the protection of selected animals of 
economic importance, such as draught animals and pregnant or lactating 
cows. Strategic chemoprophylaxis involves modifying the drug regime con-
tinually throughout the year, in relation to the seasonal tsetse and trypanoso-
miasis risk. This requires a close understanding of the disease epidemiology, 
which has been studied in southern Africa to a lesser degree than elsewhere 
(e.g. Njogu et al., 1985; Connor et al., 1989). The scope for tactical and stra-
tegic approaches to prophylaxis will increase if field techniques and insti-
tutional capability for trypanosomiasis surveillance can be improved. 
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Section 10 
Cost Comparison of Tsetse Control 
and Management of 
Trypanosomiasis Using Drugs 
Methodological issues in economic comparison of tsetse control with the use 
of trypanocides were discussed in Section 2 (page 13). 
Tsetse control is likely to be more cost-effective than drug control of trypa-
nosomiasis in situations of high cattle density, and where tsetse eradication is 
likely to be permanent, with a minimum risk of reinvasion. Chemotherapy is 
likely to be the preferred option where cattle density is low and prospects 
are poor for keeping the area tsetse-free in the future. The economic advan-
tage of one approach in relation to the other will depend on the specific cir-
cumstances. The objective of economic comparison is, therefore, to show 
where and when one approach is more cost-effective than the other, rather 
than to prove that one approach is generally cheaper. 
Economic comparison in real situations is complex, because of the need to: 
• identify and accurately cost the least-cost approach to tsetse eradication, 
which may not be straightforward; 
• accurately identify the costs of protecting the area from future reinvasion 
by tsetse; 
• assess the likely level of disease challenge and trypanocide use in the 
affected area, both now and in the future, with and without tsetse control; 
• assess the likelihood of development of drug resistance; 
• project changes in the number and productivity of livestock likely to be 
within the affected area. 
Because of this complexity, there is limited value in trying to make a general 
comparison of the economics of tsetse control and drug management of try-
panosomiasis. Analysis has to be related to specific situations. Accordingly, 
three case studies are presented below. 
The first examples (page 129 and page 136) concern Zimbabwe, where 
the threat of substantial reinvasion has been used to justify a tsetse control 
strategy. The subsequent case study (page 141) concerns western Zambia and 
is intended to provide an insight into the transferability of findings in 
Zimbabwe to other countries. 
Zimbabwe is unusual, compared with many other tsetse-affected 
countries, in that much of the area capable of supporting tsetse is presently 
fly-free. Economic justification for tsetse control in Zimbabwe therefore has 
two aspects: 
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• is it worthwhile to continue protecting presently tsetse-free areas from re-
invasion? and 
• is it worthwhile to extend the tsetse-free area by ongoing tsetse control 
programmes, and, if so, how far? 
The value of preventing fly reinvasion in Zimbabwe has appeared obvious to 
the Government over the last 70 years, but requires demonstration. Such justifi-
cation is needed since it relates to how the costs of preventing re invasion are 
dealt with in the appraisal of further reclamation. 
Assessing the area at risk 
The generally accepted limit to tsetse distribution in northern Zimbabwe 
(Figure 10.1 ), prior to the rinderpest pandemic in the 1890s, has been dis-
cussed by Ford (1971: pp 287-301 ). The limit is determined largely by cli-
matic factors. The rinderpest pandemic eliminated most of the tsetse fly's 
hosts, and only a few small residual foci of fly infestation remained in 
Zimbabwe by 1900. 
Figure 10.1 Area within Zimbabwe at risk of reinvasion by tsetse. 
In the early decades of the century, it was considered that the entire area 
within the pre-rinderpest limit was at risk of re-occupation by tsetse. Over 
the last 90 years, changes in the flora and fauna as a result of settlement and 
land use have been substantial. Therefore, the pre-rinderpest distribution has 
limited significance today, in terms of threat of tsetse reinvasion. For 
example, most of Hurungwe Communal Land in Mashonaland West Province 
was prime tsetse habitat in the 1940s, when the area was first freed of flies 
for a settlement scheme which was implemented in 1942. Despite efforts of 
the TTCB to keep tsetse under control by game elimination, the trypanoso-
miasis situation became sufficiently severe and unmanageable as to require 
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removal of all cattle from the area in 1952 (Chorley, 1954). Today, 
Hurungwe is largely tsetse-free and no control programmes have been 
necessary between Hurungwe and Lake Kariba for many years. The limit to 
tsetse distribution appears to have shifted significantly to the north, as a result 
of deforestation and the hunting of wild animals. 
On the other hand, areas such as Chesa, and neighbouring communal 
lands at the limit of the pre-rinderpest fly distribution, were devastated by fly 
reinvasion during the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite intensive human 
settlement. In Zimbabwe, land use change, by itself, appears insufficient to 
eliminate the fly from all areas at risk. 
The limit of the area where tsetse and trypanosomiasis problems have 
occurred since 1975 (Figure 10.1) was constructed by superimposing maps of 
tsetse control operations carried out since 1975, and cross-checked with in-
formation on trypanosomiasis incidence at cattle inspection centres. This 
indicates the minimum area likely to be re-invaded, if tsetse control in 
Zimbabwe were abandoned. The area eventually invaded would probably be 
somewhat larger, especially in the western region. 
The minimum area at risk of reinvasion includes some 36 000 sq km of 
farming land (Table 10.1) with a livestock population of just under 350 000 
cattle and 170 000 goats, plus lesser numbers of sheep, donkeys and pigs. 
Cattle account for over 90% of the combined total liveweight; accordingly, 
other species of domestic livestock are not considered further in the analysis. 
Table 10.1 Summary of information on areas at risk from tsetse reinvasion 
in Zimbabwe 
Area at Official 1988/89 1988/89 % area liable to 
risk carrying stocking rate cattle tsetse threat* 
(sq km) capacity (LU/sq km) census 
(LU/sq km) short medium long 
Manicaland 2095 11.4 10.6 31 800 100 
Mashonaland East 6270 10.1 8.5 75 800 so so 
Mid-Zambezi Valley 7645 10.0 1.8 20 115 100 
Mashonaland Central, 
above escarpment 8676 11 .1 10.4 130 600 75 25 
Mashonaland West 4546 8.4 3.4 22 000 40 60 
Midlands Province 2135 11 .1 16.3 49 600 25 so 25 
Matabeleland North 4675 7.6 2.5 16 752 so so 
GRAND TOTAL 36 042 9.9 6.7 346 667 32 53 15 
Source Barrett (1994; Table H.1, Appendix H) . Author's estimates of likely rate of reinvasion. 
Approximately 85% of the cattle within the area at risk of tsetse invasion are 
within communal farming systems, with a further 8.4% owned by small-scale 
commercial farmers. Only 7% of the cattle at risk are on large-scale commer-
cial farms. Part of this commercial farming area is being converted to small-
holder agriculture under the Government's resettlement scheme. Some of this 
land has already been resettled and more land is being purchased. In the 
typical scheme (called Model A), settlers are given approximately 5 ha of 
arable land and each settlement has a communal grazing area. Thus, land 
use is more like communal farming than commercial agriculture. The effect 
of the resettlement programme on the economics of tsetse control in 
Zimbabwe is marginal, particularly in view of the small proportion of tsetse-
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threatened land under commercial agriculture. To simplify the analysis, it is 
assumed that all of the farmed area at risk of invasion is under communal 
agriculture. 
Assessing the likely growth in cattle numbers 
Economic analysis of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control will be affected 
greatly by assumptions about future livestock numbers. The cattle population 
has increased rapidly throughout the area threatened by tsetse reinvasion (see 
Barrett, 1994; Table H.2, Appendix H). Over the period 1984/85 to 1988/89, 
the rate of growth of the cattle population averaged 12% per year for the 
communal and small-scale commercial farming areas at risk of tsetse and try-
panosomiasis. 
Growth rates were highest in areas of new settlement, such as the Mid-
Zambezi Valley, where the cattle population grew at over 50% per year in 
the 1980s, owing mainly to in-migration of cattle-owning farmers, and to pur-
chases of cattle from outside the valley. Current stocking rates are low in 
relation to carrying capacity. 
Growth rates were lower in areas which were relatively fully settled, well-
stocked with cattle, and where increase in the herd was due mainly to natural 
increase rather than net purchase from outside the area. However, even in 
Hurungwe, where the 1989 stocking rate (31 .4 LU per sq km) was more than 
double the nominal carrying capacity, the cattle herd was still increasing stead-
ily at about 7% per year (Barrett, 1994; Table H.2, Appendix H). 
The total cattle and goat population of the tsetse-threatened area was 
approximately 73% of the nominal grazing capacity for the area in 1988/89 
(Table 10.1 ). Most Provinces appear close to the nominal carrying capacity; 
the scope for increased numbers appears to be mainly in the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley, in the western region, (Siabuwa, Omay, Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe) 
and to a lesser extent in Mashonaland East. Within Provinces, the livestock 
population density is heterogeneous, with some areas nominally overstocked 
and others understocked (Barrett, 1994; Table H.l, Appendix H). 
The scope for continuing increase in cattle numbers appears limited, so 
that the expansion of the herd beyond the carrying capacity of the land 
causes concern about the possibility of environmental degradation (Barrett et 
al., 1991 ). This presents a major planning dilemma, since there is growing 
concern that long-established Government planning parameters for carrying 
capacity in the communal lands may be too conservative. 
The traditional AGRITEX approach to assessing the carrying capacity of 
rangeland derives from commercial experience in the management of beef 
ranches. There are several reasons why such carrying capacities may be inap-
propriate for planning livestock development in smallholder agropastoral 
farming systems: 
• such stocking rates have tended to be conservative, reflecting a manage-
ment approach based on a succession model of rangeland dynamics, that 
is being increasingly questioned (e.g. Westoby et al., 1989); 
• such stocking rates are based on economic optima for beef production, 
whereas cattle production in the communal lands is primarily for provision 
of draught and milk (Barrett, 1992); and 
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• there is growing empirical evidence that stocking rates in many Communal 
Lands in Zimbabwe have been sustained for many decades at levels well 
above recommended stocking rates without apparent loss of productivity 
(e.g. Scoones, 1989; Jarvis and Erickson, 1986). 
Similar challenges to the 'conventional' views of range carrying capacity 
in customary African production systems have been made in Botswana 
(Fortmann, 1989), Tanzania (Homewood and Rogers, 1984), and more gener-
ally by Sandford (1983). 
The argument is illustrated by empirical data on the livestock population 
in Masvingo Province, which is among the areas of densest human settlement 
in Zimbabwe. Stocking rates are well in excess of nominal carrying capacity 
at an aggregate level, and very substantially so in some specific areas, yet 
continue to increase: 
(LU per sq km) NR Ill NR IV NRV 
1988/89 stocking rate, Masvingo 31.5 18.6 0.6 
AGRITEX-reckoned typical carrying capacity 16.7 10.0 8.3 
Source Barrett (1994; Table H.3, Appendix H). NR =Natural Region. 
A detailed review of this debate is outside the scope of the present report. 
Such issues are highly relevant in projecting future cattle population growth 
in the tsetse-affected areas, which is crucial to economic appraisal of tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis control. 
In the basic analysis, it is assumed that the cattle herd does not exceed 
nominal carrying capacity by more than 50%, although a higher number 
may be plausible. This is equivalent to a maximum stocking rate of approxi-
mately 15 LU per sq km, averaged over the entire area at risk of tsetse inva-
sion. The implications of even more conservative projection of cattle herd 
growth are considered subsequently. 
In order to project future growth in cattle numbers threatened by tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis, the area at risk was subdivided into seven parts (as 
listed in Table 10.1 ), each of which was assessed separately (Barrett, 1994; 
Table H.4, Appendix H) . Cattle numbers were projected to increase at 8% 
per year (66% of the recent average growth rate) for the first five years and 
thereafter at 5% until the recommended stocking rate was reached, after 
which the herd size remained constant. For the Mid-Zambezi Valley herd, 
initial growth was estimated at 30% per year (60% of the recent growth rate), 
declining to 10% by Year Six. Changes in the goat population were ignored 
in order to simplify the analysis. 
With these assumptions, the cattle herd under tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
risk eventually rises to just over 725 000 animals in Year 20 (Barrett, 1994; 
Table H.4, Appendix H). 
Assessing the likely rate of invasion and degree of risk 
The rate of tsetse invasion varies according to the characteristics of the area 
being invaded. lt depends upon factors such as climate, vegetation and the 
density and distribution of suitable hosts. The density of the fly population in 
the area from which invasion takes places is also important. Ford (1971: 
pp 300-301) reviewed some of the evidence regarding recovery of the 
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Zambezi fly belt following the rinderpest pandemic. He concluded that, in 
the early decades of this century, the area of residual foci expanded at a geo-
metric rate of just under 30% per year. By 1930, the Sebungwe belt was 
expanding steadily at about 2500 sq km per year. 
In the present analysis, the rate of invasion was assessed separately for 
each of the seven areas identified in Table 10.1. For each area, the cattle 
population was disaggregated into three groups, according to short-, 
medium-, or long-term risk of tsetse and trypanosomiasis challenge. 
The development of the tsetse and trypanosomiasis problem throughout 
the area at risk would probably be progressive. Cattle in the areas of immedi-
ate risk (32% of the total area) are assumed to require a full prophylactic 
regime from Year Four after abandoning tsetse control. This stage will not be 
reached until Year Six in the areas of medium-term risk and Year Nine in the 
areas of longer-term risk. Problems of drug resistance are projected to begin 
in Year 11, developing slowly but progressively thereafter. 
With the previous projections of herd growth, numbers of cattle were pro-
jected by risk group, and hence future trypanocide usage was projected 
(Barrett, 1994; Table H.5, Appendix H). In the absence of objective evidence, 
the percentage figures for each year are estimates, from discussion with tech-
nical staff in Zimbabwe. 
Assessing likely changes in livestock productivity 
lt is difficult to quantify and value the productivity losses which might result 
from trypanosomiasis challenge and associated therapy, especially in commu-
nal cattle production systems (see page 126). 
There is a lack of evidence concerning productivity losses under prophy-
laxis compared with the tsetse-free situation. The present study considers a 
plausible range of productivity changes. In the basic analysis, a small but sig-
nificant loss is assumed: 1% loss under low trypanosomiasis challenge, where 
animals are maintained on a therapeutic trypanocide regime, and 2% loss 
under the situations of higher challenge requiring prophylactic regimes. 
Sensitivity analysis includes varying the assumed loss rate from 0% to 8%. 
Barrett (1992b) estimated that the gross economic output of communal 
cattle in Zimbabwe was in the order of Z$200 per animal per year (1991 
prices). For the following analysis, this value is reduced, conservatively, to a 
1990 price of Z$150 per animal (including inflation adjustment). 
The cost of preventing fly reinvasion 
The cost of maintaining the tsetse front in its 1990 position would probably 
be about Z$4 million per year, but could vary depending on how the strategy 
was planned and managed. This figure is estimated on the basis of a tsetse 
control barrier costing Z$5000 per linear km per year over a distance of 600 
km (Barrett, 1994; Table G.1, Appendix G), at a total cost of Z$3 million. An 
additional Z$1 million per year is allowed for overhead expenses, additional 
to those incurred in the management of a trypanocide programme. 
If part of the front can be protected by treatment of cattle with insecti-
cides, the overall recurrent cost will be reduced. If the barrier proves not to 
be effective, and regular expenditure on tsetse surveys and control operations 
is required, the overall recurrent expenditure could be increased. The 
realistic cost range of the tsetse control option is considered to be between 
Z$3 million and Z$5 million per year. 
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Financial analysis of preventing tsetse reinvasion 
The financial analysis of preventing tsetse reinvasion into the areas con-
sidered to be at risk within Zimbabwe involves comparing: 
• a recurrent cost of Z$4 million for preventing reinvasion; with 
• the cost of a trypanocide programme, which rises from Z$270 000 in Year 
One, to nearly Z$9 million in Year 20; plus 
• losses in cattle productivity rising from Z$167 000 in Year One, to Z$4.4 
million in Year 20. 
Over a 20 year period, the internal rate of return (IRR) on investment in the 
tsetse control strategy is 23.9% per year, which is highly acceptable. (Details 
in Barrett, 1994; Table H.6.) 
In the short term, annual outgoings on tsetse control are much higher than 
the savings in drug costs and productivity losses which would be incurred if 
tsetse control ceased. The financial position is at its worst in Year Three when 
the cumulative net cash flow is minus Z$8 million; this represents a substan-
tial financial burden in the analysis. From Year Four onwards, annual expen-
diture on tsetse control is lower than the combined cost of the trypanocide 
programme and productivity losses. From Year Six onwards, the trypanocide 
programme alone is more costly than the tsetse control option, regardless of 
cattle productivity losses. In the last four years of the 20 year period, the pro-
jected savings in drug costs are more than double the recurrent expenditure 
required to keep the area free of tsetse. 
At a 10% discount rate, the investment in tsetse control breaks even in 
Year 9, when the cumulative discounted cash flow is positive. 
This analysis strongly supports a strategy of preventing tsetse invasion into 
areas at risk in Zimbabwe. In view of the heroic assumptions involved, sensi-
tivity analysis is required, to test the robustness of the conclusions which 
derive from work by Barrett (1994; Table H.6, Appendix H). 
Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis looked at the following three parameters which are cru-
cial to the basic analysis: 
• growth in the cattle herd; 
• livestock productivity changes; and 
• the annual recurrent expenditure required to prevent reinvasion. 
Two scenarios (A and B) were considered. 
In Scenario A, the cattle herd growth was projected assuming the maxi-
mum stocking rate is 1.5 times the nominal carrying capacity (as in the basic 
analysis). This is realistic, if not conservative, since there are numerous com-
munal lands in Zimbabwe where stocking rates have been sustained over 
prolonged periods at double or treble the nominal carrying capacity. 
Scenario A could also reflect the likely consequences of a lower ceil ing on 
stocking rate, but a larger area at risk of invasion. 
Scenario B took a highly pessimistic view of future growth in the cattle 
herd within the area at risk of invasion, and assumed that the maximum 
stocking rate is equal to the nominal carrying capacity. 
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For each herd growth scenario, the projections were recalculated (Barrett, 
1994; Appendix H), with varying assumptions about changes in livestock pro-
ductivity (in the range 0-8%) and the annual cost of preventing reinvasion 
(between Z$3 million and Z$6 million per year). The resulting IRRs are sum-
marized in Table 1 0.2. 
The IRRs for Scenario B are generally in the range of 8-1 0% lower than for 
Scenario A. With the assumptions of the basic analysis (annual cost of preventing 
tsetse reinvasion: Z$4 million; livestock productivity losses: 2-4%), the IRR 
drops from 23.9% in Scenario A, to 15.4% in Scenario B (Table 1 0.2). This is a 
generally acceptable figure, suggesting that the viabi I ity of the tsetse control strat-
egy is robust with respect to projections of herd growth. 
If the annual cost of preventing tsetse reinvasion is varied by 20%, the IRR 
changes by a similar proportion. For example, in Scenario A, the IRR drops 
from 23.9% to 16.0% if recurrent expenditure on tsetse control is increased 
from Z$4 million to Z$5 million per year. Again, the cost-competitiveness of 
tsetse control appears robust. 
The basic analysis has assumed that productivity losses are in the range of 2-
4%. Taking the value of the annual output from communal cattle as Z$150 per 
year, the productivity losses account for almost 40% of the total cost of allowing 
tsetse reinvasion (Barrett, 1994; Table H.6, Appendix H). If such losses are 
assumed to be zero, tsetse control is not viable with low stocking rates (Scenario 
B) and only viable with higher stocking rates (Scenario A) if the recurrent costs 
can be kept down to about Z$3 million per year- a difficult but not impossible 
figure (Table 1 0.2). However, zero loss is an unrealistic assumption. 
Table 10.2 Sensitivity analysis: IRR* for preventing tsetse reinvasion in 
Zimbabwe, for varying assumptions about limits to herd 
growth, livestock productivity and control costs 
Assumed Annual cost Assumed level of impact on livestock 
maximum of preventing productivity of allowing reinvasiont 
stocking rate reinvasion 
(Z$million) 2 3 4 
SCENARIO A 1.5 times the 3 15.6% 26.0% 36.0% 55.3% 
nominal carrying 4 6.8% 15.9% 23.9% 38.8% 
capacity 5 neg 8.8% 16.0% 28.7% 
6 neg 3.0% 10.1% 21.6% 
SCENARIO B Equal to the 3 7.3% 17.6% 27.1% 45.3% 
nominal carrying 4 negt 7.3% 15.4% 29.7% 
capacity 5 neg neg 7.3% 20.1% 
6 neg neg 0.5% 13.0% 
* The IRRs were calculated using a spreadsheet model incorporating the analytical approach 
of Barrett (1994; Tables H.4 to H.6, Appendix H). 
t Losses in livestock productivity are assumed in relation to the trypanocidal regimes of 
Table 9.6 as follows: 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Regime 1 nil 1% 2% 4% 
Regimes 3,4 nil 2% 4% 8% 
t neg - negative IRR. 
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There would be productivity losses under tsetse and trypanosomiasis chal-
lenge and associated drug management: it is simply difficult to assess the 
likely magnitude. A range of 2% to 4% appears to be a conservative esti-
mate. Halving the projected productivity losses reduces the IRR in Scenario 
A from 23.9% to 15.9%. This suggests that the viability of tsetse control is 
reasonably robust in relation to assumptions about productivity losses. lt is 
plausible, and even probable, that losses would be significantly higher than 
have been assumed. Doubling the projected loss rates, to between 4% and 
8%, increases dramatically the viability of tsetse control; the strategy remains 
viable even in Scenario B with recurrent costs of tsetse control increased to 
Z$6 million per year (Table 1 0.2). 
The analysis so far has been optimistic about drug resistance and the poss-
ible need for higher dose rates of trypanocides, projected to begin in Year 11 
(Barrett, 1994; Table H.5, Appendix H). Since tsetse control breaks even in 
Year Nine (Barrett, 1994; Table H.6, Appendix H), it would still be viable 
even if drug resistance does not occur. On the other hand, more widespread 
drug resistance at an earlier stage would increase significantly the viability of 
tsetse control. 
Conclusions on the viability of preventing tsetse reinvasion 
in Zimbabwe 
A conservative approach has been taken in assessing the viability of prevent-
ing tsetse reinvasion in Zimbabwe. The basic analysis confirms that the cur-
rent national strategy of tsetse control is cost-effective compared with 
reliance upon trypanocides. Viability appears robust in relation to pessimistic 
assumptions about the crucial parameters. 
Other factors add weight to the conclusion that the Government of 
Zimbabwe's commitment to preventing tsetse reinvasion is justified: 
• no account has been taken of the likely impact of tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
challenge on other domestic livestock, in particular goats and donkeys; and 
• it has been assumed that human trypanosomiasis would not arise and 
indeed to date cases usually number 15 or less per year (MacKenzie and 
Boyt, 1974). This is in part because of limited man-fly contact; it is poss-
ible that human trypanosomiasis could increase if tsetse were allowed to 
become widespread in areas of settlement and cattle production. 
Approach to analysis 
As discussed in Section 2 (page 12), once the prevention of tsetse reinvasion 
has been justified, the financial analysis of further tsetse eradication does not 
require full costing of subsequent efforts against reinvasion. lt is necessary to 
consider only the costs of eradication, plus the costs of moving the existing bar-
rier, and any resultant changes in recurrent costs of preventing reinvasion. 
In Zimbabwe, little land is now left which is tsetse-infested, and where 
further reclamation could be justified by savings in drug costs and increased cat-
tle productivity. The main rationale for present operations is consolidation of an 
appropriate holding line, until regional eradication is in prospect. Accordingly, 
the following analysis is largely hypothetical and develops 'example' scenarios 
136 
based on Zimbabwean experience, which may be of relevance elsewhere in 
southern Africa- especially if the Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control 
Programme for Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe goes ahead, with 
possible extension to Botswana, Namibia and Angola. 
Two scenarios are considered, which represent operations in areas of dif-
fering carrying capacity. 
In Scenario A, the carrying capacity is 15 LU per sq km, which is typical 
of parts of Natural Regions Ill and IV. In Scenario B, the carrying capacity is 
1 0 LU per sq km. This might represent a low rainfall area. lt could also arise 
in higher rainfall areas, if cattle will be excluded from part of the area to be 
cleared of tsetse, for example in a national park, a wildlife utilization 
scheme, or an intensive irrigation project. 
Costs of tsetse control 
Three levels of expenditure on tsetse control are considered in the analysis. The 
low level is taken as Z$200 per sq km, reflecting the order of magnitude of costs 
of tsetse control by insecticidal treatment of cattle. The middle level of cost is 
taken as Z$600 per sq km, representing a target operation against mixed fly 
species, in a situation of average difficulty. The upper level is taken as Z$1 000 
per sq km, which is representative of an aerial spraying operation, where this 
would be feasible. The precise cost would depend on the specific circum-
stances of the operation (topography, fly density, ease of access, and so on). 
The cost of moving the target barrier is taken as the cost of uplifting 
(Z$3.95 per target), plus the cost of deployment (Z$15.20), minus the cost of 
servicing (Z$9.88) which is saved at the old position. The net cost is Z$9.27 
per target (Table 6.8). There is an additional cost of access provision at the 
new frontier. This is taken as Z$1875 per linear km (Barrett, 1994; Table G.1, 
Appendix G), minus the saving of Z$938 at the old line. The incremental 
indirect cost is Z$937 per km in the year of moving the barrier. If the barrier 
comprises 40 targets per linear kmJ the total cost of moving it amounts to 
Z$1308 per linear km of barrier. 
In the basic analysis, it is assumed that the length of the barrier to be moved 
is 40% of the area of the operation- so, for eradication in 1000 sq km, the bar-
rier length is 400 km. lt is further assumed that the new barrier position has the 
same length and recurrent maintenance cost as before movement. 
Costs of drug management of trypanosomiasis 
lt is assumed that trypanosomiasis is a sufficiently severe problem in the area 
of proposed tsetse eradication to require a prophylactic drug regime (Regime 
Three, Table 9.6) This, for example, occurred in Chesa and the Mid-Zambezi 
Valley in the 1980s (Section 9). In the basic analysis, no allowance is made 
for possible development of drug resistance, which is considered later. 
In the basic analysis, trypanocide requirements are calculated assuming 
that herd growth ceases when the carrying capacity is reached, and with the 
following assumptions about cattle numbers: 
Scenario 
Carrying capacity (LU/sq km) 
Initial cattle population density (LU/sq km): 
Annual herd growth rate (%): 
A 
15 
10 
5 
B 
10 
5 
10 (up to 7.5 LU per sq km) 
5 (thereafter) 
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Livestock productivity changes 
As above (page 133), it is assumed that the annual economic output of com-
munal cattle is Z$150 per animal and that productivity loss under tsetse chal-
lenge and drug treatment is 4% compared with the tsetse-free situation. 
Financial analysis of reclaiming land of carrying capacity 
15 LU per sq km (Scenario A) 
Using a simple spreadsheet (Barrett, 1994; Table H.7, Appendix H), the costs 
of tsetse control and barrier movement were compared with those of trypano-
cide use and loss in cattle productivity, leading to the calculation of IRRs for 
varying assumptions. 
The basic case 
At Z$200 per sq km tsetse control is very profitable even if the project life is 
only five years (IRR 19.4%). A target operation at Z$600 per sq km is viable 
for project life of 10 years or more in the basic analysis (IRR 11.2 to 14.4%). 
However, at Z$1 000 per sq km, tsetse control is not financially viable, even 
over a 20 year project life (IRR 7.4%). This suggests drug resistance would 
have to occur, assumptions about livestock productivity losses were more 
pessimistic, or other adverse reasons exist, before an aerial spraying oper-
ation could be justified with the assumptions of the basic analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis 
IRRs were recalculated assuming a 15 year project life, given that the finan-
cial viability does not change greatly between 10 and 20 year project life 
(Barrett, 1994; Table H.7, Appendix H). Table 10.3 summarizes the IRRs 
recalculated with varying assumptions about: 
• initial stocking rate (between 5 and 15 LU per sq km); 
• barrier length (between 20% and 60% of the operational area); 
• changes in cattle productivity (0-8%); and 
• development of drug resistance, from Year Zero to never, at a level requir-
ing five rather than three isometamidium treatments per year, and a double 
dose of diminazene as a sanative. 
The financial viability of tsetse control is highly dependent on the initial 
stocking rate (Table 1 0.3, Part A). Under the assumptions of the basic analysis 
(Barrett, 1994; Table H.7, Appendix H), tsetse control at Z$200 per sq km is 
not viable unless the initial stocking rate is at least 6 LU per sq km. 
However, the IRR increases to 53.4% if the area is fully stocked at the time 
of tsetse control. Tsetse control at Z$1 000 per sq km is only just viable if the 
area is fully stocked initially. 
Financial viability is affected greatly by the barrier aspect of the operation 
(Table 1 0.3, Part B). If the barrier to be moved is only half the length pre-
viously assumed, tsetse control is viable even at Z$1 000 per sq km. An equal 
increase in the barrier length would prejudice the viability of tsetse control at 
Z$600 per sq km but not at Z$200 per sq km. 
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Viability is highly sensitive to the assumptions made in relation to cattle 
productivity losses, except in the case of tsetse control at Z$200 per sq km, 
which remains profitable even if productivity losses are assumed to be zero 
(Table 1 0.3, Part C). Tsetse control at Z$1 000 per sq km becomes profitable 
if losses are above 7%. 
At the level of drug resistance considered, there is a significant, but not 
major, effect on the cost competitiveness of tsetse control (Table 1 0.3, Part D). 
However, even if drug resistance is anticipated in the immediate future, the try-
panocide strategy is still cheaper than tsetse control at Z$1 000 per sq km. 
Substantial parts of tsetse-affected southern Africa have carrying capacity 
of at least 15 LU per sq km. In such areas, tsetse control is a realistic alterna-
tive to the management of trypanosomiasis using drugs, provided that the less 
expensive techniques of tsetse control can be used. Where such techniques 
are not feasible, high-cost techniques such as aerial spraying will probably 
not be justified in terms of drug savings. At present, scientific evidence is 
insufficient concerning the magnitude of economic losses associated with 
changing cattle productivity. If such losses are higher than assumed above, 
the case for tsetse control at higher cost could be stronger. 
Table 10.3 Sensitivity analysis of the financial viability of tsetse 
reclamation in areas of carrying capacity of 15 LU/sq km 
A IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INITIAL STOCKING RATE 
Livestock units/sq km 5 7.5 10 
Cattle/sq km 7.1 10.7 14.3 
Cost of tsetse 200 8.1% 19.0% 30.4% 
control/sq km 600 0.1% 7.4% 13.8% 
1000 (4.1%)t 1.7% 6.3% 
B IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT BARRIER LENGTH 
Barrier length (km) as a 
proportion of eradicated area 20% 40% 60% 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 
600 
1000 
66.1% 
22.6% 
10.7% 
30.4% 
13.8% 
6.3% 
17.8% 
8.4% 
3.2% 
12.5 
17.9 
43.0% 
19.4% 
9.9% 
C IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LOSS OF CATILE PRODUCTIVITY 
Loss in cattle productivity under 
challenge/prophylaxis nil 2% 4% 8% 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 
600 
1000 
10.2% 
1.2% 
(3.5%) 
19.9% 
7.6% 
1.6% 
30.4% 
13.8% 
6.3% 
56.4% 
26.7% 
15.4% 
15 
21.4 
53.4% 
22.9% 
11.7% 
D IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG RESISTANCE 
Project year in which drug 
resistance begins to develop 0 5 10 15 Never 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 
600 
1000 
35.8% 
17.3% 
9.1% 
31.5% 
15.1% 
7.8% 
30.6% 
14.0% 
6.7% 
30.4% 
13.8% 
6.3% 
30.4% 
13.8% 
6.3% 
* Internal rates of return were calculated using the spreadsheet and assumptions of Barrett 
(1994; Table H.7, Appendix H) except where otherwise stated. All IRRs are based on a 15 
year project life. 
t Negative IRRs are indicated in brackets. 
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Financial analysis of reclaiming land of carrying capacity 
1 0 LU per sq km (Scenario B) 
The basic case 
In view of the findings for Scenario A, it is not surprising to find that tsetse 
control in Scenario B is not viable except where practicable for Z$200 per sq 
km or less, and the project life is at least ten years (Table 1 0.4, Part A). 
Table 10.4 Sensitivity analysis of the financial viability of tsetse recla-
mation in areas of carrying capacity of 10 LU/sq km:): 
Project life (years) 10 
A IRR* FOR VARYING LENGTH OF PROJECT LIFE 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 8.0% 
600 (2.1%) 
1000 (7.6%) 
15 
11.1% 
2.4% 
(2.3%) 
20 
11.9% 
3.8% 
(0.4%) 
B IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INITIAL STOCKING RATE 
Livestock units/sq km 5 7.5 10 
Cattle/sq km 7.1 10.7 14.3 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 
600 
1000 
11.1% 
2.4% 
(2.3%) 
17.9% 
6.0% 
0.2% 
24.5% 
8.9% 
2.0% 
C IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT BARRIER LENGTH 
Barrier length (km) as a proportion 
of eradicated area nil 20% 40% 
Cost of tsetse control/sq km 200 
600 
1000 
96.2% 
15.9% 
4.4% 
24.6% 
7.3% 
0.5% 
11.1% 
2.4% 
(2.3%) 
D IRR* FOR VARYING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF DRUG RESISTANCEt 
Project year in which drug 
resistance began to develop 0 5 1 0 
Cost of tsetse control per sq km 200 
600 
1000 
15.0% 
5.7% 
0.7% 
12.5% 
3.9% 
(0.7%) 
11.4% 
2.8% 
(1.8%) 
* IRRs were calculated using a modified version of the spreadsheet in Barrett (1994; Table 
H.7, Appendix H). The maximum stocking rate is set at 10 LU/sq km. In the basic scenario 
the initial stocking rate is 5 LU/sq km. Herd growth is projected at 10%/year up to 7.5 LU/ 
sq km and at 5% up to 10 LU/sq km, at which size the herd stabilizes. 
t For Part D of the table, drug resistance is assumed to develop at a constant rate, with an 
extra 10% of the herd requiring drug regimt:• four in successive years after first occurrence. 
Regime 4 (Table 9.6) is costed at Z$12.45/animal/year inclusive of manpower, vehicles and 
equipment. 
t Other assumptions are as in Barrett (1994; Table H.7, Appendix H) except where otherwise 
stated. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The initial stocking rate has a substantial effect on viability (Table 10.4, Part 
B). Even so, for tsetse control in the cost range of Z$600 to Z$1 000 per sq 
km the low ceiling on carrying capacity is crucial in constraining financial 
viability of tsetse control. 
Although the assumptions about the barrier have a significant effect on the 
cost of the tsetse control strategy, tsetse control is not viable even with no 
barrier present (ie a true 'eradication' operation) if the cost is Z$1 000 per sq 
km (Table 1 0.4, Part C). 
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The development of drug resistance would not have a major impact on 
viability, unless it occurred to a much more severe degree than has been 
assumed (Table 1 0.4, Part D). 
A carrying capacity of 10 LU per sq km could be argued for substantial 
areas of the southern African tsetse belt, especially if long-established 
parameters for carrying capacity are not reconsidered by land use planners. 
Where carrying capacity is as low as this, tsetse control is unlikely to be 
cost-effective compared with trypanocides, except in situations where: 
• low-cost tsetse control is feasible; 
• cattle are already present at overall population densities in the order of 5 
LU per sq km or above; and 
• other cost factors are favourable. 
Economic appraisal of tsetse contro l will be affected greatly by the assump-
tions made about carrying capacity of southern African savannas, and the 
cattle productivity benefits resulting from tsetse control in areas of small-
holder agriculture. There is an urgent need for technical investigation of these 
matters, to improve the basis for planning and appraisal of tsetse control 
operations in southern Africa. 
Introduction 
The tsetse control project at Senanga West (TCSW) was described briefly in 
Section 6 (pp 73-75) . An economic analysis of the stick-type targets devel-
oped at Senanga was presented in Section 7 (pp 96-99). 
The following analysis compares the cost of using trypanocides in the 
Phase Two area of the TCSW project (some 8000 sq km: see Figure 6.3), with 
the alternat ive strategy of using stick targets for tsetse control. As a case study 
of the economics of tsetse control, this serves a number of purposes: 
• since there is no pre-existing case for protection of a hinterland from tsetse 
reinvasion, the full costs of the invasion barrier have to be taken into 
account, including both establishment and recurrent maintenance costs; 
• it illustrates the impact of further economies in bait technology on the gen-
eral cost-competitiveness of tsetse control; and 
• it provides castings from outside Zimbabwe, and for another subspecies of 
tsetse fly. 
The objective in the present exercise is to evaluate the current technology, 
not the project, since mistakes have been made and are now recognized. For 
example, the initial target deployment method was selective treatment of 
woodland periphery. This approach seems not to have been effective. In 
consequence, tsetse eradication was not achieved w ithin one year. 
Subsequent operations involved deploying targets throughout all types of 
habitat, in a grid array along compass bearings. In the following analysis, the 
tsetse control strategy is costed assuming that it was designed and implemen-
ted with the present technology and procedures. 
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For the drug control strategy, the approach is to estimate the recurrent cost 
of trypanosomiasis control if there was no tsetse control in the area. The pre-
sent levels of challenge are affected by the activities of the TCSW. The num-
ber of cattle at risk and the level of disease challenge would be higher if 
tsetse control was abandoned. 
The evaluation is designed to provide a broad perspective on the econ-
omics of bait technology compared with reliance upon trypanocides. 
Accordingly, the costs of the two strategies are not disaggregated in detail. 
Budget figures are taken for items such as administrative and management 
overheads. However, the cost structure is intended to be comprehensive and 
realistic. As in the previous case studies, using budget figures facilitates sensi-
tivity analysis to explore the crucial assumptions. All costs are given in 
Zambian Kwacha (December 1991 prices), except where otherwise stated. 
The hypothesis being tested is that tsetse control using stick targets is now 
more cost effective than trypanosomiasis control using drugs. Therefore, 
assumptions made in the analysis are deliberately conservative (without being 
unduly pessimistic) with respect to the I ikely costs of tsetse control. 
The methodology of economic appraisal in this section is essentially the 
same as for sections 10.2 and 1 0.3, although the presentation of results is 
slightly different. lt is assumed in the following analysis that the annual costs 
and benefits are constant, so that it is unnecessary to construct year-by-year 
discounted cash flows over the lifetime of the project, leading to the calcula-
tion of an IRR. Instead, the constant recurrent costs are compared (as a 
simple ratio) with an annualized charge for tsetse control. This is calculated 
by converting the eradication costs to an 'annual charge' using a 'capital 
recovery factor', which is calculated using the discount rate (taken as 1 0%) 
and project life. 
This simplified technique was adopted as the analysis is based on data 
assembled during a visit to Senanga lasting only two weeks, in late 1991. 
Since some of the assumptions in the analysis are crude, the conclusions 
depend heavily on sensitivity analysis. 
Unlike the foregoing analysis in this section, the basic analysis below does 
not take account of possible changes in livestock productivity, as there was 
insufficient information readily available from which to assess the likely mag-
nitude or value of productivity changes. The viability of tsetse control is 
demonstrable even if losses are ignored under prophylaxis, compared with 
the tsetse-free situation. Relaxation of this severe assumption is considered 
later. 
The tsetse control strategy 
The following assumptions are made. 
Eradication would be achieved by deployment of stick targets at a rate of 
4 per sq km. A proportion of the targets would require revisiting during the 
year after deployment in order to clear vegetation. Otherwise the targets 
would not be revisited or recovered. 
Eradication would be achieved within the lifetime of the stick targets, esti-
mated at one year. A provision of ZK900 per target is made to cover 
materials, manpower and labour costs of deployment and servicing (Table 
7.4). The overhead provision is budgeted at 20%. The implications of higher 
overhead charges are examined later. For the present exercise, it is assumed 
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that the entire eradication phase is accomplished in one year. This is unrea-
listic in practice, but makes the cost modelling easier and does not greatly 
alter the analysis. 
A permanent tsetse barrier would be deployed around the treated area, 
comprising stick targets at 30 per linear km. These would be visited every 
four months-for maintenance. Software would be replaced annually and the 
poles replaced as required, during routine inspection. The barrier would start 
near Causeway on the Zambezi river, and proceed south along the river to 
the Senanga District boundary. From this point, it would cut west as far as 
the Kwando river floodplain (see Figure 6.3). The total length of the barrier is 
estimated at 180 km. In the basic case, no barrier is to be established along 
the Kwando river as TCSW management believe that the Kwando floodplain 
will be an effective natural barrier to fly invasion. The implications of this 
assumption being wrong are examined later. 
Table 10.5 Establishment costs of the TCSW tsetse control strategy (ZK, 
1991 prices) 
A ERADICATION 
Area to be eradicated (sq km) 
Targets deployed per sq km 
Annual cost per target 
Years to achieve eradication 
Direct cost of eradication 
Overhead cost of eradication 
Total eradication cost 
B BARRIER 
Length of target barrier (km) 
Targets per linear km 
Total number of barrier targets 
Materials cost per target 
Initial deployment cost per target 
Overhead cost of barrier establishment 
Total barrier establishment cost 
8000 
4 
900 ZK 
1 
3600 ZK 
20% 
34 560 000 ZK 
180 
30 
5400 
440 ZK 
374 ZK 
20% 
5 274 720 ZK 
C TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT COST OF THE TSETSE ERADICATION 
APPROACH 39 834 720 ZK 
Source Barrett (1992a). 
The costs for eradicating the 8000 sq km block and establishing the target 
barrier along the potential invasion fronts would amount to just under ZK40 
million (Table 1 0.5). This establishment cost translates to an annual charge 
ranging from ZK4.7 million to ZK1 0.5 million for project life varying 
between 5 and 20 years: 
Scenario 
Basic 
Pessimistic 
Optimistic 
Project life (years) 
10 
5 
20 
Annual charge (ZK) 
6 482 461 
10 507 708 
4 678 732 
Variation in the project life could reflect various circumstances. The first 
possibility is abandonment, if the project collapses due to inadequate funding 
or management. Another possibility is that future tsetse control operations, 
beyond the project area, remove the threat of fly reinvasion and trypanoso-
miasis challenge. The ecological and epidemiological factors contributing to 
the recent expansion of the fly belt into Western Province are not well under-
stood. lt is possible although unlikely that there could be a spontaneous con-
traction of the fly belt in the foreseeable future. 
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The recurrent costs of maintaining the barrier amount to just under ZK4 
million per year (Table 1 0.6, Part A). Other recurrent costs are budgeted at 
approximately ZK900 000 per year (Table 1 0.6, Part B). Taking into account 
the annual charge for the establishment phase (Table 1 0.6, Part C), the total 
annual cost of the tsetse control strategy would be ZK11 375 561 in the basic 
scenario (Table 1 0.6, Part D), of which recurrent costs account for 43%. 
Table 10.6 Cost summary for the tsetse eradication strategy (ZK, 1991 prices) 
A RECURRENT ANNUAL COSTS OF MAINTAINING THE BARRIER 
Annual materials cost per target* 
Manpower and vehicle costs per servicet 
Number of services per year 
Total recurrent cost per target 
Total number of barrier targets 
Sub-total A 
B OTHER RECURRENT ANNUAL COSTS 
Contingency provision for mopping up areas of fly reinvasion 
across the barrier+ 
Tsetse fly surveys~ 
Drug costs§ 
Management and overhead charges§§ 
Sub-total B 
C ANNUAL CHARGE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT PHASE 
Basic scenario (1 0 year project life)** 
Pessimistic scenario (5 years)** 
Optimistic scenario (20 years)** 
D TOTAL ANNUAL COST OF THE TSETSE CONTROL APPROACH 
Basic scenario (1 0 year project life) 
Pessimistic scenario (5 years) 
Optimistic scenario (20 years) 
* See Table 7.3. 
t Based on team productivity of 70 barrier targets serviced per day. 
440 ZK 
100 ZK 
3 
740 ZK 
5400 
3996 000 ZK 
90 000 ZK 
250 000 ZK 
157 500 ZK 
399 600 ZK 
897100ZK 
6 482 461 ZK 
10 507 708 ZK 
4 678 732 ZK 
11 375 561 ZK 
15 400 808 ZK 
9 571 832 ZK 
+ Provision is made for emergency control operations averaging an area of 100 sq km/year. 
Cost/sq km is taken as ZK900. lt is assumed that no incremental overhead costs would be 
incurred. 
~ Provision is made for 50 F3 traps costing ZK$1 000 per year for materials. Two full-time 
staff costed at ZK1 00 000 per year each are allowed for survey work. No additional 
vehicle is budgeted. 
§ Based on giving up to 2250 diminazene treatments per year. This represents 5% of the total 
cattle population in the protected area. 
§§ Overheads are a rough budget based on 1 0% of the direct recurrent costs of barrier 
maintenance. This is a sufficient sum to pay the full time salary of a Tsetse Control Officer 
(approximately ZK150 000), vehicle costs for supervisory visits, and a contribution to 
administrative overheads at Mongu. 
** Calculated using a 10% discount rate (see text). 
As the project life increases, the annualized cost of the eradication phase 
diminishes. Thus, in the optimistic scenario (20 year project life), the recur-
rent costs amount to 51% of the total annual cost of ZK9.57 million. The 
total annual cost for tsetse control in the pessimistic scenario increases to 
ZK15.4 million. 
The drug control strategy 
For trypanosomiasis management in Western Province, the Zambian 
Department of Veterinary and Tsetse Control Services (DVTCS) designates areas 
as having high, medium or low challenge. Under high challenge, cattle are 
given prophylaxis with four treatments of isometamidium per year plus an 
annual sanative treatment with diminazene (referred to as the '45 Regime'). 
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Under medium challenge, isometamidium treatments are reduced to two per 
year (the 25 Regime). Under low challenge, animals are treated with dimina-
zene, only when infected (the B Regime). The designation of areas to each of 
the treatment regimes is reviewed annually, or more often if required. 
In 1990, approximately 48 000 cattle were at risk of trypanosomiasis in 
Senanga West (Barrett, 1994; Table H.8, Appendix H, based on estimates by 
Or L. Schoonman, Acting TCSW Project Leader). Or Wiersma, the DVfCS 
Trypanosomiasis Officer for Western Province, estimated the number of cattle 
at risk as being 45 000. This lower figure will be used in the following analy-
sis, to be conservative. In the basic analysis no allowance is made for herd 
growth. 
The numbers of animals assigned to different drug regimes in 1991 
(Barrett, 1994; Table H.8, Appendix H) does not reflect the likely situation in 
the absence of the TCSW project. Firstly, the area of fly infestation would 
probably continue to expand, as it had been doing for many years before the 
project was established. Secondly, the level of disease challenge would prob-
ably be much higher. From discussions with Or Wiersma and other DVfCS 
staff in Mongu, it is estimated that 65% of the cattle at risk would require the 
45 Regime and the balance of 35% would be on the 25 Regime, in the 
absence of the TCSW project. 
In costing the trypanocides, the number of standard doses given per ani-
mal and number of treatments per year are as specified by the DVTCS. Drug 
costs are as calculated monthly by the DVTCS, from the latest available price 
for commercial supplies in Lusaka, plus 35% to cover handling and purchase 
overheads (1 0%), inflation (1 0%), ovrcs administrative costs (5%), and a 
drug retail margin (1 0%). 
With these assumptions, the trypanocides required in the project area 
would cost ZKl 0.9 million per year, and the annual expenditure inclusive of 
indirect and overhead charges would total ZK13.6 million (Barrett, 1994; 
Table H.9, Appendix H). 
The cost of trypanosomiasis surveys is not included in the analysis as this 
would also be required (possibly at a different intensity and cost level) under 
the tsetse control strategy. This omission probably weighs the comparative 
cost analysis slightly in favour of the trypanocide strategy. 
Comparative cost analysis of tsetse control versus reliance 
upon trypanocides in Senanga West 
The cost of the trypanocide strategy was compared directly with the cost of 
tsetse control strategy under varying scenarios (Table 1 0.7). 
Table 10.7 Cost comparison of tsetse control versus trypanocide strategies 
for trypanosomiasis control in Senanga West (Zambian 
Kwacha, December 1991 prices) 
Basic Pessimistic Optimistic 
scenario scenario scenario 
A Total annual cost of the drug strategy 13 590 000 13 590 000 13 590 000 
8 Total annual cost of the tsetse control strategy 11 375 561 15 400 808 9 571 832 
Cost ratio of drugs (A) to tsetse control (B) 119% 88% 142% 
Sources Table 10.6 and Barrett (1994; Table H.9, Appendix H). 
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In the basic scenario (ten year project life), reliance upon trypanocides is 
19% more costly than tsetse control. This contrasts sharply with the findings 
of the TCSW Phase One report, when it was calculated that chemotherapy 
could be carried out at 70% of the cost of tsetse control using S-type targets, 
albeit over a different project area (Willemse et al., 1989). The cost analysis 
was reworked assuming that S-type (swinger) targets were used instead of 
stick targets. The cost ratio of chemotherapy to tsetse control drops to 0.64 in 
the basic scenario. This indicates that the cost-competitiveness of bait tech-
nology in Phase Two was due principally to cost reductions in the target 
technology, and not due to economies of scale relating to the size of the pro-
ject area. 
In the pessimistic scenario (five year project I ife), the trypanocide strategy 
is still cheaper than tsetse control with stick targets (Table 1 0.7). 
Sensitivity analysis 
Length of the target barrier 
The recurrent costs of the tsetse control strategy represent about 50% of the 
total strategy cost. These recurrent costs depend principally on the number of 
targets in the barrier. Therefore, the cost-competitiveness of tsetse control is 
sensitive to assumptions concerning the barrier. There are two circumstances 
where the number of barrier targets may need to be increased substantially: 
firstly, if the 30 targets per km proves inadequate to prevent reinvasion; sec-
ondly, if the barrier has to be extended along the Kwando floodplain. 
Costs were recalculated assuming the barrier was extended by 80 km, i.e. 
the length of the Kwando floodplain within the Phase Two project area - an 
increase of 44% in the number of barrier targets. The analysis would apply 
equally to a barrier 180 km long with target density increased to 43 per lin-
ear km. Both the establishment and recurrent costs of the tsetse control strat-
egy are increased. With a ten year project life, tsetse control would be 1% 
more costly than the drug strategy. Economic viability in this case would thus 
be highly dependent on the project life. 
Reduced efficiency of the stick targets 
The analysis has assumed that the stick targets are technically equal, if not 
superior, to the previous S-type design. The analysis was reworked to evalu-
ate the implications of a decrease in technical performance of 20% as a 
result of the economies in target design, affecting both the eradication phase 
and the barrier. The result is that tsetse control would cost approximately the 
same as the trypanocide strategy, being only 2% more costly. Any evidence 
that the stick targets are more than 20% less effective than S-types would 
jeopardize the viability of tsetse control in Senanga West, with the cattle 
population and trypanosomiasis risk at 1991 levels. 
Increased manpower and vehicle costs 
The analysis was reworked to investigate the impact of increased costs of tar-
get deployment and servicing, resulting from increased labour costs or lower 
team productivity than has been assumed. 
With a 50% increase in manpower and vehicle charges, targets deployed 
in eradication would increase in overall cost by 23%, to ZK1 002 per target 
per year. Deployed in barriers, the annual charge would increase by 20%, to 
ZK874 per target per year. With a ten year project life, the trypanocide strat-
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egy would be then about 1% less costly than the tsetse control strategy. With 
a 20 year project life, reliance upon trypanocides would be 18% more costly 
than tsetse control. 
Increased overhead charges 
In the basic analysis, the overhead charges for tsetse operations were simply 
budgeted at 20%. Doubling the overhead charges would sti ll leave the tsetse 
control strategy 6% cheaper than the drug strategy. If overhead charges were 
trebled, drugs would become cheaper than tsetse contro l but by a compara-
tively small margin of 5%. 
Changes in cattle numbers 
The analysis so far has assumed that the number of cattle protected from try-
panosomiasis by tsetse control would be 45 000. This has tended to weigh 
the analysis against tsetse control - deliberately, in order to be conservative. 
lt is quite likely that the number of cattle at potential risk of trypanosomiasis 
would increase in the absence of tsetse control, by a combination of expan-
sion of the area under tsetse infestation, in-migration and natural growth in 
the cattle population. 
Jeanes and Baars (1991) studied the vegetation ecology and rangeland 
resources of Western Province. Drawing on this material, 5ikuleka and van 
Rootselaar (1991) concluded that the project area has sufficient grazing 
resources to support about 80 000 head of cattle, almost double the present 
herd size. They also concluded that there was little risk of environmental 
degradation on the flat Kalahari sands of 5enanga West. The main constraints 
to herd growth would be eventually the availability of forage and surface 
water. 
Considering the scope for herd growth, spreadsheet cost models were used 
to explore the situations where (a) the barrier length is increased to 260 km; 
(b) stick targets are assumed to be 20% less effective than 5-types; (c) man-
power and vehicle charges increase by 50%; and (d) overhead charges are 
trebled. The losses in cost-competitiveness due to these specified pessimistic 
assumptions would be entirely offset by an increase in the cattle herd to 
55 000 head, i.e. an increase of 22% in the herd . 
Change in the level of trypanosomiasis risk 
The analysis so far has assumed that, in the absence of tsetse control, 65% of 
the animals in the project area would be on a 45 drug Regime and the bal-
ance on a 25 Regime. Retaining this assumption, an increase in the cattle 
population at risk to only 55 000 head would be sufficient to make tsetse 
control viable under the pessimistic scenario of a project life of only 5 years. 
On the other hand, reduction in the level of disease challenge (recalcu-
lated for 30% of the herd on the 45 Regime, 30% 25 and 40% on the 8 
Regime) completely undermines the viability of the tsetse control option, 
except under optimistic assumptions about project life and herd growth. This 
emphasizes that level of disease challenge is of equal importance to number 
of cattle at risk in determining the cost-competitiveness of the two strategies. 
Thus, trypanosomiasis risk in the project area must be assessed carefully. 
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Taking livestock productivity into account 
The cost comparison of tsetse control and drug control in Senanga West has 
ignored possible differences in livestock productivity under the two strat-
egies. 
Wood (1989) estimated that the average annual economic output from 
cattle in Western Province was between 20% and 30% of the market value 
of an animal, taking into account milk, meat, manure and hide production, 
herd growth and provision of draught power for ploughing and transport. 
Mwafulirwa and Moll (1991) estimated the total gross average annual pro-
duction value from 503 000 cattle in Western Province in 1990 to be ZK427 
million, equivalent to ZK849 per animal. They used ZK14 per kg liveweight 
as the value of cattle, equivalent to a price of ZK4200 for a 300 kg animal. 
Thus Mwafulirwa and Moll's figures indicate that the value of annual econ-
omic output is about 20% of the average market value of an animal. 
At the time of the author's visit, the average price for cattle was about 
ZK19 per kg liveweight. Thus, economic output was probably about ZK1150 
per animal per year. For a cattle herd of 45 000 head, a 5% loss in pro-
ductivity would cost ZK2.59 million per year, which is almost 20% of the 
annual cost (ZK13.59 million) of the trypanocide strategy. Such potential 
losses would have a major effect on the economic analysis, favouring the 
tsetse control strategy even more strongly. 
When cattle productivity is taken into account, tsetse control may be cost-
competitive with drug control of trypanosomiasis at cattle densities signifi-
cantly lower than is suggested from consideration of drug costs alone. As 
mentioned in the context of Zimbabwe, this appears to be an appropriate 
matter for future investigation in more detail. 
Discussion 
The analysis in this section has demonstrated that the developments in bait 
technology since Phase One of the TCSW project have markedly improved 
the cost-competitiveness of tsetse control as an alternative to rei iance upon 
trypanocides. Tsetse control now appears to be a significantly cheaper 
approach than drug control in the area covered by Phase Two of the project. 
The financial viability of tsetse control in Senanga West appears fairly 
robust under sensitivity analysis. Pessimistic assumptions about the technical 
performance of the targets, the length of barrier required to prevent reinva-
sion, and overhead costs, would reduce the cost-competitiveness of targets 
close to the break even point with drug costs, but would not lead to a clear 
advantage of drugs over tsetse control. On the other hand, the viability of 
tsetse control is affected significantly by the project life and the level of dis-
ease challenge expected to prevail in the absence of tsetse control. A combi-
nation of adverse factors, particularly if the project life was short, would 
make the tsetse control option non-viable. A plausible increase in the cattle 
herd in the tsetse-affected area would offset such eventualities. 
The carrying capacity of Senanga West is about 10 animals per sq km, or 
approximately 7 LU per sq km. The present stocking rate is about half this 
level. The cost-competitiveness of tsetse control in this situation contrasts 
with areas of carrying capacity of 10 LU per sq km in Zimbabwe, where 
tsetse control using S-type targets costing Z$600 per sq km was not cost-com-
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petitive with reliance upon trypanocides. This prevailed even when reinva-
sion costs were not fully taken into account, and livestock productivity losses 
were imputed (Section 1 0, page 140 and Table 1 0.4, Part A). 
The apparent viability of tsetse control in Senanga West underlines two 
points. Firstly, continuing improvement in the economy of bait technology 
will extend the range of potential situations where tsetse control is viable. 
Secondly, costs vary significantly from one country to another and it would 
be unwise to extrapolate the findings of economic analysis in Zimbabwe 
elsewhere without detailed re-evaluation. 
The above case studies have all used 'market' prices for materials, manpower 
and other services to estimate the costs of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control. lt 
is outside the scope of the present report to present a rigorous and detailed 
'economic' as opposed to 'financial' evaluation (see Section 2, page 17). 
The economic comparative advantage of tsetse control in relation to trypa-
nocide use would vary according to the method of tsetse control, which has 
been discussed to a limited extent in Section 8 (page 1 07). The main price 
adjustments would be an increase in the price of imported goods and ser-
vices, to reflect overvaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar (and Zambian 
Kwacha), and a decrease in the price of unskilled and semi-skilled labour, to 
reflect the low opportunity cost of employing such people. 
The breakdown of costs between labour and imported chemicals is 
broadly simi lar for the trypanocide strategy and for tsetse control by treat-
ment of cattle with insect icide; in this case, an economic cost-comparison is 
unlikely to differ greatly from the f inancial analysis. The target technique is 
the method of tsetse control where cost-competitiveness w ith trypanocide 
use is more likely to be affected by shadow pricing. 
Manpower costs represent 72% of the costs of keeping a Zimbabwean tar-
get team in the field (Table 6.7) and 34% of the total direct costs of a target 
operation (Table 6.8). In Zambia, manpower costs represent about 55% of 
the field team costs (Table 7.4 : one visit per year) and thus over 25% of the 
total annual cost for a stick target deployed for tsetse eradication (Table 7.5). 
Manpower inputs to the drug strategy would be much less than this, while 
the cost of the imported drugs represents a high proportion of the overall 
cost. On balance, it seems that an economic analysis would favour a tsetse 
control using targets compared with a trypanocide strategy, more than would 
be the case in an evaluation using market prices. 
The policy of the Zimbabwe's Department of Veterinary Services towards 
control of animal trypanosomiasis is based upon tsetse control, because of 
the substantial area at risk of invasion by the fly. The above economic analy-
sis supports the general strategy of preventing f ly reinvasion. lt also provides 
a straightforward methodology for deciding w here and w hen it is appropriate 
to push back the tsetse f rontier. 
The sensitivity analyses presented in this chapter demonstrate the com-
plexity of appraising real situations. 
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Section 11 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Trypanosomiasis will remain a significant if not major constraint to rural 
development in tsetse-infested parts of southern Africa in the foreseeable 
future. With substantial assistance from a variety of international donors, 
national governments in the region are undertaking large programmes to con-
trol tsetse. The most notable among these programmes is probably the EU-
funded Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Programme, discussed 
in several earlier stages in the publication. Detailed economic investigation, 
through case studies, has enabled comparative cost analysis of the different 
techniques now available for control of tsetse and trypanosomiasis. 
Comparing different techniques for tsetse control 
An important conclusion is that, where they are feasible, the recently devel-
oped bait techniques for tsetse control (treatment of cattle with insecticide; 
targets) are generally cost-competitive with the longer-established techniques, 
i.e. ground and aerial spraying of insecticides (Section 8). Continuing 
improvement of bait techniques could further reduce the cost of tsetse con-
trol (Section 7). There are strong grounds for African governments and donor 
agencies to continue, and increase, their support to the development and 
implementation of tsetse control programmes based upon bait techniques. 
Urgent attention should be given to a detailed technical evaluation of 
tsetse control by treating cattle with insecticides. The objective should be to 
define reliable and least-cost procedures, and to better understand the scope 
and limits of the technique, particularly in relation to effects on the immune 
status of the cattle herd (Section 5). 
There is already a great deal of research being undertaken into the use of 
targets and traps for tsetse control. This research should continue. However, 
more attention should be given to designing modifications (and therefore 
appropriate experiments) which will improve the financial performance of 
the targets, rather than necessarily their technical performance. 
The study has shown that economic analysis can be useful in establishing 
the priorities for investigation, and should be a tool for the research scientist 
as much as for the senior manager of control operations. Tsetse scientists 
need to grasp and apply the rudiments of economic analysis, which is not an 
unreasonable challenge. Alternatively, the national institutions need to have 
professional economics backup within the organization. 
Increased attention should be given to improving the design and manage-
ment of operational aspects of tsetse control using targets (Section 7). The use 
of 'target team returns' for the monitoring and evaluation of the performance 
of field teams was described in Section 6. Technical monitoring of the per-
formance of targets and insecticide-treated cattle should also be introduced 
on a systematic basis. This would require different approaches from those 
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used to evaluate ground and aerial spraying operations, reflecting the con-
tinuous action of bait technology compared with the limited duration of 
ground and aerial spraying campaigns. 
The use of bait techniques for prevention of tsetse fly invasion will be an 
important aspect of future use of targets and the treatment of cattle with 
insecticides. This aspect requires urgent investigation, to enable the design of 
reliable and least-cost operations for various situations (Barrett, 1994; 
Appendix G). 
Because of factors other than cost, all four methods of tsetse control con-
sidered in this report are likely to be appropriate for use in some places, and 
under plausible circumstances, in the foreseeable future. However, ground 
and aerial spraying are likely to become less important than in the past 
(Section 8). These techniques are already well developed and further research 
is unlikely to result in major improvements in technical performance or great 
reduction in cost. Accordingly, they do not warrant major investment in 
further development at present. 
Tsetse control versus reliance upon trypanocides 
The analysis in Section 10 justifies the policy of the Zimbabwe Government, 
to rely upon tsetse control to prevent the fly occupying land at risk of 
invasion, in both financial and economic terms. However, in general terms, 
the choice between tsetse control and control of trypanosomiasis using drugs 
is complex. The relative cost of the two strategies depends greatly upon the 
specific circumstances. Important factors include: 
• the size of the existing cattle population density and its projected growth; 
• the present and future levels and distribution of tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
challenge; 
• the feasibility of alternative methods of tsetse control in the particular situ-
ation; and, 
• the projected recurrent expenditure necessary to keep the area fly-free. 
A methodology for economic analysis of eliminating tsetse flies from 
infested areas, as an alternative to relying upon drugs to control trypano-
somiasis, has been demonstrated in three examples: two from Zimbabwe and 
one from Zambia. These illustrate that tsetse control can be viable in semi-
arid areas with carrying capacity in the order of 10-15 LU per sq km, 
provided that the initial stocking levels are not low. Otherwise, using drugs 
to manage trypanosomiasis is the cheaper option, until cattle increase in 
number to the level required to justify tsetse control (Section 1 0). 
Simple versus complex modelling approaches 
Elsewhere in Africa, modelling approaches have been developed for econ-
omic evaluation of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control (pp 6-8). Such models 
are mostly sophisticated in comparison with the methodology used in the 
present study. Complex economic models are possibly appropriate for histori-
cal evaluations and strategic studies carried out by professional economists. 
In this context, further development of such models will be valuable. 
However, simpler approaches are needed for routine planning and appraisal 
of control operations and scientific research programmes (page 17). 
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Few senior staff in national tsetse control organizations have the time, 
ability or inclination to thoroughly understand sophisticated models for econ-
omic analysis of their decisions. lt is easy to arrive at incorrect decisions by 
applying a generalized model where the assumptions and structure of the 
model (perhaps not clear to the user) are invalid or inappropriate. lt would 
be expensive and impractical to design unique models for each situation, 
especially expensive as the models would have to be updated regularly. 
Procedures are needed which are easy to use and which give essential in-
formation to the manager, in a simple form which is relevant to the decisions 
he makes. This could mean building 'expert systems' into complex models, 
so that they are easier to use and meet the specific requirements of the user. 
Alternatively, it could mean deriving 'decision rules' by running the model 
under a range of plausible situations to identify key parameters which the 
planner can use as indicators of choice. These approaches have some poten-
tial. However, current knowledge of traditional cattle production systems in 
tsetse-affected southern Africa is inadequate to a point where sophisticated 
modelling approaches probably give a spurious sense of accuracy to econ-
omic analysis. A conclusion from the present study is that alternative 
approaches are appropriate, involving simple economic analysis, based on 
best estimates and approximations, with emphasis on sensitivity analysis of 
the assumptions which have been made. 
Costs and benefits can be approximated in terms of tsetse control costs on 
the one hand and drugs costs on the other, which can be estimated subjec-
tively or using separate technical models. Changes in livestock productivity 
can be assessed crudely and are not relevant to choice of strategy where sav-
ings in drug costs alone are sufficient to justify tsetse control. The practica-
bility and value of an approach based on simple models has been 
demonstrated in Part Two of this publication. 
Cattle productivity changes 
In some situations, the economic analysis will depend upon the assumptions 
made about productivity changes under trypanosomiasis challenge and drug 
treatment in comparison with a tsetse-free situation. This can arise whether 
the economic analysis uses a simple or sophisticated approach. Technical in-
formation in this area is simply lacking. Investigation is urgently needed into 
the productivity changes of animals, under different levels of disease risk and 
associated drug therapy, and under conditions of nutrition, husbandry and 
other environmental factors appropriate to traditional cattle production sys-
tems in semi-arid parts of southern Africa. 
Before productivity changes can be assessed, it is essential to understand 
the basic economics of cattle production in traditional farming systems of 
southern Africa. The productivity of cattle in communal farming systems in 
Zimbabwe may be significantly higher than has generally been recognized 
(Barrett, 1992; Scoones, 1992). Such a conclusion tends to increase the justi-
fication for government and donor support to communal cattle production. 
Formal surveys of cattle production in tsetse areas of Zimbabwe, carried 
out under the auspices of the TICS have proved useful for valuing pro-
ductivity changes which are assumed in economic analysis of tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis control. Similar studies are required in a much wider range 
of situations throughout the tsetse belts of southern Africa. 
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Assumptions about growth in cattle numbers and 
sustainability of cattle production 
The economic analysis of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control can be highly 
dependent on assumptions concerning the carrying capacity of tsetse-infested 
areas and the rate at which the cattle population will grow towards that level 
from the present herd size (Section 1 0). Experience in Zimbabwe suggests 
that, in frontier areas, the rate of herd growth is determined by transfers of 
live animals into the herd from other parts of the country and not principally 
by the reproduction of the herd. This may not be the case in other parts of 
southern Africa. Within realistic limits for the relevant variables, the econ-
omic analysis is less sensitive to the herd growth rate than to the maximum 
number at which the herd is assumed to stabilize. 
Farmers in Zimbabwe widely consider that official assessments of carrying 
capacity in the communal lands are far too conservative. Land use plans may 
be made, but they are unli kely to be accepted by farmers if they are not per-
ceived as realist ic. If farmers are right, then economic analysis based on 
official estimates of carrying capac ity w i ll undervalue the economic benefits 
of tsetse control. If fanners are w rong, and overstocking takes place, there is 
a risk of environmental degradation and eventual disbenefits as a result of 
promoting cattle development through tsetse and trypanosomiasis control. 
This is a crucial issue which has received much public debate but little for-
mal investigation. 
Environmental degradation after tsetse eradication 
In parallel with the economic studies presented in this publication, the author 
engaged in an interdisciplinary study of land degradation associated with 
agropastoral land use in a tsetse-cleared part of the Mid-Zambezi Valley 
(Barrett, 1994; Part 3). The principal conclusion from the study was that the 
Mid-Zambezi Valley (as represented by Chiswiti Communal Land) is indeed 
potentially suitable for agricultural development. lt does not appear to be 
valid to argue against settlement, and associated tsetse control programmes, 
on the grounds that the ecology of the area is inherently unsuited to small-
holder mixed farming. Although based only upon a limited exercise using 
rapid appraisal techniques, the study provided objective evidence that not all 
tsetse-infested parts of Africa are inherently marginal, and unsuited to agricul-
ture or cattle keeping - an argument often advanced by antagonists of tsetse 
control. 
The future sustainability of land use does not depend primarily upon the 
natural resource characteristics, but upon the prospect of : 
• limiting the human population density, particularly through immigration; 
and 
• introducing more intensive methods of agricultural production, which must 
be technically sustainable, financially viable, and, crucially, workable 
within the social and economic constraints of the people living in the 
Valley. 
As a general point, the linkage between the tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
situation and growth of cattle numbers appears weak. Cattle development in 
the Mid-Zambezi Valley seemed to be primarily dependent upon institutional 
and infrastructural development and the profitability of cash cropping. 
Successful farmers acquired cattle, and in the absence of tsetse control, were 
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able to protect them from trypanosomiasis using drugs. The concept of the 
tsetse fly as a 'protector' of infested areas does not appear valid in the Mid-
Zambezi Valley in Zimbabwe. 
The study showed that it is feasible and worthwhile for organizations 
which are involved in the funding or implementation of tsetse and trypanoso-
miasis control operations to address the issues relating to land use, using 
rapid appraisal techniques. Similar studies of the sustainability of cattle pro-
duction in other tsetse-infested parts of southern Africa are needed where 
large-scale programmes of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control are to be con-
sidered in this region. 
While the Chiswiti case study (Barrett, 1994) has shown that some areas 
which are currently infested with tsetse may be suitable for settlement and 
smallholder mixed farming, the study has equally demonstrated the need for 
careful attention to land use issues in areas where tsetse control is to be 
undertaken. The emergence of bait techniques for tsetse control gives pros-
pects of a new era in which operations can be planned in ways which will 
co-ordinate with rural development in the affected areas to a degree much 
greater than has proved possible in the past. In this context, it is appropriate 
to examine the scope for fundamental re-examination of the approach to 
tsetse and trypansomiasis control. 
The novel characteristics of bait techniques 
In the past, the planning of tsetse control operations has been dominated by 
several constraints, characteristic of the techniques available before bait tech-
nology was developed: 
• the problem of fly reinvasion has tended to favour large-scale operations; 
• ground spraying and aerial spraying are of very limited duration and sur-
viving flies can rapidly increase in number; therefore, tsetse control oper-
ations have generally been planned to achieve eradication rather than 
population suppression; and 
• neither ground nor aerial spraying operations offer much scope for partici-
pation or management by local farmers. Both methods require a high 
degree of central planning and co-ordination; they also involve specialized 
equipment and expertise. 
Perhaps the most significant feature of bait techniques for tsetse control is 
that they operate continuously. By contrast, ground and aerial application of 
insecticides take effect only for a short, finite period following the appli-
cation. Bait techniques thus provide scope for preventing fly movement into 
areas threatened by tsetse invasion, using target barriers or insecticide-treat-
ment of cattle along the fly front. With adequate resources and competent 
technical management, it should be possible to control and contain tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis more effectively and confidently than in the past. lt 
should, thus, be easier to consolidate existing positions and to reclaim further 
land from tsetse infestation, when and where it is appropriate and con-
venient. 
This implies that tsetse control operations should be planned and 
appraised in closer co-ordination with land use planning than in the past. 
Each new tsetse control operation should have an economic appraisal in 
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advance of implementation. This is not beyond the capability of national 
tsetse control organizations in Africa, if appropriate methodologies are used 
by managers with a basic knowledge of such analysis. 
The continuous operation and flexibility of operational design of bait tech-
niques for tsetse control allows tsetse population suppression as an alternative 
to eradication·. 
Bait techniques are not only flexible but also potentially simple to 
implement. Insecticidal treatment of cattle is very straightforward. The physi-
cal design of a target and the way it is used can be varied greatly from a 
sophisticated factory-produced version to a disposable low-technology ver-
sion which a farmer could make and use. Is it time to reconsider the role of 
Government tsetse control organizations in relation to the farmer as the pri-
mary agent of intervention and also of who should pay for tsetse control? 
Control or eradication 
Because bait techniques operate continuously, they enable a degree of con-
trol over the tsetse fly population density which is not feasible with ground 
or aerial spraying. lt may be worthwhile, in general or specific circum-
stances, to consider the possible merits of using bait techniques to suppress 
rather than eradicate a tsetse population. Such merits may include both cost-
effectiveness and sustainability. 
As shown in Section 8, the cost advantage of tsetse control over trypano-
somiasis control using drugs depends in part on the presence of a high level 
of trypanosomiasis challenge in the absence of tsetse control, which would 
result in high drug costs. Only a moderate reduction in potential disease 
challenge is necessary in order to bring drug costs down substantially and 
render eradication non-viable. This could be achieved by deployment of tar-
gets throughout the tsetse-affected area at a much lower density than 
required for eradication. Alternatively, only a proportion of the cattle need be 
treated with insecticide. On the one hand, the tsetse suppression programme 
would have to be permanent. On the other hand, a barrier to prevent rein-
vasion would not be needed. 
Tsetse suppression should be obviously considered when eradication is in 
any case not financially viable, for example, because of a long front to be 
protected from reinvasion, or where there is a low cattle population density. 
Suppression should also be considered where the viability of tsetse control 
depends on the assumption of a high level of drug use, in the absence of 
such control. 
The level of optimum suppression is such that expenditure on further sup-
pression would not result in a net saving in drug costs, i.e. an 'economic 
threshold' approach to pest and vector management. 
The ramifications of such a change in philosophy towards tsetse control 
would be substantial. In particular, because the scheme is permanent it 
would provide a realistic basis for developing a community participation 
approach to tsetse control (page 156). 
The design of a tsetse suppression programme needs better information 
than presently available concerning the technical performance of targets at 
deployment rates lower than used for eradication. Also, better data concern-
ing the likely effects of such deployment on trypanosomiasis epidemiology 
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and tsetse ecology are needed, to assess the optimum level of intervention. A 
new area of research would be necessary to generate the required infor-
mation. 
Tsetse suppression in areas peripheral to the tsetse-free area would have 
added advantages to the longer term strategy of eradication. Firstly, potential 
problems of reinvasion of the eradication block will be reduced. Secondly, 
when the time is right to move the tsetse front forwards, the fly population 
will already have been reduced in the next zone to be eradicated. 
Farmer participation in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control 
Relevant experience in West and Central Africa 
The idea of farmers participating in tsetse control is new in the context of 
southern Africa and the control of animal trypanosomiasis (Salmon and 
Barrett, 1994). However, it is a long-established concept elsewhere in Africa, 
where local people are actively involved in the control of riverine species 
(mainly the palpalis group) of tsetse where they transmit human trypano-
somiasis (Laveissiere et al., 1985, 1986 and 1989; Laveissiere, 1987; 
Gouteux et al., 1987; Leygues and Gouteux, 1989; Okoth, 1985; Lancien et 
al., 1989). 
Farmer participation has become less enthusiastic once incidence of sleep-
ing sickness has declined (e.g. Gouteux and Sinda, 1990), but there is usually 
little difficulty in getting people to co-operate in community health projects. 
Now, with odour-bait techniques for tsetse control, similar farmer participa-
tory schemes for control of savanna tsetse and animal trypanosomiasis may 
be in prospect in southern Africa. 
Recent experience in eastern and southern Africa 
A few large-scale commercial ranches in Kenya and Tanzania have already 
tried bait technology for tsetse control, instead of relying upon trypanocidal 
drugs. Perhaps the more interesting prospect is whether bait technology is 
appropriate for use by smallholders in traditional African farming systems. 
At Nguruman in Kenya, a highly successful research project under the aus-
pices of the International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) 
has pioneered a method of trapping tsetse flies with community participation 
(Brightwell et al., 1987; Mutuku-Mutinga, 1987; Otieno and Dransfield, 
1990). The project aims to control rather than eradicate tsetse, by developing 
a technology with minimal inputs external to the village, and which local 
people can implement and manage. The design is based on a trap rather than 
a screen, so that commercial insecticide is not needed. Highly expensive 
imported odour attractants were substituted by ox urine, which had to be 
replenished frequently. The trap could be made by farmers using materials 
readily available in the rural areas. The rationale for the project was that 
low-technology, community-based control has a high chance of being both 
successful and sustainable. 
The issue of social and institutional feasibility 
The Nguruman trap appears much less efficient than a Zimbabwe-type target, 
but has proved technically effective in reducing the disease challenge. The 
financial viability of the technique has not yet been fully proven, but the 
trapping approach may prove cost-effective because the technology is com-
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paratively cheap. Perhaps the greater question mark over the feasibility of 
using the Nguruman approach to control tsetse at other locations concerns 
the social aspects of this type of operation. 
As livestock grazing areas are often communal, the technique cannot be 
used effectively by individual farmers. A high degree of co-operation is 
required, botli in setting up the operation and in maintaining control once 
the traps are deployed. A collaborative project involving ICJPE and NRI was 
in progress at the time this publication was prepared examining social and 
economic aspects of this approach to tsetse control in Kenya. 
The Nguruman approach is not the only way of involving farmers in tsetse 
control. Tsetse control programmes can be designed with a range of differing 
levels of community participation. For example, an approach intermediate 
between the Zimbabwe and Kenyan philosophies of bait technology has been 
explored at the Belgian Animal Disease Control Project near Chipata in the 
Eastern Province of Zambia (Gorissen, 1988). Tsetse were controlled using 
targets rather than traps, using commercial insecticides and selected attract-
ant odours which were supplied by the project. The local farmers were 
involved in the manufacture and maintenance of the targets, which used 
bamboo poles to replace the metal frame of the commercial Zimbabwean 
target. 
Different approaches are appropriate in different situations, and the choice 
should be based on an understanding of the prevailing social system. This 
underlines the need for increasing inputs from social scientists into the plan-
ning and appraisal of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control programmes in 
southern Africa, as argued at greater length by Salmon and Barrett (1994). 
Who pays for tsetse control? 
From the Government's viewpoint, an important advantage of farmer partici-
pation in tsetse control is that it involves contribution from the beneficiaries, 
and in principle should reduce costs to the public sector. However, it is 
unreasonable to rely upon farmer involvement and financial responsibility in 
all situations. The scope for farmer participation in an eradication or barrier 
operation is limitedi for the following reasons. 
In eradication operations, co-ordinated action is required over a large 
area, with a high degree of central control to ensure that eradication is 
achieved efficiently. Small pockets of surviving flies will jeopardize the entire 
operation. Planning, control and conduct of strategic operations cannot be 
handed over to local committees. 
In barrier operations, the beneficiaries include people well behind the 
operational front, living in the tsetse-free areas which are being defended 
from invasion. The burden of financing or maintaining the barrier should not 
fall only on those farmers who are living in the immediate vicinity of the bar-
rier. They probably benefit the least, since the incidence of trypanosomiasis 
is likely to be higher along the barrier than some distance behind it, because 
of the tsetse which penetrate the barrier and transmit trypanosomiasis before 
being killed. 
These circumstances provide the classic argument for public (i.e. 
Government) responsibility for control of diseases of strategic importance. 
Care is required in trying to 'involve farmers' for the sake of it. Farmers 
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greatly appreciate being consulted and informed about Government pro-
grammes but they value their time and will become disenchanted and dis-
interested if they are being used as free labour for someone else's benefit. 
By contrast, farmers obtain direct benefits from a nearby tsetse suppression 
programme. Therefore they can be reasonably expected to participate in the 
planning, funding and conduct of such operations. 
Scope for a new approach 
A new philosophy of tsetse control could embrace all of the issues discussed 
in this section: in appropriate areas, tsetse would be controlled by farmers, 
with minimum support from a small public sector agency which operates as 
an extension unit. The staff of this unit would act as technical advisors, 
encouraging and assisting local farmer groups to plan their own programmes 
of intervention, to co-ordinate different farmer groups, organize any necess-
ary commercial inputs (e.g. odours, insecticides) and run training courses. 
Tsetse control would be a patchwork of localized tsetse suppression pro-
grammes. 
Such an extension unit could operate within a national organization 
already undertaking large-scale operations funded by the public sector and 
carried out by government employees or contractors. Countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Zambia, where continuing programmes of strategic control 
and containment of tsetse appear necessary, would be good candidates for 
such an approach. 
In other southern African countries, such as Mozambique, which lack the 
financial and institutional base necessary for large-scale public sector oper-
ations, a tsetse extension unit could represent an inexpensive and effective 
way of promoting livestock health and production in tsetse-affected areas 
without heavy reliance on trypanocides. Apart from the short-term benefit to 
people living in such areas, such initiatives could prepare the way for longer 
term tsetse and trypanosomiasis control programmes. 
However, before introducing this type of approach, further social study is 
required concerning farmer participation in tsetse control. Scientific research 
into trypanosomiasis epidemiology and tsetse ecology is also needed where 
tsetse populations would be suppressed using different techniques. 
The importance of economic analysis in planning and appraisal of tsetse and 
trypanosomiasis control is widely acknowledged, and a number of economic 
studies have now been completed in various parts of Africa (Barrett, 1991 ). 
However, many African countries have given insufficient priority to develop-
ing their own institutional capability for veterinary and livestock economic 
analysis. More attention needs to be paid to developing such capability 
within the continent, by establishing and strengthening national veterinary 
economics units, with or without setting up regional units to provide econ-
omics support to national agencies. The remainder of the Section considers 
this need in more detail. 
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Limitations in studies carried out to date 
As with previous long-term economic studies of trypanosomiasis control (e.g. 
jahnke, 1974; Putt et al., 1980; Brandl, 1989), the Zimbabwe study was 
essentially a research project of fixed duration, with specific objectives to 
address certain issues. Strategic economic studies of this nature provide valu-
able insights into strategy and policy. However, such studies almost inevitably 
tend to be ex post (hindsight) evaluations of completed operations as 
opposed to ex ante (foresight) appraisals of planned operations. 
The detailed and rigorous methodologies that tend to emerge from ex post 
analysis are often too sophisticated and data-demanding for application by 
trypanosomiasis control organizations for routine ex ante appraisal, especially 
if the planner or manager has little, if any, background in economics. The 
entire rationale for development of economic methodologies for improved 
resource management disintegrates if there is no effective translation of econ-
omic research into the world of the tsetse control practitioner. 
The power of economic analysis rests in improving not our hindsight, but 
our foresight- the money spent on economic analysis is wasted if it does not 
improve our ability to make better decisions in the future. This is a lesson 
well understood by the international agencies and donors, who widely 
employ economists to participate in decision-making over resource alloca-
tion. But where are their counterparts in the trypanosomiasis control agencies 
of the African nations? 
African countries with substantial tsetse and trypanosomiasis control oper-
ations should develop their own institutional capability for economic analysis 
of their activities. Indeed, Zimbabwe is already moving in this direction. 
Donor agencies should consider whether future economics support to tsetse 
and trypanosomiasis control should place more emphasis on institutional 
development, and less on strategic studies and policy analysis by external 
organizations. 
Institutional development 
There are several ways in which African nations, possibly with donor assist-
ance, could develop their own capability for economic monitoring, evalu-
ation and appraisal of their trypanosomiasis control operations. These 
include: 
• giving economics training to senior technical staff in trypanosomiasis con-
trol organizations; 
• strengthening economics capability within the country outside the tsetse 
control agency; and 
• establishing regional units with a mandate to provide economics support to 
member nations. 
Each option has limitations and none can be preferred universally. 
Development of an economics capability within the trypano-
somiasis control agency 
Few tsetse and trypanosomiasis control organizations in Africa could justify 
the permanent recruitment of an economist. The work load may not be full-
time. In the era of structural adjustment, African governments are trying to 
cut down their expenditure on the civil service, and funding for additional 
staff is hard to find. Even if this were feasible, such a post creates substantial 
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institutional problems. The economist has little prospect of promotion within 
the organization and so is likely to leave in due course, to advance his career 
elsewhere. Continuity of economics support is therefore unlikely. 
The alternative is to identify suitable technical staff within the organization 
to whom economics training can be given. This has merits in that career 
prospects for such individuals are likely to be enhanced within the organiz-
ation rather than hindered. The disadvantage is that such staff may be able to 
carry out relatively routine cost analysis and even rudimentary benefit-cost 
analysis but will not have sufficient time, expertise or experience to carry out 
in-depth strategic studies and policy analysis which may be needed. 
Development of an economics capability outside the 
national trypanosomiasis control agency 
Many trypanosomiasis control organizations have close links to a veterinary 
department which usually also lacks a much-needed capability for economic 
analysis. There is scope to establish or strengthen veterinary economics and 
epidemiology units in tsetse-affected countries, and to improve the insti-
tutional linkage of such units to the trypanosomiasis control organization. 
This is one part of the approach being adopted in Zimbabwe. In other 
African countries alternative institutional linkages may be appropriate, for 
example with government units concerned with livestock development plan-
ning, or monitoring and evaluation of other agricultural pests and vectors. 
The disadvantage of this arrangement is that the economists in such a unit 
are likely to be involved in a wide range of livestock disease issues other 
than trypanosomiasis. They may find themselves too heavily involved in 
other areas of work to provide the support required by the trypanosomiasis 
control organization, which will not have direct control over these staff. 
Development of a regional-based economics capability 
specifically for trypanosomiasis control 
A third possible approach is to consider the establishment of regional units to 
provide economics support to several national trypanosomiasis control organ-
izations. Such regional units could be funded by member countries, or 
through donor agencies, and should be staffed by nationals from the region. 
Economics support on a regional basis would make most sense in the con-
text of other arguments for establishment of regional units to support national 
tsetse and trypanosomiasis control agencies. The present report has been con-
cerned with economic aspects of tsetse and trypanosomiasis control, but 
there are numerous other issues which will become increasingly important in 
planning and appraisal of control operations. These issues are equally diffi-
cult for individual agencies to handle adequately with their own scarce staff. 
They will include social issues, land use, environmental impact assessment 
and regional collaboration where operations cover more than one country. 
Reliance on independent research and advisory organiz-
ations 
The last alternative is for African governments to continue relying upon inde-
pendent organizations for economics support in tsetse and trypanosomiasis 
control. This could include bilateral and multilateral donor funding of 
research institutes or consultancy companies in Africa or elsewhere. As was 
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discussed earlier, such sources of expertise and advice can be effective in 
addressing strategic issues, but are not well placed for assisting in routine 
economic support. 
The best solution may be a mix of assistance 
The alternatives discussed above are not mutually exclusive. A trypanosomia-
sis control organization could give its senior staff economics training to 
enable them to undertake cost analysis for operational planning, while rely-
ing on external support, from a veterinary economics unit or a consultancy 
source, for its strategic study needs. 
Final comments 
Tsetse and trypanosomiasis control is not an end in itself, but merely one ele-
ment of an overall approach to rural development in which the emphasis 
must be upon on sustainability. This requires improving the co-ordination 
between the planning and appraisal of tsetse control operations and rural 
development planning, in particular land use planning. In practice, this co-
ordination is difficult to achieve. The institutional capability of trypanosomia-
sis control organizations needs to be strengthened in the sphere of agricul-
tural economics. This should contribute to more effective communication 
and liaison between the trypanosomiasis control organization and other rural 
development agencies. In this context, the economist has a constructive role 
in promoting a sustainable future for rural people in tsetse-affected parts of 
Africa. 
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Appendix 1 
The use of helicopters for dealing 
with rugged terrain 
In July and August 1989, a trial was carried out under the auspices of the 
RTICP Aerial Spraying Research and Development Project (ASRDP) at 
Shamrock Mine on the Zambezi escarpment in northern Zimbabwe, to test 
the technical feasibility of using helicopters for the sequential aerosol tech-
nique (SAT). The following cost analysis is based on the experience of that 
trial. 
Technical details of the trial 
The trial was located in the Chewore Safari Area, an uninhabited area of very 
rugged terrain and difficult access, bordering on Mukwichi Communal Land. 
An area of 126 sq km was treated with endosulfan (Hoechst Zimbabwe Ltd), 
applied in three cycles of 24 glha and a fourth cycle at 20 glha. A Bell 206 
jet Ranger 11 was used, fitted with two Micronair AU 4000 atomizers. 
The helicopter proved capable of spraying the area as planned and the 
results were encouraging. The insecticide was delivered with a satisfactory 
droplet spectrum, and the droplets reached the tsetse habitat. Entomological 
studies were inconclusive, in view of the small size of the trial block, and 
the limited resources available for fly surveys. However, reductions in the fly 
numbers were sufficient to justify further trials of the technique in the future. 
Cost analysis of the helicopter trial 
The main costs of an SAT operation are for the insecticide and the flying 
charges (Table 4.6). Hourly hire rates for helicopters (Z$1467 per hour in 
Zimbabwe, 1990 prices) are not significantly greater than for fixed-wing air-
craft (Z$1245 per hour) but air speed is significantly lower. The fixed-wing 
aircraft used for aerial spraying in the Zambezi Valley in 1987 and 1988 flew 
at air speeds in the order of 250 km/h, covering abut 30 sq km per hour of 
flying time, with operational efficiency of about 45%. In the Shamrock Mine 
trial, the Bell jet Ranger achieved an overall average speed during spraying 
of approximately 135 km/h, covering only 11 sq km per hour of flying time, 
with operational efficiency of about 43%. 
These figures are equivalent to a flying charge of Z$220 per sq km for five 
spraying cycles with fixed-wing aircraft compared with Z$667 using a heli-
copter, or Z$534 if only four cycles were carried out. 
Insecticide application rates probably need to be higher in rough terrain, 
as the helicopter has to fly higher above the ground than is possible over flat 
terrain and droplet penetration is not as effective or as even. Endosulfan 
applied at 30 g a.i./ha over four cycles would cost Z$387 per sq km. The 
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combined cost of insecticide and variable flying charges for a four-cycle heli-
copter SAT operation in rough terrain would thus amount to Z$921 per sq km 
compared with Z$51 0 for fixed-wing aircraft operating over flat ground (basic 
scenario, Table 4.6). The first conclusion is that it is not cost-effective to use 
helicopters in SAT operations where fixed-wing aircraft can be used. 
Mobilization, demobilization and other fixed overheads would be already 
committed where a large-scale aerial spraying operation is already under 
way, including the use of a helicopter for ferrying beacons and other field 
equipment. In this case, the marginal cost of using such a helicopter for 
spraying small areas of rugged terrain would be less than calculated above. 
In effect, the operational efficiency would be improved if the helicopter was 
already on site for other duties. On the basis of the Shamrock Mine trial, it is 
estimated that a helicopter used in this way could increase its operational 
efficiency to about 55%. This reduces the combined insecticide cost and fly-
ing charge down to about Z$720 per sq km. 
As a marginal cost, this compares favourably with the average overall cost 
of a fixed-wing operation (Table 4.6). Inclusion of helicopter SAT spraying in 
an operation would have to be considered in relation to alternative tech-
niques (targets, ground spraying) available for dealing with isolated areas of 
rough terrain. In circumstances where helicopter spraying proved the only 
practicable method, it should not be ruled on grounds of cost. Further 
research and development is required to explore the technical feasibility of 
the technique, to establish recommended operational procedures and to 
define the limits of application. 
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Appendix 2 
Treatment of Cattle with 
Insecticides: Supplementary Case 
Studies 
Costing of the manufacturer's recommendations for 
treatment of cattle with deltamethrin 
Deltamethrin is a synthetic pyrethroid insecticide manufactured by Rousell 
Uclaf. lt is formulated in Zimbabwe, and available through Cooper 
(Zimbabwe) Ltd, as two proprietary products used for tsetse control: 
Decatix: 5% mass/volume, for use as dipwash or spraywash: the Zimbabwe 
Government Tender Board price was Z$125 per litre in 1990; and 
Spoton: 1% mass/volume, for use as a pour-on treatment: the Zimbabwe 
Government Tender Board price was Z$46 per litre in 1990. 
Recommendations for dipping 
The recommended application is to dip cattle fortnightly in a suspension of 
37.5 ppm deltamethrin, requiring 1 litre of Decatix per 1333 litres of water. 
The capacity of a typical dip tank is about 15 000 litres, requiring 11.25 litres 
of the formulation in the initial filling. The manufacturers recommend replen-
ishment at the rate of one litre of Decatix to 1100 litres of water added. 
Assuming each animal removes approximately 2 litres of solution per dip-
ping*, the insecticide usage is about 1.8 ml of undiluted Decatix (90 mg of 
deltamethrin) per animal treatment. The alternative basis for replenishment, 
given by the manufacturers, is to add 225 ml of Decatix to the tank for every 
100 head of cattle dipped. This is equivalent to 28.13 cents per animal per 
treatment, or Z$ 7.31 per animal per year for 26 treatments. 
Recommendations for treatment by pour-on 
The recommendation for the pour-on formulation, Spoton, is a monthly appli-
cation of 1 ml per 10 kg of liveweight, requiring about 30 ml of Spoton per 
adult animal*, costing approximately Z$1.38 per animal per treatment of 
30 ml. 
Initially, the pour-on formulation was applied at the same frequency as the 
dipping regime (26 treatments per year). However, the pour-on application is 
more persistent than the dip treatment. Consequently, the treatment interval 
*The average liveweight for Shona cattle in the Zambezi Valley is about 280 kg for cows, 350 kg for adult 
males, and about 300 kg for all adults. 
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was extended to one month with satisfactory tick and tsetse control. On this 
basis, the cost was Z$16.56 per animal per year, 2.27 times higher than the 
cost of fortnightly dipping. 
Recommendations for treatment by spraywash 
Although acaricides are not normally applied in Zimbabwe by spraying, th is 
method is used in other countries. An appropriate procedure has been 
suggested by the manufacturers (A. Wi lson, personal communicat ion). The 
deltamethrin solution is made up at a strength of 0.005% a.i., by diluting 
commercial Decatix at one part of the concentrate to a thousand parts of 
water. Each animal is sprayed until the solution runs off, requiring an esti-
mated 5 litres of solution (5 ml of concentrate) per adult animal per treat-
ment, including an allowance for wastage. This regime requires 26 
treatments per year, at a total annual cost of Z$16.25 per animal. 
The manufacturers suggest that an alternative monthly regime with delta-
methrin at a strength of 0.01% a.i. would have equal efficacy. The acaricide 
cost would be the same but delivery costs would be reduced. 
Costing of conventional acaricidal treatment 
Cattle dipping in Zimbabwe 
Livestock production in Zimbabwe is seriously threatened by tick-borne dis-
eases, including anaplasmosis, babesiosis, cowdriosis and theileriosis. For 
much of this century, the Government has implemented a successful policy 
of nationwide tick control through intensive dipping. The requirements for 
dipping are stipulated in the Cattle Cleansing Regulations of 1976, and are 
implemented through the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS). Whereas 
the maintenance and operation of dip tanks in the commercial sector is in 
the hands of the farmer, the DVS operates some 2450 dip tanks distributed 
throughout the Communal Lands, providing a service to about 3.9 million 
cattle in 1988/89. 
At each dip tank, the DVS provides acaricide, a dip attendant who may 
serve several dip tanks, and one or more water carriers. The Cattle Cleansing 
Regulations require that cattle within the area serviced by a dip tank are pre-
sented there at a designated time interval. Stock registers are maintained by 
the dip attendant. Records are generally well kept in Zimbabwe. In principle, 
the dipping interval is weekly from November to June, and fortnightly for the 
rest of the year. This amounts to 42 immersions per year. 
Although the Cattle Cleansing Regulations have not been formally 
amended, the DVS has been exploring the scope for moving away from so-
called intensive dipping, as outlined above, to so-called strategic dipping, 
with less frequent treatment, as discussed further below (Perry et al., 1990). 
Conventional acaricides used in Zimbabwe 
The main acaricides used at DVS dip tanks in Zimbabwe are amitraz (Triatix, 
Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd) and dioxathion (Delnav, Cooper Zimbabwe Ltd) . 
Dioxathion is an organophosphorous acaricide, which has been used 
extensively in Zimbabwe during the last ten years. Results have been very 
satisfactory but the chemical presents management problems. Because of the 
limited protective period, cattle require to be treated every two weeks in the 
dry period and weekly during the rains, a total of 42 times per year. 
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Maintenance of accurate dip strength can be problematic. The DVS is con-
cerned about possible development of acaricide resistance in ticks through 
use of understrength dips. Dipping with dioxathion was estimated by the 
DVS to cost approximately 5.38 cents (1990 prices, Z$) per treatment, equiv-
alent to Z$2.26 per animal per year for 42 treatments (F.S. Dune, personal 
communication). 
Amitraz (amidine) is a more recently developed acaricide, with a better 
protective period. Current practice in Zimbabwe is to give 26 treatments per 
year. Triatix is a 'total replenishment' formulation which means that dipwash 
is made up to strength at each occasion; its concentration is thus easier to 
control. In 1989, approximately 85% of the DVS dip tanks were using ami-
traz, which is steadily replacing dioxathion. Dipping with amitraz was esti-
mated by the DVS to cost approximately 10.7 cents (1990 prices, Z$) per 
treatment, or Z$2.78 per animal per year for 26 treatments (F.S. Dune, per-
sonal communication). 
Historical expenditure by the DVS 
Perry et al. (1990) assessed the costs of the dipping service in Zimbabwe, as 
part of an evaluation of the DVS strategy for tick and tick-borne disease con-
trol.* In 1988/89, the annual recurrent cost was Z$24.5 million, equivalent 
to Z$6.28 per animal, inclusive of overhead costs (Table A2.1 ). The major 
cost item was acaricide, accounting for just over 40% of the costs including 
overheads. The average expenditure on acaricide averaged only Z$1.77 
(1990 price) per animal, compared with the costs of Z$2.26 to Z$2.78 esti-
mated above for the recommended treatment regimes. 
Table A2.1 Costs of the dipping service in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands, 
1988/89 (Z$, 1990 prices) 
Item Total DVS Annual cost %direct %total 
budget per animal costs costs 
Z$'000 Z$ 
Dipping chemicals 6901 1.77 42.2 28.2 
Wages, bonus and cycle allowance of dip 
attendants 3730 0.96 22.8 15.2 
Wages of water carriers 2792 0.72 17.1 11.4 
Water cart allowances 61 0.02 0.4 0.2 
Repair and maintenace of dip tanks 1717 0.44 10.5 7.0 
Construction of new dip tanks 385 0.10 2.4 1.6 
Dip tank record books and supplies 132 0.03 0.8 0.5 
Protective clothing for dip attendants, 
water carriers 507 0.13 3.1 2.1 
Water pumps 109 0.03 0.7 0.4 
Sub-total of direct costs 16 334 4.19 100.0 66.7 
Overhead costst 8155 2.09 33.3 
TOTAL OF DIRECT AND OVERHEAD COSTS 24 489 6.28 100.0 
Source Based on data presented in Perry et al. (1990) with adjustment to 1990 prices using the Consumer Price Index. 
tThe overhead costs include the costs of Headquarters, Provincial and District level staff and 
their transport, with provision for support facilities, equipment, training and research. This sum 
was an estimate based on the overall size and structure of the DVS annual budget. 
*The present author participated in the study, on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe. 
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As a follow-up to the study by Perry et al. (1990), the DVS circulated a 
questionnaire (designed and evaluated by the present author) to all 2450 dip 
tanks in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands, to seek more detailed information on 
current dipping practi ces and problems. Preliminary analysis of approxi-
mately 850 questionnaires revealed that dipping frequency varied greatly 
throughout the country. A significant number of dip tanks were used less than 
ten times per year. Most were used between 17 and 25 times. 
On average, weighted according to the number of cattle at each centre, 
dip tanks operated on 20.7 occasions in 1989. The average turnout was 82% 
of the cattle census, so the average number of treatments was 17 for the 
communal herd as a whole. This is well below the recommended treatment 
frequency for either dixathion or amitraz. 
Field staff gave various reasons for low dipping frequency. In many cases, 
there was lack of water for replenishment of dipwash. Commonly, the bore-
hole close to the dip tank dried up for part of the year. In other cases, water 
pumps had broken down or there were staffing problems. The point to note 
is that even in Zimbabwe, considered to have one of the best-run veterinary 
services in Africa, it is difficult to maintain rural cattle dipping programmes 
at planned levels. This must be anticipated in planning to use such infrastruc-
ture for routine tsetse control. 
Estimating the indirect costs of fully intensive dipping 
The above historic cost data do not fully reflect the capital cost of establish-
ing the dip tanks, and may underestimate the full costs of running them prop-
erly, since the dipping service is not operating at its intended level of activity. 
Table A2.2 Cost model of dipping overheads in Zimbabwe (1990 prices) 
per per per % direct %total 
person dip animal§ cost cost 
Capital recovery for the dip* - 3349 2.09 41.8 37 .3 
Wages and allowances of water carrier 2875 2875 1.80 35.9 32.0 
Wages and allowances of dip attendantt 5176 1294 0.81 16.1 14.4 
Sub-total , direct costs of dip operation 7518 5.01 100.0 89.3 
Cost of inspection teamt 
Wages and allowances of Animal Health Inspector 19 758 395 0.25 4.4 
Wages and allowance of driver: 6120 122 0.08 1.4 
Wages and allowances of field orderly 4800 96 0.06 1.1 
Transpo~ 17 160 343 0.21 3.8 
Total annual cost of dip inspection team 47 838 95 7 0.60 10.7 
TOTAL COST OF DIPPING SERVICE 8475 5.61 100.0 
* Estimated on basis of depreciation over 20 years at 10% interest and annual maintenance 
etimated at 5% of the initial establishment cost, budgeted at Z$20 000. 
t Cost d ivided between four dips. 
t Cost divided between 50 dips. 
Budgeted on basis of approx.imately 1000 km/month required on dip inspections, costed at 
Z$1 .43/km (CMED rate) . 
§ Cost per animal is calculated on the bas is of 1600 animals/dip. This is based on the ratio 
of 3.9 million cattle to approximately 2450 dips in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands. 
Accordingly, the costs of establishing and properly operating a dip were 
estimated, as a basis for the likely costs of tsetse control by dipping with del-
tamethrin (Section 5). The total annual cost of operating each dip tank would 
be Z$8475 per year (Table A2.2). For the national average throughput of 
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1600 head per dip, the full 'cost of delivery' of the dipping service would 
thus be Z$5.30 per head per year, compared with Z$2.42 (for direct cost 
minus chemical) given in Table A2.1. This is a significant cost in relation t~ 
that of the acaricide. 
Estimating the indirect costs of pour-on treatment of cattle at 
inspection races 
Where cattle numbers do not justify establishment of a dip tank, the DVS 
usually has an inspection race with a crush pen. This is used for monthly ani-
mal health inspections and for delivery of vaccinations. The cost of establish-
ing such a race is about Z$500 and there are minimal maintenance costs. No 
permanent staff are employed at each location, although staff time is spent 
on inspection days. No acaricidal treatments are normally given to cattle pre-
sented at inspection races in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands. The cost of the 
inspection team is estimated at 60 cents per animal per year (Table A2.2). 
If acaricides were applied routinely, by pour-on or spray application at 
races, additional manpower would be required. Estimating this to be at a 
similar cost to that of the dip attendant (Table A2.2), the budgetary require-
ment for acaricidal delivery is estimated to total Z$1.50 per animal per year 
(this figure is used in Table 5.1 ). 
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